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I 
 
Abstract 
This thesis presents three empirical studies on household finance. The first study investigates 
the determinants of household financial inclusion and its impact on household consumption in 
China. The second study looks at the extent to which households’ consumption profile changes 
after health shocks in China. The third study estimates the association between financial stress 
and body weight status in nine European countries. All studies are based on micro-level survey 
data. This thesis is inspired by the following phenomena: (1) the development of household 
finance as an emerging and thriving field in literature; (2) the importance of enhancing financial 
inclusion in both developing and developed countries; (3) the rising prevalence of obesity in 
western countries; (4) the global ageing challenge.  
Using the 2013 wave of the China Household Finance Survey, I investigate the 
determinants of financial inclusion in China, focusing on the role played by informal finance. I 
then test the extent to which financial inclusion affects households’ consumption. I find that 
informal financing is positively related to the probability of having formal loans, but negatively 
related to the probability of owning bank accounts and credit cards. After controlling for the 
potential endogeneity of informal finance, only the latter association remains significant. Next, 
I find that financial inclusion is associated with a higher level of household consumption. These 
findings suggest that enhancing financial inclusion in China may play an important role in 
rebalancing the economy towards domestic consumption. 
Using the 2011, 2013 and 2015 waves of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal 
Study, I investigate the extent to which households’ consumption profile changes after health 
shocks. I find that health shocks are significantly associated with increases in out-of-pocket 
medical expenditure, but not with changes in other non-medical expenditures. The increase in 
out-of-pocket medical expenditure after health shocks is higher for urban and poorer residents, 
as well as for individuals living in provinces with a better healthcare system. These findings 
suggest that non-medical consumption is generally insured against health shocks in China.  
Using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe over the period 2004-2015, 
and controlling for the state dependence of body weight as well as individual heterogeneity, I 
find a positive association between financial stress and body weight in Austria, Germany, 
Sweden, Spain, Italy, France and Switzerland. This association is robust to controlling for 
measurement error in self-reported weight in Austria, Germany and Spain, and to using an 
objective measure of financial stress in Germany and Spain only. These findings suggest that 
the association between financial status and body weight is weak. I also find that individuals 
are more likely to respond to self-perceived financial stress than to objective levels of debt. 
Thus, policies aimed at improving citizens’ ability to cope with financial stress and at reducing 
self-perceived financial stress may play a role in tackling the obesity epidemic in EU countries 
such as Germany and Spain. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
As an emerging and thriving field, household finance has gradually gained its own title and 
identity in the past decade (Guiso and Sodini, 2013). This thesis presents three empirical studies 
on household finance. Specifically, the first study investigates the determinants of household 
financial inclusion and its impact on household consumption in China. The second study looks 
at the extent to which households’ consumption profile changes after health shocks in China. 
The third study estimates the association between financial stress and body weight status in 
nine European countries. All studies use micro-level survey data. 
This thesis is inspired by the following phenomena 1 . Firstly, due to the global 
development of the financial sector, households and individuals interact with finance in 
multiple ways: financial services provide them with a range of ways to make and receive 
transfers and payments, to make inter-temporal saving and dissaving arrangements, to obtain 
credit when facing liquidity shortage, and to be insured when facing uncertainty. Financial 
inclusion, defined as the use of formal financial services, is recognised as an important 
contributor to global economic growth (Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013). 
Both developing and developed countries are committed to improve financial inclusion. 
However, the development of financial inclusion is uneven across countries. There exist greater 
accessibility and availability of financial services in developed countries than in developing 
ones. In the developing world, countries like China are endeavouring to stimulate the use of 
financial services including bank loans, whilst in developed countries, household indebtedness 
is gradually becoming a concern for policy makers.  
                                                 
1 The background of this thesis is only briefly mentioned in this chapter. A more detailed presentation of this 
background can be found in each subsequent chapter. This is to avoid being largely repetitive. 
2 
 
Secondly, population ageing, as the consequence of increasing longevity as well as 
decreasing fertility and mortality rates, is becoming a global challenge. A United Nation report 
(United Nations, 2002) has identified this challenge as unprecedented, pervasive, enduring and 
influential. Ageing and health, have attracted great attentions from policy makers and 
academics alike. With the increasing size and percentage of the older population, understanding 
older people’s behaviour and needs, in order to provide them with sufficient support and care, 
has never been so important around the world. However, to ensure healthy ageing, the 
challenges that need to be addressed differ between developing and developed countries. In 
developing countries like China, providing health security at affordable prices is the key to 
facilitate healthy ageing because the proportion of out-of-pocket health expenditure relative to 
the total health expenditure is still very high compared to that of developed countries. In 
developed countries, the prevalence of obesity has posed a serious threat to healthy ageing.  
In this context, I firstly look at the determinants of financial inclusion and its impact on 
consumption in China. This is important considering that developing financial inclusion is one 
of the main national strategies of the Chinese government2. Secondly, in the context of the high 
proportion of out-of-pocket medical expenditure that Chinese residents need to pay, I 
investigate the extent to which Chinese households’ consumption is insured against one of the 
most common uncertainties in older age, namely health shocks. Thirdly, considering that the 
prevalence of indebtedness and obesity has been rising rapidly over the past decades in Europe, 
I test the extent to which financial stress, a consequence of the extensive use of financial 
services, is associated with being obese and/or overweight in nine European Union (EU) 
                                                 
2 The National Plan of Promoting Financial Inclusion can be found: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-
01/15/content_10602.htm 
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counties. The findings presented in this thesis will provide empirical evidence for the merits of 
developing household finance and insights on healthy ageing.  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Section 1.1 of this chapter presents 
the outline of each study. The contributions of this thesis are discussed in Section 1.2. Three 
empirical studies are presented in Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Four, respectively. 
Chapter Five concludes the thesis.  
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1.1. Thesis outline  
In Chapter Two, I empirically investigate the determinants of financial inclusion in China. I 
further test the extent to which financial inclusion is associated with a higher level of household 
consumption. Financial inclusion in this study is defined in four ways: having a bank account, 
having a credit card or using a credit card when purchasing goods, having a bank loan, and 
using either one of the three above-mentioned financial services. It is worth mentioning that I 
exclude those who express having no need of using these financial services from all analyses 
due to the clear distinctions between voluntary and involuntary financial exclusions. From the 
policy makers’ perspective, voluntary exclusions are not problematic because they are driven 
by lack of demand rather than lack of access (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008).  
In developing countries like China, informal finance which is defined as credit from 
family members and/or friends, is especially prevalent compared to developed countries, where 
bank credit is the main borrowing source (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). I thus investigate 
whether informal finance affects households’ ability to obtaining formal financial services. 
Using the 2013 wave of the China Household Finance Survey which contains detailed 
information on 28,100 Chinese households’ income, assets, debts, as well as their social and 
demographic characteristics, I estimate a set of probit specifications with each financial 
inclusion indicator, in turn, acting as the dependent variable. Conditioning on households’ 
characteristics such as the household head’s age, gender, education level, job and marital status, 
financial literacy and risk attitude, as well as household income, net wealth, household size, 
home ownership and residential region, I find that informal finance is a substitute to formal 
financial services such as bank accounts, credit cards, as well as bank loans. Other positive 
determinants of financial inclusion include having a younger household head, having a higher 
education level, being married, having higher income and net wealth, being a Communist Party 
 5 
 
member, being less risk averse and having better financial literacy. These findings are robust to 
instrumenting the potentially endogenous variable possession of informal loans using whether 
or not the household head and his/her spouse have siblings as an instrument. Furthermore, based 
on results from a set of ordinary least square (OLS) estimations, I find that financial inclusion 
indicators are associated with a higher household consumption. This finding confirms that 
developing financial inclusion may be a valid tool for boosting domestic consumption in China, 
which is one of the priorities established by the Chinese government.  
In Chapter Three, I investigate the extent to which Chinese households’ consumption is 
affected by health shocks. Although China has achieved a universal coverage of public health 
insurance schemes in 2011, there has been a debate over the efficiency of these schemes. The 
schemes significantly reduce household out-of-pocket medical expenditure, but the reduction 
is uneven across regions and between groups with higher and lower income/wealth (Zhang et 
al., 2017). In this context, the second study investigates the extent to which households’ 
consumption profile changes after health shocks using data taken from the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study covering year 2011 to 2015. I focus on individuals aged 45 and 
over because population ageing is recognised as a great challenge in China and older individuals 
are more prone to health risks than the younger cohorts. Following the literature, I define health 
shocks as the onset of severe medical conditions, the onset of moderate medical conditions, as 
well as a large deterioration of mobility. Based on a set of random-effects estimations as well 
as propensity score matching techniques, I find that health shocks are associated with an 8.1 to 
19.1 percent increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditure. The magnitude of this association 
depends on the health shock indicator and model specification. In addition, the increase in out-
of-pocket expenditure is higher for urban residents, poor respondents, as well as residents living 
in provinces with a better healthcare system. In addition, I find that households’ expenditure on 
 6 
 
non-medical items remains unchanged following health shocks, for all groups. This suggests 
that Chinese households’ non-medical consumption is insured against health shocks.  
In Chapter Four, I empirically test the extent to which financial stress is associated with 
a higher likelihood of being obese/overweight in nine EU countries3, taking into account the 
state dependence of body weight as well as individual heterogeneity. Again, I focus on older 
individuals because of the global population ageing concern. By applying a dynamic analysis 
framework to data from waves one to six of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in 
Europe (covering the period 2004 - 2015), I find that the association between financial stress 
and being obese/overweight only exists in some countries and this association is small in 
magnitude. I also find that the association is higher and more significant when financial stress 
is measured subjectively than objectively. This finding indicates that individuals’ self-
perception of bearing debts is more likely to affect their body weight compared to the actual 
amount of debts they bear. This finding also suggests that providing financially stressed 
individuals with financial management training aimed at increasing their self-perceived 
capability and confidence of dealing with financial hardships may have impact on reducing 
obesity/overweight in European countries such as Germany and Spain.  
                                                 
3 They are Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland and Belgium. Sample selection 
criteria are discussed in Section 4.3, Chapter Four. 
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1.2. Contributions to the literature 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the existing literature. In Chapter Two, I test 
for the first time in literature the intertwined relationship between formal and informal finance, 
at the household level in China. Most studies on this topic, such as Allen et al. (2018), Guariglia 
et al. (2011) and Zhang (2008), have investigated the relationship between formal and informal 
finance at the firm-level. Cull et al. (2015a) has studied the dual existence of formal and 
informal finance at the household level in China, but the association between them is not 
discussed in their paper. In addition, for the first time, the voluntary exclusion issue, whereby 
individuals voluntarily choose to be excluded from financial services because they do not need 
them, is taken into account. Given the extensive use of informal finance in China, understanding 
the relationship between formal and informal finance helps promote financial inclusion and 
achieve the goal of boosting domestic consumption.  
In Chapter Three, I investigate the extent to which both objectively and subjectively 
measured health shocks affect Chinese older people’s consumption. In the literature, only a few 
studies on this topic have focused on older people in China and none of them has measured 
health shocks in multiple ways. In addition, the dataset used in this study is very recent. Since 
the universal coverage of public health insurance was just achieved recently, there lacks 
research on analysing households’ consumption profile following health shocks after public 
health insurance was made universally available in China. Thus, a timely investigation on this 
topic is of great importance. My findings will provide insights on addressing the healthy ageing 
issue in China.  
In Chapter Four, I conduct a comparative study across nine EU countries on the extent to 
which financial stress is associated with higher body weight. To the best of my knowledge, 
 8 
 
none of the existing studies analyse the finance-health nexus in a country-specific comparison 
setting. Additionally, the majority of existing studies on the finance-health link focus on mental 
health outcomes. This chapter thus contributes to the literature by estimating the association 
between financial stress and body weight. Furthermore, among studies looking at the finance-
weight link, this study is the first to take into account the persistence of body weight, as well as 
initial conditions. In the context of increasing prevalence of obesity/overweight and household 
indebtedness in Europe, this work sheds new light on understanding the epidemic of obesity in 
European countries. 
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Chapter Two: Financial Inclusion, Informal Finance, and Consumption: An Empirical 
Investigation on Chinese  
2.1. Introduction 
Financial inclusion, generally defined as the use of financial services, has been considered as 
an important determinant of global economic growth (Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2013) 4 . Hence, governments in both developed and developing countries are 
endeavoring to ensure a high level of financial inclusion. In 2010, the leaders of G20 countries 
launched the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (known as the GPFI), aiming at 
enhancing financial inclusion in each member country. At the same time, the World Bank and 
the United Nations also recognised the importance of financial inclusion, to the point at which 
developing financial inclusion has been added to their agenda. By 2013, over 50 countries had 
made commitments to improving financial inclusion, and hopefully a universal access to basic 
financial services will be reached by 2020 (The World Bank, 2013). Moreover, the Chinese 
government has issued the Development Plan for Promoting Financial Inclusion (2016-2020) 
which indicates that developing domestic financial inclusion has become one of the main 
national strategies in China (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Under such 
circumstances, understanding the determinants of financial inclusion and its impact on the 
economy has become urgent for policy makers and scholars alike. 
Amongst all emerging countries, China stands out as a special case. According to the 
World Bank Global Findex Database (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), a representative 
cross-country database on financial inclusion, the latter can be measured along three dimensions, 
                                                 
4 The mechanism behind this is discussed in the Section 2.3.1. 
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namely the ownership of an account at a formal financial institution (formal account), savings 
at a formal financial institution (formal saving) and the use of bank credit (formal credit). 
According to the Findex Database, in 2014, 79 percent of the surveyed Chinese adults had an 
account at formal financial institutions. This figure is much higher than the world average (61 
percent). It is also higher than that of some other BRIC countries (68 percent of Brazilian adults, 
67 percent of Russian adults, 53 percent of Indian adults, and 70 percent of South African adults 
are reported having a formal account). As for formal saving, 41 percent of the surveyed Chinese 
individuals had saved at formal financial institutions in the past year. The figure for other BRIC 
countries ranges from 12 percent (South Africa) to 33 percent (India). The formal saving figure 
in China is also much higher than the world average (22 percent). Hence, in terms of both formal 
account and formal saving, it seems that China has an extremely high financial inclusion level. 
The two percentages are even more impressive considering that China’s GDP per capita only 
ranked 3rd place among all BRIC countries in 20145. However, when it comes to the formal 
credit, China does not rank as well: Less than 9 percent of Chinese individuals surveyed in the 
2014 wave of Findex obtained credit from formal financial institutions during the last 12 months, 
and only 16 percent of Chinese individuals reported having a credit card.  
It is surprising that Chinese households have such a high level of bank account ownership 
and savings, but a very low level of formal credit attainment. It is therefore interesting to look 
at the determinants of specific measures of financial inclusion in the Chinese context. Moreover, 
as the growth of the Chinese economy has been mainly driven by exports and government 
investments in the past, promoting financial inclusion is regarded as a valid tool of boosting 
domestic consumption and stimulating the economy. This paper will therefore aim at answering 
                                                 
5 In 2014, the GDP per capital of each of the BRIC countries was as follows: Russia, 13,902 USD; Brazil, 11,729 
USD; South Africa, 6,472 USD; China, 7,587 USD; India 1,577 USD. This data is taken from the World Bank 
Database.  
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the following questions: What determines various components of financial inclusion in China? 
In addition, would an enhancement of financial inclusion in China be useful in order to boost 
domestic consumption, achieving one of the key current objectives of Chinese policy makers?  
Probably due to limitations in data availability, only a few papers have looked at financial 
inclusion in China. Among these, Fungáčová and Weill (2015) find that higher income, better 
education, being male, and being older are positively related to financial inclusion. These results 
are generally consistent with the findings obtained in cross-country studies (Beck and Brown, 
2011, Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013). Apart from the widely recognized 
factors, Cull et al. (2016) find that political connections positively affect households’ access to 
formal finance in rural areas but not in urban areas, and a larger social network is positively 
associated with access to informal finance. Li et al. (2016) analyse both the demand and supply 
of bank credit and find that political connections (i.e. whether or not the household head is a 
member of political party) contribute to a higher credit demand, as well as a higher likelihood 
of being granted credit by banks in China.  
This work makes the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, motivated by the 
facts that informal financing has been found to play an important role in boosting growth in the 
private sector in China (Allen et al., 2018, Cull et al., 2015a, Guariglia et al., 2011, Zhang, 
2008) and formal financiers take into account small entrepreneurs’ ability to raise informal 
finance when making lending decisions (Degryse et al., 2016), I investigate the links between 
informal financing and several dimensions of financial inclusion at the household level. 
Specifically, I proxy financial inclusion through bank accounts and credit cards ownership, 
having obtained formal loans, and through a composite index which denotes the possession of 
at least one of the three above mentioned indicators. To the best of my knowledge, this issue 
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has been investigated in very few studies (Fungáčová and Weill, 2015, Cull et al., 2015a, Sui 
and Niu, 2018) and none of them has looked at the intertwined relationship between having 
informal and formal finance. Secondly, for the first time in the literature, I test whether a high 
level of financial inclusion may contribute to an increase in household consumption. Thirdly, 
this study is the first to take into account “voluntary exclusions”, whereby households may not 
use certain financial services simply because they do not need them and are therefore 
voluntarily excluded from financial markets.  
Based on a set of specifications estimated with linear probability models (LPM), Probit 
and OLS specifications, I firstly find that having informal loans is positively associated with 
the formal credit indicator of financial inclusion, but negatively associated with ownership of 
bank accounts and credit cards. This result is consistent with Allen et al. (2018) who find both 
complementarity and substitution effects between informal and formal financing at the firm-
level in China. Additionally, I observe that, with the exception of credit card holding, the links 
between informal finance and financial inclusion tend to be larger and/or more prevalent for 
rural households. After controlling for the potential endogeneity of households having informal 
finance, the positive association between household’s informal and formal loans becomes 
insignificant but the negative association between informal finance and other financial services 
remains significant. I also find that, in line with other studies on financial inclusion in China 
and other countries (Beck and Brown, 2011, Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 
2013, Cull et al., 2015a), households with younger and better educated heads, higher income, 
lower risk aversion, and larger family size are more likely to exhibit higher financial inclusion. 
Finally, I find that financial inclusion is generally associated with a higher level of consumption. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief 
introduction of the characteristics of the Chinese economy. Section 2.3 reviews the literature 
on financial inclusion and financial constraints (which can be seen as a form of financial 
exclusion) at the household level. Section 2.4 develops the main hypotheses. Section 2.5 
presents the data and summary statistics. Section 2.6 illustrates the baseline specifications and 
estimation methodology. Section 2.7 describes the empirical results. Section 2.8 addresses the 
issue of endogeneity and Section 2.9 concludes.  
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2.2. The Chinese economy 
2.2.1. The unbalanced economy: low domestic consumption and high saving rates 
Consumption, along with export and investment, is one of the main engines of economic growth 
for a country. A healthy economy is characterised by a good balance between these three 
components of GDP. However, the Chinese economy is far from balanced. Over the last decade, 
the share of consumption dwindled, while the share of investment kept rising. In 2013, the share 
of investment in China’s GDP reached 50 percent, much higher than the 22 percent world 
average and the 19 percent average of advanced economies6. Over-investment results in a 
concern of overcapacity in the industrial sector7. 
By contrast, the share of private consumption to GDP has been decreasing in recent years 
(Orlik and Chen, 2015). This share was 61 percent in 1990 and 58 percent in 1998 (Zhang and 
Wan, 2004). Yet, in 2013, it was only 38 percent. China’s share of consumption to GDP stands 
as an outlier compared to other countries (see Figure 2.1). This evidence suggests that the 
Chinese economy needs to be rebalanced, which is a concern for policy makers.  
On March 5th 2016, Li Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of the PRC delivered 
the Report on the Work of the Government at the Fourth Session of the 12th National People's 
Congress of the PRC (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2016). In this Report, 
strengthening the role of consumption in promoting economic growth has been emphasized 
again as one of the major areas of work for the Chinese government. In fact, promoting 
                                                 
6 This data is taken from Bloomberg. 
7 For instance, with reference to the construction industry, some cities in China contain massive amounts of unsold 
properties, which transform them into “ghost towns” (Orlik and Chen, 2015).  
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consumption and rebalancing the economy have been added to the annual government work 
plan since 2008. 
The low domestic consumption in China goes hand in hand with a massive saving ratio. 
Even under the environment of worldwide recession, in recent years, China’s saving ratio has 
kept rising. At the national level, China’s gross saving rate has been at around 50 percent for a 
decade.8 This figure is at least twice as large as that of OECD countries. At the household level, 
Chinese households save a large proportion of their disposable income indicating that their 
behaviour is highly inconsistent with the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) where households 
dissaving in later life is predicted. This is referred to as the “Chinese saving puzzle” (Modigliani 
and Cao, 2004). In 2013, the average household saving rate in China was 38 percent, 
dramatically higher than that of OCED countries9.  
Several reasons have been proposed for the high saving ratio characterising China. 
Among these, the precautionary reason is a leading one. Before the reform, all workers were 
guaranteed permanent employment by the state sector, together with housing, coverage of all 
medical and educational expenses, as well as pensions. This was known as the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
(He et al., 2018). After the reform, which led to the privatisation of the economy, all these 
benefits were lost and people’s jobs became much more uncertain. According to He et al. 
(2018), this uncertainty led to a rise in precautionary savings, which can explain 30 percent of 
the rise in savings over the period 1995-2002. Precautionary saving in China is magnified by 
the fact that people find it difficult to borrow via financial markets. Hence, saving is a 
convenient instrument to ensure they can sustain their current consumption level in the presence 
                                                 
8 These data are taken from the World Development Indicator, the World Bank Data Library.  
9 These data come from OECD (2016), Household savings (indicator). doi: 10.1787/cfc6f499-en (Accessed on 
26 May 2016). 
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of negative income shocks. Several other explanations have been put forward to explain the 
high and rising saving ratio in China. Among these, Feng et al. (2011) focus on the weaknesses 
of the pension system; Wang and Wen (2012), on the rising house prices; Barnett and Brooks 
(2010), on the increasing health and education expenditures; Meng (2003) and He et al. (2018), 
on the rising unemployment risks; Wei and Zhang (2011) on the increasing sex ratios; and Zhu 
et al. (2014), on the declining number of children that followed the introduction of the one child 
policy. Under these circumstances, promoting financial inclusion could help enhancing 
domestic consumption, as it would reduce the need to save for precautionary reasons. This is 
certainly one of the reasons why policy makers in China are paying increasing attention to 
financial inclusion.  
2.2.2. Informal financing and co-funding in China 
As in other countries with underdeveloped formal financial markets, both Chinese enterprises’ 
and individuals’ financial decisions make heavy use of informal financing. Informal financing 
in general is loosely defined as all finance sources provided by agents different from banks and 
other formal financial institutions.  
According to Tsai (2004b), those sources include trade credit, borrowing from families 
or friends, private money houses, pawnshops and others. Although the exact amount of informal 
financing is difficult to calculate, as some of it may involve illegal activities, a conservative 
estimation shows that informal financing in China accounts for at least one quarter of all 
financial transactions (Tsai, 2004a). Allen et al. (2005) suggest that informal financing plays a 
crucial role in supporting the growth of private firms and consequently boosting economic 
growth. Allen et al. (2018) argue that when the banking industry is more developed, the effect 
of informal financing on firm growth diminishes. Addtionally, their results show that informal 
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financing is more prevalent in cities where firms have more access to bank credit, siggesting 
that the two forms of finance are complements. Firms thus rely on both channels in order to 
finance their activities, which is referred to as co-funding (Zhang, 2008, Degryse et al., 2016). 
Cull et al. (2015a) argue that co-funding is also common for Chinese households. Those who 
have access to formal finance also hold informal finance. In their sample which was taken from 
the 2013 wave of China Household of Finance Survey, 48.3 percent of Chinese households 
have some loans, but only 16.2 percent of them have bank loans while 40.9 percent have 
borrowed from informal sources. This indicates that Chinese households use both formal and 
informal financing, and are more likely to borrow from informal sources.  
Compared to bank credit, informal financing is easier to obtain since it is typically based 
on reputation or trust without any collateral requirements. The cost of informal financing 
depends on the sources: lending from family or friends is normally with no or low interest, 
while lending from private money lenders involves very high interest rates. Allen et al. (2018) 
show that 6.7 percent of the new investment and 7.9 percent of the working capital of the firms 
in their sample comes from trade credits and loans from families or friends. However, as firms’ 
activities usually involve a considerable amount of investment, loans from family or friends are 
unlikely to be sufficient. 
By contrast, the percentage of households relying on informal sources from families or 
friends is generally much higher than that of firms. Turvey and Kong (2010) document that 52 
percent of all Chinese rural household’s borrowing comes from family members and/or friends. 
Similarly, based on the 2011 CHFS, 25.5 percent of the Chinese households have at least one 
informal loan (whilst less than 14.2 percent of them have a formal bank loan), and over 90 
percent of the informal loans is from family members and friends. Households seem therefore 
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to make a much larger use of informal financing than firms. It is therefore particularly 
interesting to look at links between formal and informal financing for Chinese households.  
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2.3. Literature review  
2.3.1. Merits of an inclusive financial system  
The finance-growth nexus has been widely discussed in the literature. A number of theoretical 
and empirical studies have found a positive link between financial development and growth 
(Beck et al., 2007b, Bruhn and Love, 2014, Goldsmith, 1969, Honohan, 2004, Levine, 1997). 
Goldsmith (1969) is the first well-known work in this field. Using data on 35 countries from 
1860 to 1963, he finds that rapid economic growth is always accompanied by an above-average 
rate of financial development. Levine (1997) reviews a large number of papers and concludes 
that there is a strong and positive link between financial development and economic growth, as 
financial development facilitates trading, diversifies risks, helps to better allocate resources, 
mobilizes savings and facilitates the exchange of goods and services. Beck et al. (2007a) 
confirms the positive linkage between financial development and economic growth. 
Additionally, they find that financial development also has the additional effect of reducing 
inequality and poverty by boosting the aggregate income growth of the poor. Their findings are 
consistent with Honohan (2004), who find that financial development fosters sustainable 
economic growth.  
Using provincial data from China over the period 1989-2003, Guariglia and Poncet 
(2008) examine the effects of a set of indicators of financial development on different proxies 
of economic growth. They find that the indicators measuring the degree of market-driven 
financing helps promote gross domestic product (GDP) and total foctor productivity (TFP) 
growth, as well as capital accumulation, while other indicators measuring the level of state 
interventionism in finance are generally negatively related to economic growth. Their findings 
suggest that financial distortions place obstacles on economic growth. Using data from 286 
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cities over the period 2001-2006, Zhang et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between 
various measurements of financial development and economic growth after controlling for 
other factors that may affact economic growth.  
The above mentioned strong relationship between financial development and economic 
growth has convinced policy makers and researchers of the benefits of promoting financial 
inclusion. It is in fact widely recongised that an inclusive financial system contributes to a 
deeper and broader development of the financial sector and consequently to higher economic 
growth. Intuitively, with better access to financial services, individuals are able to allocate their 
assets in a more efficient way and firms, especially small enterprises, are able to grasp any 
promising growth opportunities (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013).  
Apart from its impact on economic growth, an inclusive financial system also contributes 
to mitigating persistent income inequality and poverty. Honohan (2008) observes a positive 
correlation between financial inclusion and gross national income (GNI) per capita in 160 
countries. Based on an experiment in rural India, Burgess and Pande (2005) find evidence that 
the state-led expansion of bank branches in unbanked areas significantly increases credit and 
continuously reduces povery. Bruhn and Love (2014) take advantage of the fact that over 800 
bank branches opened in 2002 in Mexico. Treating this fact as a natural experiment, they find 
robust evidence on the positive impact of the improved access to financial services on poverty 
reduction. Similar results are found in Brune et al. (2011) who focus on rural Malawi, and Allen 
et al. (2013), who investigate the Kenyan context. 
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2.3.2. Measurements of financial inclusion and its determinants  
Due to the importance of financial inclusion, an increasing number of studies has been focusing 
on its measurement and determinants. There is much less consensus on the former than the 
latter. Literature on the measurement of financial inclusion can be roughly divided into two 
parts. 
The first stream includes Honohan (2008), Allen et al. (2012), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper (2012, 2013) and Fungáčová and Weill (2015). These authors consider direct indicators 
of financial inclusion such as the use of formal accounts, saving behaviour, and the availability 
of credit. Specifically, Honohan (2008) uses the percentage of households having accounts at 
formal financial intermediaties within one country as an indicator of this country’s financial 
inclusion level. Allen et al. (2012) use the ownership of a bank account, the usage of the account 
to save, and the frequency of using this account as indicators of both country- and individual-
level financial inclusion. In addition to the use and ownership of a bank account, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Klapper (2012, 2013) and Fungáčová and Weill (2015) also use formal saving and 
formal credit as indicators. Being based on multiple indicators, their approach presents a 
relatively more comprehensive picture of financial inclusion. However, the pitfall of using 
multiple indicators is that different indicators may behave differently. Thus, the evaluation of 
the overall financial inclusion level amongst countries or within a country becomes arbitrary 
and misleading as the ranking would highly depend on the indicator chosen.  
The second stream of literature includes Sarma (2008), Mialou et al. (2017), and Park and 
Mercado (2015). These authors compute a composite financial inclusion index (FI index). By 
combining various information on penetration, availability, and usage of formal financial 
services, they calculate a composite index presenting the level of financial inclusion for each 
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country. Specifically, Sarma (2008) measures a FI index as the normalized distance from the 
ideal value (full financial inclusion) to the actual value in a n-dimensional space where each 
financial inclusion dimension denotes one axis in this space. He uses the number of bank 
accounts per 1,000 adults, the number of bank branches per 100,000 adults, domestic credit (as 
percent of GDP) and domestic deposits (as percent of GDP) as four dimensions of financial 
inclusion. He then standardizes each dimension of the index, so that the maximum value of each 
dimension is 1 and the minimum value is 0. In the four-dimensional space, the ideal value (full 
financial inclusion) is thus the point I=(1,1,1,1), presenting the achievement in all dimensions. 
The financial inclusion index is calculated as the normalized inverse of the distance from each 
country’s actual situation (the actual point in the space) to the ideal value. Normalization 
ensures the value of the FI index is between 0 and 1, and taking the inverse makes sure that 
higher values of the FI index represent higher financial inclusion. This method is closely 
followed by Park and Mercado (2015). Based on four dimensions of financial inclusion, namely 
the number of ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers, the number of branches of other depository 
corporations (ODCs) per 1,000 square kilometers,10 the total number of resident household 
depositors with ODCs per 1,000 adults, and the total number of resident household borrowers 
with ODCs per 1,000 adults, Mialou et al. (2017) take advantage of the factor analysis (FA) 
method in order to reduce the dimensions of financial inclusion and obtain a single index for 
each country in their sample.  
The rankings based on the calculated financial inclusion scores from all methods 
mentioned above are very similar. In particular, developed countries’ financial inclusion is 
                                                 
10 According to Mialou et al. (2017, p.9): “The ODC sector includes commercial banks, credit unions, saving and 
credit cooperatives, deposit taking microfinance (MFIs), and other deposit takers (savings and loan associations, 
building societies, rural banks and agricultural banks, post office giro institutions, post office savings banks, 
savings banks, and money market funds)”.  
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significantly higher than that of developing countries and wealthier countries are generally 
associated with higher financial inclusion. Compared to multi-indicators of financial inclusion, 
indices provide a more convenient way to compare financial inclusion across countries. 
However, one problem with the use of a composite index of financial inclusion is that the 
weights chosen for each component in the index could be arbitray. Countries ranked higher in 
dimensions with higher weights are more likely to obtain a higher FI index.  
As for determinants of financial inclusion, findings in the literature are fairly consistent. 
At the country level, wealthier countries are associated with higher financial inclusion 
(Honohan, 2008, Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2013, Mialou et al., 2017, Park and Mercado, 2015, Sarma, 2008). The sharp 
disparities in financial inclusion between developed and developing economies appear no 
matter what indicator is used. At the individual level, being male, better educated, wealthier 
and/or older are associated with higher financial inclusion (Cull et al., 2015a, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Klapper, 2013, Fungáčová and Weill, 2015). Due to recent developments in detailed micro-
level datasets, financial literacy is also found associated with higher financial inclusion (Cull et 
al., 2015a, Sui and Niu, 2018).  
2.3.3. Liquidity constraints 
Pirior to the widespread recognition of financial inclusion, liquidity constraints have been 
widely studied in the literature. These constraints can be seen as a typical phenomenon of 
financial exclusion. Hall and Mishkin (1980) and Zeldes (1989) observe that around 20 percent 
of U.S. households deviated from their optimal consumption indicated by the standard Life-
Cycle Hypothesis. They attribute this deviation to the existence of liquidity constraints. Later, 
the presence of liquidity constraints in the US has been confirmed by Jappelli and Pagano 
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(1989), Jappelli (1990), Garcia et al. (1997), Engelhardt (1996) and Jappelli et al. (1998). 
Among these, Jappelli (1990) is the first to study the determinants of liquidity constraints at the 
household level. He uses data from the 1983 US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and looks 
into the relationship between consumers’ characteristics and the probability of being excluded 
from bank credit by applying a logit model. He identifies those who have been rejected credit 
by formal financial institutions as financially excluded. The result shows that consumers with 
lower current resources face more liquidity constraints. Being young indicates the lack of a 
credit record which may tighten one’s credit constraints, but it also indicates less demand for 
consumption and higher future labour income compared to consumers in other age groups. 
Thus, the effect of age is ambiguous. 
Inspired by Jappelli (1990), Garcia et al. (1997) also attempt to investigate the 
determinants of being liquidity constrained in the US. Their findings suggest that, in addition 
to income and wealth, other social and demographic variables such as race, sex, and marital 
status also have an impact on determining access to financial services.  
Those studies have shown that in addition to age, income, education, and gender, other 
factors also affect the likelihood of households being included/excluded in/from financial 
services. However, there is little evidence on what such factors might be. This work potentially 
fills this gap and provides a more detailed description of financial inclusion in the Chinese 
context.  
2.3.4. Literature on China  
Although Chinese policy makers have added ‘promoting financial inclusion’ on their agenda, 
little is known about Chinese households’ degree of financial inclusion. Only a small number 
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of studies have focused on micro level evidence on the determinants of financial inclusion in 
China, and none of them takes into account the “voluntary exclusions” issue.  
Using data from the 2011 World Bank Global Findex Database, Fungáčová and Weill 
(2015) provide some information on financial inclusion in China and make some comparisons 
between China and other BRIC countries. They find that the limited financial inclusion in China 
is mainly due to the limited access to formal credit. They argue that, as a consequence of this, 
informal credit from relatives or friends (rather than formal credit from banks) is the main 
financing source for Chinese households. However, due to data limitations, Fungáčová and 
Weill (2015) only look at the role of a limited range of individual characteristics in affecting 
financial inclusion (e.g. age, gender, income and education). Other important potential variables 
such as region of residence, family size, employment status, and marital status are omitted in 
their study.  
Using the 2013 wave of the China Household Finance Survey in 2013, Cull et al. (2015a) 
analyse the links between household characteristics such as wealth, social networks, political 
connections, financial and economic literacy, and access to formal and informal finance. They 
conclude that younger, less educated households with lower income, limited financial 
knowledge, and larger family size are less likely to have access to formal finance and are more 
likely to rely on informal finance. These results suggest that Chinese households face dual credit 
markets.  
Cull et al. (2016) specifically study the link between social capital and access to credit, 
as well as its implications for households’ consumption levels. Based on the 2013 wave of the 
China Household Finance Survey, they define households’ social capital in two ways: private 
social networks and membership to the Communist Party. They document that party affiliation 
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is linked to a higher level of consumption in rural areas, but the positive impact is not resulted 
from a better access to credit markets.  
Using the same dataset, Sui and Niu (2018) study the determinants of household’s 
ownership of bank deposits, risky financial assets and credit cards. They further test the 
differences in financial service usages between urban and rural households. They document the 
existence of both demand side and supply side barriers to financial inclusion in China. On the 
demand side, socioeconomic status (SES) affects households’ access to financial services. 
Being poor and having less education are associated with lower demand for finance. On the 
supply side, in less-developed areas of China, households have less availability and 
accessibility to financial services compared to those living in financial developed areas, leading 
to a low usage of financial services in less developed areas. In addition, Sui and Niu (2018) find 
that improving financial infrastructures may have larger impacts on promoting financial 
inclusion in less-developed areas than in developed areas.  
Also using the 2013 wave of CHFS, Li (2018) studies the importance of relative income 
in determining households’ financial inclusion in China. The author argues that income 
comparisons with peers may increase household debts. In particular, households with low 
income are more likely to apply for bank credit than those with high income due to peer 
comparisons. Among all applicants who obtained bank credits, those with low income increase 
education spending more than the rich. This may indicate a “tunnel effect”, in which the poor 
are inspired by the rich’s economic success and thus invest more in human capital via 
borrowing. The author further documents that if the “tunnel effect” is the main drive of the poor 
applying for bank credits, indebtedness of poor household is less concerning, and developing 
financial inclusion will help the poor improve their socioeconomic situation.  
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Zhang and Wan (2004) show that liquidity constraints are responsible for the decline in 
both the level and growth of consumption over the period 1961-1998. Liquidity constraints and 
uncertainty mutually reinforce each other’s effect, hence accelerating the decline in 
consumption. Due to the presence of binding liquidity constraints, Chinese households cannot 
borrow freely. As a consequence, they may cut down their consumption in the presence of 
uncertainty. However, this study is only conducted at the aggregate level.  
Using data collected by the Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, which covers 1,000 
households from 2003 to 2009, Li et al. (2013) find that 61.5 percent of Chinese rural 
households in their sample are credit rationed, and that this rationing leads to a decrease in 
consumption. Smilarly, using a survey consisting of 743 hosueholds, Li et al. (2016) estimate 
that 54.9 percent of rural households in the Jiangxi Province are credit constrained. They also 
find that households with credit constraints have 7.3 percent less consumption expenditure 
compared to those without. These findings suggest that reducing household’s credit 
constraints/increasing financial inclusion may be a valid tool for boosting China’s domestic 
consumption.  
In conclusion, to the best of my knowledge, only few studies look at the determinants of 
financial inclusion in the Chinese context. Furthermore, none of these studies focus on the 
relationship between informal financing and financial inclusion, and only few of them look at 
links between financial inclusion and household consumption. Finally, none of these studies 
takes into account “voluntary exclusions” from credit markets. This work thus extends the 
existing literature in several dimensions: for the first time in literature, I test whether having 
informal finance facilitates gaining formal finance; I drop households who voluntary exclude 
themselves from financial markets to alleviate the self-selection issue; and I further test the 
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extent to which financial inclusion is associated with household consumption. These findings 
could potentially help Chinese policy makers reach their objectives of promoting financial 
inclusion and stimulating domestic consumption. 
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2.4. Hypotheses 
2.4.1. General hypothesis 
Previous studies, which focus both on firms (Zhang, 2008, Allen et al., 2018, Degryse et al., 
2016, Ayyagari et al., 2010) and households (Cull et al., 2015a), find that informal and formal 
financing co-exist in China. Among these, Allen et al. (2018) argue that informal and formal 
financing can be either complements or substitutes for firms, depending on firms’ 
characteristics, while Ayyagari et al. (2010) question the traditional view of informal finance 
complementing formal finance systems and also contributing to firms’ growth. To the best of 
my knowledge, although informal financing is widely used by Chinese households (Fungáčová 
and Weill, 2015), no paper has tested the interactions between informal and formal financing 
at the household level. Intuitively, informal finance may crowd out households’ needs for 
formal financial services. In other words, it may substitute to formal finance. However, it may 
also serve as collateral, making it easier to obtain longer-term financing such as bank loans, 
which would lead to a complementarity between the two sources of finance. In line with this 
argument, Degryse et al. (2016) find that, in the Chinese context, formal financiers take into 
account small entrepreneurs’ ability to raise informal finance when making lending decisions.I 
therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Informal financing may serve as a complement to long-term financial services such as bank 
loans, but as a substitute to other financial services.  
2.4.2. Hypothesis on the effect of financial inclusion on households’ consumption 
As China is experiencing a slow-down in exports as a consequence of the recent financial crisis, 
and an overheating of the economy due to excessively high investment, it is important for the 
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economy to be rebalanced through an increase in domestic consumption. This can be achieved 
by increasing domestic consumption and/or reducing the high saving rates that characterises 
the Chinese economy (Meng, 2003, Barnett and Brooks, 2010, Wei and Zhang, 2011, Wang 
and Wen, 2012).  
The very high saving rate/low domestic consumption characterizing Chinese households 
could be due to a low level of financial inclusion. If this were the case, policies aimed at 
boosting domestic consumption should enhance financial inclusion. In order to see whether or 
not this is the case, I test the following hypothesis:  
H2: Financial inclusion is positively associated with household consumption.  
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2.5. Data and summary statistics 
2.5.1. The China Household Finance Survey  
This work largely relies on the 2013 wave of the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), 
one of the most representative and highest quality micro-level datasets in China. The dataset is 
published by the Survey and Research Centre of China Household Finance at the Southwestern 
University of Finance and Economics. It surveys 28,100 households from 29 Chinese 
provinces/municipalities and contains detailed information on their income, assets, debt, and 
expenditure as well as their social and demographic characteristics. The baseline survey is 
conducted in 2011 with only 8,438 households being interviewed. In addition, the 2011 wave 
lacks important information needed for my analyses, such as household heads’ financial 
literacy. To reduce the concern for outliers with extreme high or low household income and 
wealth, I drop observations with income/wealth lower than the 1st percentile or higher than the 
99th percentile of the income/wealth distribution.  
2.5.2. Indicators of financial inclusion  
I use four indicators as proxies for financial inclusion, namely the ownership of bank accounts 
(Account), the ownership of credit cards (Credit), the possession of bank loans (Floan) and 
having either one of the three above-mentioning financial services (Inclusion).  
In the CHFS questionnaire, each respondent is asked the following sets of questions. The 
first relates to credit cards and are formulated as follows: “Does your family have a credit card? 
Inactive credit cards are not included.” and “When you and your family shop, what is your 
typical method of payment?” Those who answer “yes” to the former question and “credit cards” 
in the latter question are identified as having a credit card. For these respondents, the Credit 
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dummy equals one. For those who answered “No” to the former question or answered using 
other methods of payment when shopping in the latter question, the Credit dummy equals zero.  
The second set of questions relates to formal bank loans and read: “Do you currently have 
any loans for your industrial/commercial activities?”, “Currently, has your family borrowed 
money to purchase, improve, remodel, or expand your home?”, “Did your family take bank 
loans to buy your cars?” and “Have any family members taken out student bank loans?” Those 
who answer “yes” in at least one of these questions are identified as having a formal bank loan. 
The Floan dummy will therefore take value one for these respondents otherwise it equals zero.  
The third set of questions relates to bank accounts: “Does your family currently have RMB 
denominated checking accounts?” and “Does your family currently have outstanding RMB time 
deposits?” Those who answer “yes” to at least one of the above questions are identified as 
having a bank account. For these respondents, the Account dummy equals one otherwise it 
equals zero. 
Furthermore, I generate a combined indicator of overall financial inclusion based on the 
three individual indicators mentioned above (Inclusion). Inclusion equals one if the household 
possesses at least one of the three financial instruments discussed above (i.e. bank account, 
credit card, or formal loan), and zero otherwise.  
These indicators can be justfied as follows. Evidence found in the Global Findex Database 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012) suggests that financial exclusion in China is mainly due 
to the lack of formal credit. This evidence is confirmed by Fungáčová and Weill (2015). I 
therefore construct two indicators to proxy for financial inclusion in formal credit markets: the 
ownership of a credit card (Credit) and having obtained loans from formal financial institutions 
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(Floan). Data reported in the Global Findex Database 2011 reveal that only 7 percent and 8 
percent of Chinese adults have a credit card and a formal loan respectively. The Floan indicator 
is consistent with similar indicators used in Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012, 2013). The 
Credit indicator, on the other hand, which represents the ownership of a credit card, has not yet 
been used in the literature.11 Additionally, I also use a third indicator, Account, which measures 
the ownership of a formal bank account and has been widely used in studies on financial 
inclusion (Allen et al., 2012, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012, Fungáčová and Weill, 2015). 
Finally, I construct the indicator Inclusion to measure the possession of either one of the three 
above-mentioning formal financial services.  
2.5.3. Use of informal finance  
My primary research interest is distangling the relationship between informal and formal 
finance at the household level in China. In paticular, I want to test the extent to which informal 
finance is used as an alternative to formal finance, in the absence of a well-developed financial 
market. Following Cull et al. (2015a), I construct a dummy variable “Infloan” which is equal 
to one if the household currently has at least one loan from friends, relatives, co-workers, or 
other non-banking financial institutions, and zero other wise. In the CHFS, respondents are 
asked whether they make use of informal loans to finance households’ business or agricultural 
projects, purchases or refurbishments of houses/flats, purchases of vehicles, and education or 
training programmes. These items are consistent with the ones used for constructing floan. It is 
also worth mentioning that, according to the CHFS data, more than 80 percent of the informal 
loans are obtained from family members or friends with no collateral required and no interest 
                                                 
11 The percentage of adults having a credit card is reported in the World Bank Global Findex Database. However, 
the determinants of having a credit card have not been studied.  
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charged. Moreover, 79 percent of those who have at least one informal loan borrow because of 
housing-related events.  
2.5.4. Other control variables  
Following Cull et al. (2015a) and Fungáčová and Weill (2015), the control variables include 
household heads’ age, education level, work and marital status, household income and net 
wealth, household size, and home ownership. In the context of China, I also include an indicator 
for political access (party). This is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the household 
head is a communist party member. Guariglia and Mateut (2016) find evidence for political 
affiliation contributing to alleviating financial contraints in Chinese firms. Similarly, Cull et al. 
(2015b) find that firms with non-government-appointed CEOs face higher financial contraints. 
It is thus reasonable to assume that households whose heads are members of the ruling party 
may have better access to formal financial services in China. This is later confirmed in Cull et 
al. (2016).  
Similar to Cull et al. (2015a) and Sui and Niu (2018), I also control for the level of 
financial literacy of household heads. In the 2013 wave of the CHFS, there are three questions 
relating to respondents’ basic financial literacy. These questions test the respondents’ basic 
financial knowledge regarding interest rates, inflation and portfolio risk management. I 
construct a variable grade which takes a value between zero (if the respondent answers no 
question correctly) to three (if the respondent answers all questions correctly). This represents 
the household’s financial literacy level. In addition, I include a variable risk_averse based on 
respondents’ answer to the question “Do you prefer receiving 4,000 RMB for sure to receiving 
10,000 RMB with 50 percent probability?” to reflect household heads’ risk attitude. Those who 
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prefer receiving 4,000 RMB are identified as risk averse heads. In this case, the dummy 
risk_averse equals to one, otherwise it equals zero.  
2.5.5. Measurements of household consumption 
After studying the determinants of financial inclusion in China, I further test the possible impact 
of financial inclusion on Chinese households’ consumption. To this end, I calculate household 
total non-durable consumption. The items included in non-durable consumption are the 
following: expenditure on food at home and out of the home, utility bills, purchases of 
household items, fees for hiring cleaners/babysitters/servants, commuting costs, cellphone and 
internet bills, clothes, heating bills, travelling expenditure, education and training fees, and 
healthcare expenditure. I do not include durable consumption such as the purchase of antiques 
and luxury goods, cars, furniture and electronic devices because the incurrence of these fees is 
likely to be volatile across years. Moreover, expenditure on durable items can be seen as a form 
of investment. I drop observations with total non-durable consumption higher than the 99th 
percentile or lower than the 1st percentile of the consumption distribution to reduce the concerns 
for outliers.  
2.5.6. Dealing with voluntary exclusions 
It is of great importance to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary exclusions 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). However most of the studies in this field do not take this 
distinction into consideration.  
Figure 2.2 shows the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary exclusions. Boxes 
in grey denote access to financial services for individuals, while boxes in white show no access 
to formal financial services. Voluntary exclusions and involuntary exclusions both relate to 
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non-users of formal financial services. However, not using financial services is not necessarily 
associated with no access to financial services. Among non-users, voluntary exclusions result 
from not needing to use financial services or, in some regions, from religious reasons. Adults 
may choose to be excluded from financial services because they do not need to use these 
services. Others may actually be eligible to use financial services, but for religious reasons, may 
decide not to do so. These exclusions are self-determined: Voluntary non-users may have in 
fact access to formal financial services, but choose not to use them12. By contrast, involuntary 
exclusions refer to people who demand financial services but do not have access to them. 
Reasons for the exclusions could be that these individuals have insufficient income or using 
financial services is too costly for them.  
From the policy makers’ perspective, voluntary exclusions are not problematic because 
they are driven by lack of demand (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). Policy makers mainly focus 
on how to eliminate barriers for those who have no access to financial services, despite wishing 
to use them.  
For these reasons, I omit voluntary exclusions from the analyses. The CHFS enables me 
to do so. For individuals who do not have a formal loan (including any aspect of 
agricultural/business related loans, mortgages, and vehicle related loans), a follow-up question 
is asked, namely “ Why don’t you have one?” Some individuals answer they do not have formal 
loans because of “No need”. I thus idenfity observations who answered “No need” in any one 
of the three components of Floan as voluntary exclusions.  
                                                 
12 One concern is that those who voluntarily excluded may not apply for financial services because they perceive 
rejections if they were applying for one. Fortunately, the CHFS enables me to identify those “discouraged” 
borrowers and these observations are kept in the final sample. 
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Focusing on the Credit indicator, individuals who do not currently use a credit card are 
asked: “Why don’t you have a credit card?” Some of them answer: “Like spending cash”. I 
identify these responses as voluntary exclusions and exclude them from the corresponding 
Credit analysis. I also exclude those who “like spending cash” and/or have “no need” for a loan 
from the regressions with dependent variable Inclusion.  
After omitting voluntary exclusions, the sample size drops from 28,100 observations to 
20,105 for Credit, and from 14,515 for floan and 10,868 for Inclusion. Appendix 2.2 
investigates differences in the marginal effects of regressors including and excluding those 
voluntary exclusions. It also looks at the determinants of voluntary exclusions. 
2.5.7. Summary statistics  
Table 2.1 presents the means and standard errors of all variables used in the present study. 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix 2.1. Considering the wide existence of 
disparities between urban and rural areas in China, Table 2.1 also reports the mean differences 
between urban and rural subsamples.  
We can see clear and statistically significant urban-rural differences across all measures 
of financial inclusion. Specifically, urban households are more likely to own bank accounts, 
credit cards and bank loans, compared to their rural counterparts. The overall financial inclusion 
is also higher for urban households. The differences in the four financial inclusion indicators 
between urban and rural households are highly statistically significant. The mean of non-
durable consumption for the rural sample is much smaller than that of the urban sample. The 
difference is as high as 16,823 RMB and significant at the 1 percent significance level. As for 
the use of informal finance, the data also highlights that a higher proportion of rural households 
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hold informal loans compared to urban households. It is also worth mentioning that the 
percentage of households having an informal loan is higher than that of having a formal loan 
for both urban and rural groups, suggesting a wide penetration of informal financing among 
Chinese households.  
Table 2.1 also shows that the income and wealth disparity between rural and urban 
households is huge. The average income of urban households is more than double that of rural 
households. The average net wealth of urban households is three times as large as that of rural 
households. The high housing price in urban areas potentially contributes to this considerable 
difference in net wealth. Furthermore, compared to rural households, urban households 
generally have younger and more educated heads, a smaller family size, a lower probability of 
home ownership and a lower chance of being employed. Additionally, the two groups have 
similar risk attitudes. All differences between the two groups are statistically significant.  
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2.6. Specifications and methodology 
2.6.1. Determinants of financial inclusion  
Following Allen et al. (2012), Fungáčová and Weill (2015), and Cull et al. (2015a), I start by 
estimating a Probit model of the following type:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝛷(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜸𝑷𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖)                                                              (2.1) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑗 (j=1, 2, 3, 4) presents the four financial inclusion indicators, i.e. Account, Credit, 
Floan, and Inclusion for household i. 𝑿𝒊 is a set of characteristics of household i and 𝑷𝒊 is a set 
of provincial dummies for household i. Considering the main component of Floan is mortgages, 
I exclude Homeownership from the Floan regressions. I also exclude Homeownership from the 
regressions explaining financial inclusion in general, since Floan is a major component of 
Inclusion. 𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
I estimate Equation 2.1 using a Probit model as the dependent variables are all binary. In 
line with H1, I expect the marginal effect of Infloan to be positive for Floan, but negative for 
Account, Credit and Inclusion. The urban-rural distinction in utilising financial services are 
well-documented in Sui and Niu (2018). To take into account the urban-rural disparity, I 
estimate Equation 2.1 using the full sample, as well as the rural and urban subsamples 
separately.  
Among basic households’ characteristics, I control for age, education level, gender, 
marital and employment status of the household head, household income and wealth, household 
size and home ownership, risk attitude, financial literacy as well as social capital measured by 
whether or not the head is a communist party member. These variables are in line with those 
considered by Cull et al. (2015a) and Sui and Niu (2018). I expect households with older, better 
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educated and employed heads, having higher income and a smaller household size to be 
associated with higher financial inclusion. I expect being risk averse to be associated with lower 
financial inclusion and household heads with a higher level of financial literacy to be associated 
with higher financial inclusion. 
2.6.2. The effect of financial inclusion on household consumption 
Next, I test the extent to which financial inclusion, measured in turn through Account, Credit, 
Floan and Inclusion contributes to household consumption. The merits of financial inclusion 
have been fully discussed in Allen et al. (2012), Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012), and Beck 
et al. (2007b), who focus on its effects on economic growth, as well as poverty and inequality 
reduction. Households with better access to financial services may be able to borrow money in 
case of financial difficulties, which should lead to a lower need for precautionary savings and, 
ultimately, a higher level of consumption. To empirically test the extent to which financial 
inclusion is associated with household consumption, I estimate the following models for the 
logarithm of household total non-durable consumption using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
log⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝜷𝟒𝑿𝒊 + 𝜸𝑷𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖                       
(2.2) 
and 
𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜸𝑷𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                  
(2.3) 
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where 𝑿𝒊 is a set of characteristics of household i and 𝑷𝒊 is a set of provincial dummies for 
household i.⁡𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term. 
I estimate Equation 2.2 and 2.3 using the full sample, as well as the rural and urban 
subsamples, respectively. In line with H2, I expect 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3  in Equations 2.2 and ⁡𝛽1  in 
Equation 2.3 to be positive. 
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2.7. Main empirical results  
2.7.1. Determinants of financial inclusion  
Table 2.2 presents the marginal effects obtained from estimations of Equation 2.1. I observe 
that having an informal loan is associated with a 7.9 percent higher probability of having formal 
bank loans in the rural sample (column 9). The corresponding percentage in the urban 
subsample is 8.6 (column 8). One possible explanation for this finding is that informal 
borrowing might be seen as collateral by banks. This would suggest that, in China, households 
may rely on informal borrowing to obtain formal loans. This interpretation is consistent with 
Degryse et al. (2016) who show that formal financiers take into account entrepreneurs’ ability 
of raising informal fundings when making lending decisions in the Chinese context. The 
marginal effect associated with Infloan is also significantly positive in the full sample (column 
7). This indicates that having informal borrowing is associated with an 8.2 percent higher 
probability of having formal bank loans. 
As for other financial inclusion indicators, namely Account, Credit, and Inclusion, they 
are generally negatively associated with the probability of having informal loans. Specifically, 
having an informal loan is associated with a 3.3 percent lower probability of having a credit 
card in the full sample (column 4). Similar results are obtained for the urban and rural 
subsamples (columns 5 and 6), and the substitution effect is larger for urban households. These 
findings can be explained considering that credit cards are used to cover shorter-term needs for 
financing and are relatively costly in the Chinese context. Hence, having informal loans reduces 
the use of credit cards. Furthermore, informal loans are associated with a 6.6 percent lower 
probability of having a bank account in the full sample (column 1), suggesting that cheap 
informal loans may reduce the demand for other financial services. Once again, similar results 
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are found in both the urban and rural subsamples (columns 2 and 3), with the substitution effect 
being slightly larger for the latter. As for the general indicator of financial inclusion (Inclusion), 
it exhibits a negative and significant marginal effect both in the full and the urban samples 
(columns 10 and 11), indicating a negative association between informal financing and financial 
inclusion.  
Focusing on the control variables, I find that age is negatively related to Credit, Floan 
and Inclusion for both rural and urban households. Yet, the magnitude of these associations is 
small. This is consistent with Cull et al. (2015a), and can be explained considering that older 
household heads may have limited awareness of financial services compared to their young 
counterparts 13 . These findings also show that household income and net wealth are both 
positively associated with the likelihood of financial inclusion. This effect is always larger in 
rural areas, except for the floan. This can be explained considering that rural households face 
stricter requirements on creditworthiness compared to urban households because information 
asymmetries are likely to be more prevalent in rural areas. Having secondary education or above 
is positively related with the probability of financial inclusion, while being illiterate is 
significantly associated with a lower financial inclusion. A better education level may increase 
the likelihood of credit applications being approved and thus it is positively associated with 
financial inclusion. These findings are in line with those from other countries.  
                                                 
13  Several papers in the literature account for a non-linear relationship between age and financial inclusion 
(Jappelli, 1990; Allen et al., 2012; Fungacova and Weill, 2015). However, the marginal effect associated with Age2 
was almost zero if added in my regressions. I thus excluded Age2. It is interesting to note that Allen et al. (2012) 
and Fungacova and Weill (2015) find a non-linear relationship between age and financial inclusion. In particular, 
they find a positive relationship initially, which turns negative after a certain age. The negative correlation we 
observe between age and financial inclusion can therefore be explained considering that the average age in my 
sample is 50.08. 
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The marginal effect associated with male is negative and significant for Credit, Floan and 
Inclusion. This suggests that being male is associated with lower financial inclusion than being 
female. This contradicts Fungáčová and Weill (2015), according to which being female is 
associated with a 4.5 percent (2.5 percent) lower probability of having bank accounts (formal 
loans). These finding suggests that gender discrimination in obtaining formal financial services 
is not a concern in the Chinese context. The difference may be attributed to the comprehensive 
households’ characteristics I control for. In Fungáčová and Weill (2015), only income, age, 
gender and education are considered due to data limitation. The relation they find between 
gender and financial inclusion may be driven by unobserved factors that are not controlled for 
such as households’ risk attitude and financial literacy.  
Being married is associated with a higher likelihood of having bank accounts, credit cards 
and bank loans. It is likely that households with married couples have higher needs of financial 
services compared to households with a single member. Interestingly, I also find that being 
widowed is positively associated with a higher likelihood of having credit cards and owning 
bank loans compared to household with single heads. Having a job is significantly associated 
with a higher likelihood of having credit cards. This may relate to the fact that being employed 
is normally one of the first requirements when applying for a credit card.  
Being risk averse is negatively associated with the probability of having a credit card 
and/or formal loans. This may reflect a lower demand for credit among risk averse households. 
They may lack trust on banks and financial services. Financial literacy is highly and positively 
associated with all financial inclusion indicators, suggesting that better financial knowledge is 
associated with higher usages of financial services. Being a Communist Party member is related 
to a higher probability of having bank accounts, credit cards, and overall financial inclusion. 
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Consistent with Cull et al. (2015a), I also find that being a party member is significantly 
associated with a higher probability of having bank loans in the rural area. Lastly, in the full 
sample, the marginal effect associated with the rural dummy is negative and statistically 
significant for Account, Credit, and Inclusion, suggesting that being based in a rural area is 
associated with a lower level of financial inclusion. This can be explained considering that 
financial development is poorer in rural areas. However, the marginal effect on the rural dummy 
is positive and significant for the Floan regression, indicating the existence of anti-poverty 
programmes which favours rural areas in China.  
In summary, the results show that Chinese households rely on financial services from 
both informal and formal sources, which confirms the existence of dual credit markets first 
proposed by Cull et al. (2015a). Informal loans act as substitutes for bank accounts and credit 
cards but seem to be complements to bank loans. However, endogeneity may arise due to other 
factors that are not controlled for in the model and may affect Floan and Infloan at the same 
time. I will discuss endogeneity of Infloan in Section 2.8.  
2.7.2. To what extent is financial inclusion related to household consumption? 
Estimates of Equation 2.2 to 2.3 are presented in Table 2.3. We can see that better access to 
financial services is generally positively related to household non-durable consumption. All 
marginal effects associated with the financial inclusion indicators are statistically significantly. 
More specifically, having bank accounts is associated with a 12.3, 9.9 and 13.1 percentage point 
higher consumption in the full, rural and urban samples, respectively (column 1, 3, 5). Similarly, 
having a credit card is associated with a 24.1, 29.4 and 25.4 percentage point higher 
consumption in the full, rural and urban samples, respectively (column 1, 3, 5). Having bank 
loans is associated with an 8.6, 13.2 and 7.8 percentage point higher consumption in the full, 
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rural and urban samples (column 1, 3, 5). Finally, Inclusion displays positive and statistically 
significant marginal effects in all regressions (column 2, 4, 6). These findings strongly support 
H2. The findings suggest that, if financial barriers were cleared, household consumption would 
significantly increase.  
As for other household characteristics, having a higher education level and better financial 
literacy, a higher income and net wealth, a larger household, being a communist party member, 
are all positively associated with household non-durable consumption. Age is negatively 
associated with total non-durable consumption. Being male and illiterate are also negatively 
associated with consumption, but such associations are not significant in the rural subsample. 
Having a currently working household head, being a home owner and being risk averse are 
significantly related to lower consumption level. In contrast to the predictions of the LCH, 
which indicates households dis-save in later life to maintain their consumption level, my results 
suggest that consumption declines with age. The underdeveloped pension system in China may 
be responsible for this phenomenon, together with the low generosity of the national health 
insurance schemes. Given the difficulties in getting support from formal financial institutions, 
older households tend to consume less to cover any unexpected expenditures that may arise in 
the future (Meng, 2003, Barnett and Brooks, 2010, Wei and Zhang, 2011, Wang and Wen, 
2012, He et al., 2018). 
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2.8.  Controlling for the endogeneity of Infloan 
There is concern that Infloan may be endogenous. Households with less education, lower 
income and wealth are in fact more likely to show lower financial inclusion and thus may use 
informal finance more often. Moreover, households’ social network and capital may affect both 
informal and formal finance of this household. I thus adopt an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach similar to Cull et al. (2016). Specifically, I use whether the household head has 
siblings to instrument the use of informal finance in the Equation 2.1. Households with siblings 
have more informal borrowing sources and thus are more likely to have informal loans. Cull et 
al. (2016) suggests that having siblings is a strong and significant predictor of informal finance 
use because it is pre-determined and it is unlikely to be endogenous once a comprehensive set 
of household characteristics are controlled for. I therefore use a binary variable sibling_dum 
indicating whether or not the household heads have siblings to instrument the ownership of 
informal loans in Equation 2.1.  
I adopt two sets of estimators, namely the bivariate probit estimator and the special 
regressor (SR) estimator, to implement the IV approach using sibling_dum as the IV for Infloan. 
The IV probit estimator is not an option here because it can only be applied when the 
endogenous explanatory variable is continuous. The linear probability model (LPM) with IV is 
also not considered because its fitted values are not constrained to (0,1).  
Wooldridge (2010) validates the use of a bivariate probit model to address the 
endogeneity of a binary explanatory variable in a probit model. The SR method was initially 
proposed by Lewbel (2000) and relies on a “special regressor” which is assumed to be 
exogenous and appear additively in the model. Following Dong and Lewbel (2015), I use age 
as the “special regressor” because it is arguably exogenous and continuous. The advantage of 
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both these methods over the IV probit estimator is that they allow for a binary endogenous 
explanatory variable.  
Table 2.4 reports estimated marginal effects of covariates by the bivariate probit and the 
special regressor estimators, respectively. All standard errors are obtained from 200 bootstrap 
samplings. For brevity, I do not report the marginal effects of other covariates other than 
Infloan. It is also worth noting that, marginal effects are directly comparable across 
specifications (Dong and Lewbel, 2015).  
In the full sample, both special regressor and bivariate probit estimators give a larger 
effect of Infloan than the standard probit estimators. In Table 2.1, the marginal effect of Infloan 
estimated by the standard probit estimators was -0.07 for Account, -0.03 for Credit, 0.08 for 
Floan and -0.03 for Inclusion. Using the SR estimator, the corresponding marginal effect are 
0.53, -0.35, -0.21 and -0.26 The estimated marginal effects on Infloan obtained using the 
bivariate probit estimators are generally smaller than those obtained with SR: They are -0.27, -
0.27, -0.12 and -0.16 for Account, Credit, Floan and Inclusion, respectively. The H1 is thus 
only partially supported due to the non-positive marginal effect associated with the Floan.  
In the rural subsample, marginal effects estimated by the SR estimators are not 
statistically significant. In the bivariate probit model setting, having informal loans is associated 
with a 28.7 percent, 17.5 percent, 11.0 percent, and 19.6 percent lower probability of having 
bank accounts, credit cards, bank loans and overall financial inclusion. In the urban subsample, 
having informal loans is associated with a 42.4 percent, 55.4 percent, 32.0 percent and 25.6 
percent lower probability of having bank accounts, credit cards, bank loans and overall financial 
inclusion using the SR estimators, with corresponding percentages being 26.2 percent, 31.0 
percent 12.5 percent and 13.7 percent when using the bivariate probit estimators. These findings 
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confirm that informal finance is a substitute of formal financial services. In addition, as 
marginal effects are comparable across specifications, I can compare the magnitude of the 
marginal effect of Infloan between the rural and urban subsamples. The substitute effect 
between informal loans and bank accounts as well as overall financial inclusion is larger in rural 
areas, while the substitution effect between informal loans and credit cards as well as bank loans 
is larger in urban areas. In addition, the substitute effect between Infloan and Credit is the 
highest in the urban subsample and the substitute effect between Infloan and Account is the 
highest in the rural subsample. This may indicate that, with the promotion of financial inclusion, 
the usage of bank accounts in rural areas and the ownership of credit cards in urban areas will 
experience the largest growth compared to other financial services.  
It is worth mentioning that the positive association between having informal loans and 
having bank loans no longer exists in the new estimations, indicating the complementarity effect 
between informal and formal finance I found previously may have been due to an endogeneity 
bias. My finding is inconsistent with Allen et al. (2018) where evidence of the complementarity 
effect is found for Chinese firms. This suggests that the prevalence of informal finance among 
Chinese households may crowd out the need and usage of formal financial services.  
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2.9.  Conclusion 
Globally, the importance of developing financial inclusion has been widely recognised by 
policy makers and scholars in recent years. Thanks to the development of data such as, for 
instance, the World Bank Global Findex Database and the IMF Financial Access Survey, a 
growing literature has been studying the measurement, determinants, and impact of financial 
inclusion worldwide. However, due to the heterogeneity in social and economic development 
among countries, it is necessary to look at financial inclusion in separate countries. Although 
China is the largest emerging economy, its financial inclusion profile has not been fully 
discussed in the literature. This study fills this gap by providing insights in the following 
aspects:  
First, since informal financing plays a crucial role in the Chinese context, I investigate 
the links between informal financing and several measures of financial inclusion at the 
household level. To the best of my knowledge, this issue has not been investigated before. 
Second, I test, for the first time, the extent to which financial inclusion affects household 
consumption. Finally, this study is the first to remove “voluntary exclusions” from the sample 
used, which is likely to lead to more reliable results.  
I use a representative household level dataset, the 2013 wave of the China Household 
Finance Survey, which covers more than 20,000 households from 29 provinces (municipalities) 
in China. Based on various specifications, I document that informal financing and financial 
inclusion are substitutes at the household level in China. Next, I document that financial 
inclusion is strongly associated with a higher level of household consumption. From a policy 
viewpoint, these findings suggest that the prevalence of informal finance among Chinese 
households may crowd out the need and usage of formal financial services. Policies aiming at 
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improving accessibility to financial services may contribute to higher financial inclusion. In 
addition, promoting financial inclusion helps stimulate domestic consumption, which is a key 
policy objective in China. 
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2.10. Limitations and future research  
There are several limitations in the present study. First, only associations, other than causal 
relationships, can be identified due to the cross-sectional structure of the data I use. Second, 
other covariates in the estimations such as income and net wealth are likely to be endogenous, 
especially in the regressions for household non-durable consumption. Thus, future research will 
focus on instrumenting the potentially endogenous household income/wealth once community 
level data or more waves of CHFS become available. Further research could also investigate 
the intensity of using financial services other than the coverage of these financial services.  
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Table 2. 1 Summary statistics and differences between urban and rural groups 
 Full  Urban Rural Diff  
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  
Dependent variables 
Account 0.635 0.482 0.723 0.448 0.445 0.497 0.277*** 
Credit 0.160 0.367 0.221 0.415 0.0296 0.170 0.192*** 
Floan 0.142 0.349 0.145 0.352 0.135 0.341 0.010** 
Inclusion 0.696 0.460 0.774 0.418 0.527 0.499 0.247*** 
TotalC (RMB) 36,595 28,071 41,909 29,173 25,086 21,395 16,823*** 
        
Control variables 
Infloan 0.255 0.436 0.218 0.413 0.335 0.472 -0.117*** 
Age 51.43 14.38 50.35 14.98 53.74 12.68 -3.389*** 
Male 0.757 0.429 0.699 0.459 0.883 0.322 -0.184*** 
Illiterate 0.0790 0.270 0.0489 0.216 0.144 0.351 -0.095*** 
Secondaryedu 0.278 0.448 0.355 0.478 0.114 0.317 0.241*** 
Tertiaryedu 0.0869 0.282 0.126 0.332 0.00236 0.0485 0.124*** 
Married 0.858 0.349 0.845 0.362 0.887 0.317 -0.042*** 
Widowed 0.0694 0.254 0.0667 0.250 0.0753 0.264 -0.009*** 
Income (RMB) 46,291 76,363 56,671 85,471 24,040 44,114 32,631*** 
Netwealth (RMB) 537,645 809,372 709,537 906,162 170,781 321,017 538,759*** 
Hhsize 3.480 1.628 3.228 1.438 4.023 1.863 -0.795*** 
Homeowner 0.812 0.390 0.750 0.433 0.946 0.226 -0.196*** 
Job 0.674 0.469 0.603 0.489 0.826 0.379 -0.224*** 
Risk_averse 0.732 0.443 0.726 0.446 0.746 0.435 -0.020*** 
Grade 0.678 0.818 0.797 0.844 0.422 0.695 0.375*** 
Party 0.165 0.371 0.196 0.397 0.0989 0.299 0.097*** 
No. of obs. 28,060 19,146 8,914  
Notes: S.D. stands for standard deviation. All variables are dummies except for TotalC, Age, income, netwealth, 
hhsize and Grade. The Diff column presents the p-value of t-tests of the difference in each variable between the 
urban and rural groups. See Appendix 2.1 for complete definitions of all variables.  
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Table 2. 2 Marginal effects of determinants of financial inclusion 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABL
ES full urban rural full urban rural full urban rural full urban rural 
                          
Infloan -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.011** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.079*** -0.028*** -0.042*** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male 0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.023*** -0.033*** 0.007 -0.023** -0.015 -0.017 -0.034*** -0.020** -0.054* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011) (0.010) (0.031) 
Illiterate -0.117*** -0.108*** -0.136*** -0.026 -0.068** 0.003 -0.031 -0.020 -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.045** 
-
0.107*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.010) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.028) 
Secondary 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.043*** 0.101*** 0.140*** 0.004 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.038* 0.095*** 0.082*** 0.073** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030) 
Tertiary 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.122 0.184*** 0.241*** 0.059* 0.086*** 0.065*** -0.105 0.182*** 0.152*** -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.103) (0.008) (0.011) (0.033) (0.013) (0.013) (0.123) (0.022) (0.019) (0.152) 
Married 0.027** 0.026** 0.032 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.005 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.136*** 0.008 0.010 0.028 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.041) (0.016) (0.016) (0.044) 
Widowed 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.038** 0.067*** -0.014 0.046* 0.059** 0.085 -0.021 0.007 -0.069 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.036) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.052) (0.022) (0.023) (0.055) 
Lincome 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Lwealth 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.018*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.068*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Hhsize -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.012*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Homeowner -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.087*** -0.058*** -0.076*** -0.022*       
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)       
Job -0.018** -0.022*** -0.003 0.038*** 0.054*** -0.009 0.030*** 0.012 0.040* 0.002 -0.008 0.022 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) 
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Risk_averse 0.008 0.012* 0.003 -0.022*** -0.034*** 0.002 -0.022*** -0.018** -0.021 0.004 0.010 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) 
Grade 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.007 0.025*** 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.068*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) 
Party 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.026 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.005 -0.009 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.080*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.030) 
Rural -0.033***   -0.093***   0.090***   -0.030***   
 (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.010)   
             
Observation 25,402 17,670 7,732 18,026 12,311 5,715 12,998 9,344 3,654 9,613 6,807 2,806 
 Notes: Income and net wealth are in logarithm. All regressions were estimated using a Probit model. Dependent variables are Account, Credit, Floan and Inclusion, 
respectively. Voluntary exclusions are removed from all estimations. Provincial dummies are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Appendix 2.1 for complete definitions of all variables. Homeowner is excluded from the Floan 
and Inclusion regressions as mortgage is the main component of Floan. 
 
 
 56 
 
Table 2. 3 Financial inclusion and household consumption 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 full full rural rural urban urban 
              
Account 0.123***  0.099***  0.131***  
 (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.010)  
Credit 0.241***  0.294***  0.254***  
 (0.010)  (0.042)  (0.011)  
Floan 0.086***  0.132***  0.078***  
 (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.012)  
Inclusion  0.155***  0.123***  0.173*** 
  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Age -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.039*** -0.045*** -0.043 -0.041 -0.042*** -0.049*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.010) (0.010) 
illiterate -0.111*** -0.096*** -0.034 -0.032 -0.161*** -0.142*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Secondaryedu 0.112*** 0.137*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.146*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) 
Tertiaryedu 0.169*** 0.253*** 0.046 0.083 0.195*** 0.276*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.137) (0.131) (0.015) (0.015) 
Married 0.187*** 0.194*** 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.167*** 0.177*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.040) (0.040) (0.017) (0.017) 
Widowed 0.052** 0.064*** 0.166*** 0.169*** -0.005 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.050) (0.050) (0.026) (0.026) 
Lincome 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lwealth 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Hhsize 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Homeowner -0.193*** -0.202*** -0.169*** -0.173*** -0.218*** -0.229*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.037) (0.037) (0.012) (0.012) 
Job -0.104*** -0.091*** -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.063*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) 
Risk_averse -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.039*** -0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) 
Grade 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.056*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
Party 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) 
Rural -0.203*** -0.211***     
 (0.011) (0.011)     
Constant 8.581*** 8.553*** 8.642*** 8.635*** 8.457*** 8.399*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.101) (0.102) (0.052) (0.053) 
Observations 25,014 25,026 7,559 7,560 17,455 17,466 
R-squared 0.463 0.452 0.374 0.369 0.415 0.397 
Notes: Household total non-durable consumption, income and net wealth are in logarithm. All regressions are 
estimated using OLS. Provincial dummies are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Appendix 2.1 for 
complete definitions of all variables.  
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Table 2. 4 Marginal effects of Infloan using Sibling_dum as IV 
Panel A Full sample Special regressor 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan -0.534*** -0.346** -0.211** -0.256** 
S.E. 0.077 0.162 0.107 0.105 
No. of observations 24,148 17,137 12,358 9,139 
 Bivariate probit 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan -0.270*** -0.269*** -0.120*** -0.155*** 
S.E. 0.067 0.014 0.040 0.058 
No. of observations 25,402 18,026 12,998 9,613 
Panel B Rural sample Special regressor 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan 0.439 -0.014 -0.264 -0.374 
S.E. 0.375 0.041 0.273 0.325 
No. of observations 7,351 5,434 3,474 2,668 
 Bivariate probit 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan -0.287*** -0.175*** -0.110*** -0.196*** 
S.E. 0.067 0.013 0.040 0.072 
No. of observations 7,732 5,715 3,654 2,806 
Panel C Urban sample Special regressor 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan -0.424*** -0.554*** -0.320*** -0.256*** 
S.E. 0.070 0.101 0.145 0.080 
No. of observations 16,799 11,704 8,884 6,472 
 Bivariate probit 
 Account Credit Floan Inclusion 
ME of Infloan -0.262*** -0.310*** -0.125*** -0.137*** 
S.E. 0.068 0.015 0.040 0.052 
No. of observations 17,670 12,311 9,344 6,807 
Notes: Dependent variables are Account, Credit, Floan, and Inclusion respectively. The endogenous variable 
Infloan is instrumented using Sibling_dum. Other control variables are Age, Male, Illiterate, Secondaryedu, 
Tertiaryedu, Married, Widowed, (log of) Income, (log of) Netwealth, Hhsize, Homeowner, Job, Risk_averse, 
Grade and Party. ME denotes the marginal effect. Standard errors (S.E.) are obtained from 200 bootstrap 
samplings for both models. The marginal effects of other controls are not reported for brevity. The special 
regressor method is implemented by the STATA user written command sspecialreg. Voluntary exclusions are not 
included in the Credit, Floan and Inclusion regressions. In the bivariate probit setting, the marginal effect of 
Infloan is computed for urban and rural subsamples separately after estimating each bivariate probit model for the 
full sample. In the special regressor setting, the marginal effect of Infloan for urban and rural subsamples are 
obtained from separate regressions for urban and rural subsamples respectively.  
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Figure 2. 1 Private Consumption as % GDP (2013) 
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 Figure 2. 2 Distinguishing Voluntary vs. Involuntary Exclusion 
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Appendix 2.1 Definitions of the variables used 
Dependent variables 
Account 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has either a current account or a 
deposit account in a formal financial institution, and 0 otherwise 
Credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has a credit card, and 0 otherwise 
Floan 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household currently has formal loans from 
banks, and 0 otherwise 
Inclusion 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household currently has either a bank account, 
and/or a credit card, and/or a bank loan, and 0 otherwise 
TotalC Continuous variable: household total non-durable consumption (yearly) 
  
Independent variables 
Infloan 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has loans from informal sources, 
and 0 otherwise 
Age Discrete variable: Household head’s age measured in year 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is male, and 0 if female 
Illiterate Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is illiterate, and 0 otherwise 
Secondaryedu 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has completed secondary 
education, and 0 otherwise 
Tertiaryedu 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has completed tertiary 
education or above, and 0 otherwise 
Married Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is married, and 0 otherwise 
Widowed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is widowed, and 0 otherwise 
Income (RMB) Continuous variable: household total income (yearly) 
Netwealth (RMB) Continuous variable: household total wealth minus total debts (yearly) 
Hhsize Discrete variable: number of household members 
Homeowner 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a home-owner, and 0 
otherwise 
Job 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is currently working, and 0 
otherwise 
Risk_averse Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is risk averse, and 0 otherwise 
Grade 
Discrete variable: [0,3] indicating household head’s financial literacy; 0 
represents the lowest financial literacy and 3 represents the highest financial 
literacy 
Party 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a communist party member, 
and 0 otherwise 
Rural 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household resides in rural areas, and 0 
otherwise 
Sibling_dum 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head or his/her spouse has siblings, 
and 0 otherwise 
Source: 2013 wave of the CHFS 
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Appendix 2.2 Further investigations of the characteristics of voluntary exclusions 
Appendix Table 2.2a presents descriptive statistics for samples with and without voluntary 
exclusions. We can see that the sample means of the four financial inclusion indicators are 
significantly different between the groups with and without voluntary exclusions. Specifically, 
the full sample without voluntary exclusions has a much higher level of Credit and a much 
higher level of Floan, a slightly higher level of Inclusion, and a lower level of Account. This is 
because observations who like spending cash and/or do not need bank loans are removed from 
the sample. Omitting exclusions also leads to a higher average total consumption. Next, I 
investigate the determinants of the voluntary exclusions. I thus perform Probit estimations 
identical to Equation 2.1 whereby the dependent variable is given by the voluntary exclusions. 
Marginal effects of these Probit estimations are reported in Table 2.2b. 
We can see that, households with older heads are more likely to like spending cash and 
do not need bank loans. Households with higher income and/or net wealth are more likely to 
become voluntarily excluded, which reflects a lower need for financial services among richer 
households. Being risk averse is positively associated with the likelihood of having a preference 
on spending cash but does not seem to be closely related to a lack of need for formal loans. 
Homeownership is strongly positively correlated with type II exclusions. This is not surprising 
as the main component of formal loans in my sample is made up by mortgages and households 
who already own a home are less like to demand mortgages compared to renters. Being a party 
member is strongly associated with a lower probability of having no need for bank loans. 
Residing in rural areas is significantly associated with a lower probability of having a preference 
on spending cash and a high probability of lack of need for bank loans. This may be caused by 
the fact that the percentage of home owners is higher among rural households than urban 
households.  
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Appendix Table 2.2a Means and standard deviations for samples with and without voluntary 
exclusions 
 
Full sample 
 (N=28,060) 
Full sample 
without voluntary 
exclusions  
(N=10,868) 
Type I Exclusion:  
Like spending cash  
(N=7,956) 
Type II Exclusion:  
No need for bank 
loans 
(N=13,545) 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Account 0.635 0.482 0.617 0.486 0.665 0.472 0.643 0.479 
Credit 0.160 0.367 0.259 0.438 - - 0.125 0.330 
Floan 0.142 0.349 0.284 0.451 0.112 0.316 - - 
Inclusion 0.696 0.460 0.729 0.445 0.702 0.457 0.658 0.475 
TotalC 36595 28071 38746 30682 35701 24438 34824 26443 
         
Infloan 0.255 0.436 0.309 0.462 0.231 0.422 0.205 0.404 
Age 51.43 14.38 49.40 14.17 52.45 14.16 53.21 14.44 
Male 0.757 0.429 0.754 0.431 0.762 0.426 0.759 0.428 
Illiterate 0.0790 0.270 0.0761 0.265 0.0618 0.241 0.0891 0.285 
Secondary 0.278 0.448 0.284 0.451 0.298 0.457 0.266 0.442 
Tertiary 0.0869 0.282 0.116 0.321 0.0598 0.237 0.0674 0.251 
Married 0.858 0.349 0.851 0.356 0.875 0.331 0.859 0.348 
Widowed 0.0694 0.254 0.0651 0.247 0.0675 0.251 0.0760 0.265 
Income 46291 76363 46770 76313 44803 72564 46807 78586 
Netwealth 537645 809372 524756 846416 530941 745407 561071 798101 
Hhsize 3.480 1.628 3.515 1.628 3.438 1.586 3.457 1.640 
Homeowner 0.812 0.390 0.755 0.430 0.823 0.382 0.873 0.333 
Job 0.674 0.469 0.705 0.456 0.641 0.480 0.654 0.476 
Risk averse 0.732 0.443 0.719 0.449 0.744 0.436 0.741 0.438 
Grade 0.678 0.818 0.716 0.841 0.692 0.806 0.633 0.797 
Party 0.165 0.371 0.167 0.373 0.169 0.375 0.161 0.368 
Rural 0.318 0.466 0.309 0.462 0.280 0.449 0.340 0.474 
Source: 2013 China Household Finance Survey. See Appendix 2.1 for detailed definitions of all variables. 
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Appendix Table 2.2b Probit regressions for voluntary exclusions 
  Type I: like spending cash Type II: do not need loans 
 (1) (2) 
      
Age 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.010 -0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Illiterate -0.071*** 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Secondaryedu -0.017** -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Tertiaryedu -0.123*** -0.118*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Married 0.044*** -0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Widowed 0.031* -0.083*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Lincome 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lwealth 0.009*** 0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Hhsize -0.005** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Homeowner 0.005 0.110*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Job -0.020*** 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Risk_averse 0.011* 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Grade 0.005 -0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Party -0.003 -0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Rural -0.039*** 0.055*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
   
Observations 25,440 25,440 
Notes: Income and net wealth are in logarithm. All regressions were estimated using a probit model. Dependent 
variables are type I and II voluntary exclusions respectively. Provincial dummies are included in all regressions, 
but the marginal effects of provincial dummies are not reported for brevity. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Appendix 2.1 for 
complete definitions of all variables.  
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Chapter Three: To What Extent Does Household Consumption Respond to Health 
Shocks? Evidence from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
3.1. Introduction  
According to the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) 
and the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) of consumption proposed by Friedman (1957), 
consumption is determined by the value of lifetime resources or, in the latter case, by one’s 
permanent income defined as expected income in future years. If the expected income equals 
to the annuity value of lifetime resources, the two theories are very close (Deaton, 1992)14. It is 
predicted that agents’ consumption only responds to changes in permanent income and should 
not respond to anticipated and/or transitory income changes. Consequently, any shock that can 
potentially lead to fundamental changes of agents’ expected income may have great impact on 
their consumption choices.  
Acute health shocks, among others, are examples of permanent shocks which can largely 
affect individuals’ consumption decisions. Health shocks can affect consumption through both 
direct and indirect channels. On one hand, the presence of health shocks limits individuals’ 
working hours and productivity. Furthermore, if the shocks are persistent, individuals may 
partly or fully exit the labour market. Hence, the shocks have a direct impact on one’s 
permanent income. On the other hand, health shocks increase out-of-pocket medical 
                                                 
14 Although both theories predict consumption smoothing, the LCH pays more attention to the relationship between 
age and wealth accumulation/decumulation, while the PIH puts more emphasis on the dynamics of consumption 
in a relative shorter period. As the main concern of this paper is to investigate the fluctuations of consumption 
after health shocks, the PIH is the favoured theory in this context. Hence, in the remaining chapter, the PIH other 
than the LCH is mentioned.  
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expenditure on obtaining treatments and care, so that the consumption on other items is 
constrained and the overall consumption level might be affected consequently.  
The extent of the sensitivity of consumption to health shocks depends on the persistence 
of the shocks and the degree of imperfection of credit and insurance markets. When health 
shocks occur, households can smooth their consumption if they own health insurance, have 
accumulated precautionary savings, and/or are able to borrow from formal and/or informal 
sources (Babiarz et al., 2012, Wagstaff, 2007). Ideally, if the markets are complete, households’ 
idiosyncratic shocks will be mitigated by risk-sharing institutions, and household consumption 
changes over time should purely result from the growth of aggregate consumption (Gertler and 
Gruber, 2002). However, empirical studies have found evidence against the full insurance 
theory, although the extent of this failure varies (Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Babiarz and 
Yilmazer, 2017, Yilmazer and Scharff, 2014). For households living in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) with inadequate insurance and credit markets, the costs of health adversities 
can be considerably high. Acute health shocks fundamentally change households’ consumption 
decisions (Alam and Mahal, 2014), as they significantly increase out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (Saksena et al., 2010, Van Doorslaer et al., 2006, Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003), 
reduce hours worked and labour income (Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Lindelow and Wagstaff, 
2005, Wagstaff, 2007), which lead, in turn, to declines in non-medical consumption (Asfaw 
and Braun, 2004, Gertler et al., 2009, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2010) in LMICs. Moreover, to 
cope with the shocks, households are likely to take on unsecured debts (Babiarz et al., 2013), 
leading to further uncertainties in life.  
Although health risk and its impact on agents’ consumption profile have earned 
considerable attention among researchers and policy makers alike, under the background of 
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global ageing, convincing empirical evidence for the older population on this topic is very 
limited. Compared to younger adults, elderly people are more prone and vulnerable to health 
shocks. Many diseases, such as arthritis, back and neck pain, heart problems and diabetes, have 
higher occurrences among older people (World Health Organization, 2018). Furthermore, as 
human capital decreases with age, elderly people have lower or no labour earnings compared 
to their younger counterparts. I therefore expect older people to act differently in the presence 
of a health shock.  
China stands out as a special case for studying the impact of health shocks on 
consumption among older people for several reasons. First, China has the world’s largest older 
population and the rate of population ageing is accelerating (Smith et al., 2014). According to 
the United Nations, due to declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy, by 2050, China 
will have more than 400 million people aged 65 and over, which accounts for more than one 
quarter of the total population in (United Nations, 2017). In 1950, the average number of 
children per women was 6, and the average life expectancy was only 45 years in China. 
However, in 2015, these two numbers were 1.5 and 75, respectively. Population ageing has 
profound impacts on a wide range of economic and social issues. Among them, economic 
burden and elderly care are two main challenges facing China (Smith et al., 2014). A better 
understanding of older people’s consumption profile could potentially help assess the economic 
burden brought by health shocks and ultimately contribute to improvements in the healthcare 
system China.  
Second, China’s share of out-of-pocket (OOP) payment in total health expenditure, on 
average, is 35 percent despite the fact that a universal coverage scheme was achieved since 
2011. This can be explained by, at the micro-level, inpatient care utilised by the insured is 
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covered with an average reimbursement rate between 44 percent and 68 percent, depending on 
the insurance scheme (Zhang et al., 2017). However, the outpatient service usage is only 
covered in some counties. Under these circumstances, OOP medical expenditure will be 
expected to increase dramatically if one is experiencing a severe health shock. As elderly people 
face reduced labour earnings, large OOP medical expenditure is likely to erode their non-
medical consumption and well-being.  
Third, due to the underdevelopment of financial markets, individuals in China face 
significant financial constraints that impede borrowing from formal financial institutions15. 
When a health shock occurs and OOP medical expenditure increases, Chinese households tend 
to rely on dissaving and/or informal borrowing from family members, relatives or friends. Once 
dissaving and borrowing are not available in the absence of complete financial markets, high 
OOP medical expenditure may lead to impoverishment and even a vicious spiral of poverty and 
ill health (Li et al., 2014).  
This chapter aims at investigating the extent to which both objectively and subjectively 
measured health shocks affect Chinese older people’s consumption decisions. To the best of 
my knowledge, although the impact of health shocks has been widely discussed in the literature, 
only few studies have adopted both subjective and objective measures of health shocks, and 
only very few studies looked at elderly people in China. This study contributes to the existing 
literature in several ways. Firstly, it measures health shocks in two ways and includes an 
arguably more exogenous measure of health shocks – accidents as a robustness check to 
eliminate biases posed by the difference between self-reported and actual health status. Second, 
                                                 
15 For more discussion about liquidity constraints and financial exclusions in China, please refer to Chapter 2 of 
this thesis.  
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this study specifically focuses on elderly people in China, the largest older population group 
worldwide, using a recent and representative dataset, the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). Third, I differentiate my findings between subgroups of the 
population according to a range of regional and socioeconomic divisions considering wide 
disparities existing between urban and rural areas as well as across provinces in China. This 
study will provide insights on addressing the healthy ageing issue in China.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide a brief 
introduction to the background of the healthcare system in China. Section 3.3 summarises 
findings in the literature on the impacts of health shocks on consumption and on other outcomes 
affecting households’ consumption. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses. Data summary 
statistics and methodology are presented in Section 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Section 3.7 
presents the empirical results. In Section 3.8, I conduct several robustness tests. Section 3.9 
concludes, and Section 3.10 discusses limitations of this study and future research directions.  
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3.2. Public health insurance system in China16 
China has achieved a universal health insurance coverage since 2011. This process has been 
recognised as “unparalleled” (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). Although evaluating the 
effectiveness of China’s health insurance schemes is not the main purpose of this chapter, an 
introduction to the background of the public health insurance system in China helps us 
understand why the OOP medical expenditure that Chinese households are facing is still high 
despite the full coverage provided by the public health insurance. As a result, a large number 
of people do not seek for healthcare due to high OOP medical costs and their inability to pay 
for such costs (Wang et al., 2018).  
In China, health-related legislations and policies are designed by the central government. 
Yet, health insurance is directly provided and financed by local governments with local 
discretion. There are three types of health insurance schemes in China. Employees including 
retirees in urban areas are covered by the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), 
whilst unemployed urban residents are eligible for self-enrolling in the Urban Resident Basic 
Medical Insurance (URBMI). Rural residents and some migrants can voluntarily participate in 
the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS). In addition, the Medical Assistance 
(MA) programme was launched in 2003 to provide supplementary medical funding to the 
extremely poor residents.  
The premium of all schemes is largely affordable. The yearly enrolment fee is only 140 
RMB (≈ 22 USD) for the URBMI and 160 RMB (≈ 25USD) for the NRCMS with the personal 
contribution being as low as 20 RMB (≈3 USD) for both schemes in 2010 (Zhang et al., 2017). 
                                                 
16  This section largely draws on the People’s Republic of China Health System Review (World Health 
Organization, 2015) and the International Healthcare System Profiles - China (Mossialos et al., 2017). 
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However, the share of total medical expenditure that can be financed by these public health 
insurance schemes is rather limited. Inpatient and outpatient services are financed differently, 
and deductibles, co-payments and ceilings are used by all three medical insurance schemes17. 
UEBMI is the most generous public insurance scheme which has the widest medical service 
coverage, highest reimbursement rates and ceilings compared to that of URBMI and NRCMS. 
Outpatient service utilisation is covered by the UEBMI nation-wide, but it is only covered by 
the URBMI and NRCMS in some developed counties. 
The proportion of medical expenditure which can be covered by the public health 
insurance schemes differs not only across regions but also amongst the levels of healthcare 
providers. In China, health service providers are categorised into tertiary hospitals, secondary 
hospitals and primary healthcare centres. Tertiary hospitals are normally located in the most 
developed cities like Beijing, Shanghai and the capital city of each province. The best medical 
equipment and experts are concentrated in tertiary hospitals. Primary healthcare providers 
include community health centres, rural health units and stations. Compared to hospitals, they 
have limited capacities and can only deal with basic medical conditions. Secondary healthcare 
providers offer a wider range of services compared to that of primary provides, but the quality 
of their services are not as good as tertiary hospitals. Using the same medical service at different 
health institutions is subject to different reimbursement rates. Taking Shanghai as an example, 
in 2013, for city employees with the UEBMI, only 50 percent of outpatient service expenditure 
higher than the deductible (1500 RMB) could be reimbursed at the tertiary level, while 60 
                                                 
17 For clear definitions of deductibles, co-payments and ceilings, please see (World Health Organization, 2015). 
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percent and 65 percent of the expense incurred at the secondary and primary level could be 
reimbursed, respectively18.  
In addition to the varying reimbursement rates, only limited medical services and 
medicines on the national insurance reimbursement list are eligible for reimbursement. For 
example, if a patient with public health insurance is treated with services and medicines outside 
of the national insurance list, s/he needs to pay for the full cost of using these medicines. 
Moreover, both home and hospice medical care expenditures are not covered in all public 
medical insurance schemes.  
In 2016, the OOP health expenditure accounted for less than 30 percent of total health 
expenditure. This percentage was more than halved compared to that in 2001 (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2017). Despite the great reduction in the share of OOP health expenditure 
brought by the universal coverage of public health insurance, Zhang et al. (2017) argue that the 
current health insurance system boosts regional inequalities because the healthcare resources 
are not distributed evenly across regions. In addition, although having public health insurance 
indeed reduces OOP medical expenditure, those with very high medical bills are still at risk due 
to the shallow coverage of these health insurance schemes. 
In this context, Chinese individuals who are going through severe health shocks are 
vulnerable. Firstly, certain diseases can only be treated at tertiary hospitals and several 
specialised secondary hospitals, but the reimbursement rate at this level is lower than that at the 
primary level. Secondly, certain diseases often require treatments and medicines which are not 
on the national insurance list. Patients will have to pay 100 percent of these costs as OOP 
                                                 
18 Source: The Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, URL: 
http://www.12333sh.gov.cn/201712333/index.shtml [In Chinese] 
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expenses. Thirdly, since aftercare and preventive treatments are not generally covered in public 
health insurance schemes, post-shock individuals are likely to face high OOP medical bills for 
a long period of time. Thus, Individuals without enough savings or assets and lack of formal 
and informal access to credit may withdraw from treatments due to their inability to pay for the 
OOP medical costs. Alternatively, they may have to reduce essential consumption on other 
items in order to finance their rising OOP medical expenditure after a health shock.  
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3.3. Literature review 
The relationship between health shocks and socio-economic outcomes in both low and middle 
income countries (LMICs) and other countries has been widely discussed in literature (Liu, 
2016, Genoni, 2012, Mohanan, 2013, Nguyet and Mangyo, 2010, Wagstaff, 2007, Lindelow 
and Wagstaff, 2005). The scope of socio-economic outcomes is ranging from, but not limited 
to, earnings (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005, García-Gómez et al., 2013), consumption 
(Mohanan, 2013, Liu, 2016, Asfaw and Braun, 2004, Gertler et al., 2009), labour market 
participation and supply (Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005), as well as 
households’ coping strategies (Sparrow et al., 2013, Nguyen et al., 2012). However, as various 
measurements of health shocks and estimating strategies are adopted, the findings are mixed. 
The remainder of this section will review all major health shock measurements and summarise 
the findings on the economic impact of health shocks in recent empirical studies.  
3.3.1. Review of health shock measures 
The most widely used measures of health shocks include, among others, changes in individuals’ 
self-assessed health status (Clark and Etilé, 2002, García-Gómez, 2011, Lindelow and Wagstaff, 
2005, Sundmacher, 2012), increased physical limitations (Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Gertler et 
al., 2009), new diagnoses of severe health conditions (Jones et al., 2016), and occurrences of 
accidents or injuries (Mohanan, 2013, Pohl et al., 2013, Zucchelli et al., 2010).  
A health shock is usually defined as a change from self-reported excellent or good health 
to poor health between two waves of a survey19. The idea behind this is that a large drop in 
                                                 
19 Mainstream health surveys such as HRS, SHARE, ELSA and CHARLS adopt a 5-point scale of self-rated health 
status. Respondents are asked to rate their health status into one of the following five categories: excellent, very 
good, good, fair and poor. 
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health status over a relatively short period of time is very likely to be caused by a severe health 
adversity, which is assumed to be unanticipated and exogenous (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). 
Also, by differencing between waves, possible unobservable time-invariant factors which also 
affect outcomes of interest are removed.  
However, there is an increasing number of empirical evidence showing that the self-
reported health status is subject to considerable measurement errors. Bound (1989) discusses 
the reasons why self-assessed health measures are usually biased. First, individuals’ subjective 
judgments on health status are not entirely comparable. Individuals with identical physical 
health conditions may have completely different self-perceptions on their health status. 
Secondly, individuals may have various incentives to misreport their health status. For example, 
those who exit the labour market earlier than others may use poor health as a ‘legitimate’ excuse 
to justify their behaviour. In addition, financial incentives also contribute to misreported health 
status since individuals with poor health may receive social benefits or paid leaves. However, 
this case may not apply to developing countries where such benefits are not commonly available. 
This suggests that self-reported health status may be a better proxy for health shock in LMICs 
than in developed countries with comprehensive social welfare systems. However, the issue of 
lacking comparability across individuals remains as a concern because individual’s self-
perceived health status may be affected by factors such as education background, risk attitude, 
and mental health status other than the actual health status. This issue can be partially solved 
by utilising micro-level dataset with comprehensive information on respondents’ characteristics 
such as socioeconomic status, education background, risk attitude, preferences and so on to 
control for observable individual heterogeneities as much as possible.  
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To eliminate the concerns about the inaccuracy of self-perceived health status, recent 
studies have considered measuring health shocks by the deteriorations of individuals’ mobility 
(Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Gertler et al., 2009). The activity of daily living score is an index 
measuring individuals’ limitations in conducting various activities of daily livings (ADLs) such 
as bathing, dressing, and walking short distances. The ADL score has been proven reliable and 
valid for measuring physical health (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). A health shock is normally 
defined as an increase in the number of physical limitations between two survey waves, with 
the magnitude of such an increase varying across different studies. The ADL score has been 
seen as a reliable health predictor of morbidity and mortality by Millán-Calenti et al. (2010) 
and is widely believed to be more objective compared to the self-reported health status. Yet, 
the availability of ADL information is limited as not all surveys contain this information, and 
it is usually restricted to elderly individuals in surveys. In addition, individuals still have 
incentives to misreport their actual physical limitations for the reasons discussed above.  
Other studies measure health shocks as the occurrence of new severe health conditions 
such as cancer, stroke, or heart problems. Although the information used is still self-reported 
by individuals, the probability of misreporting a health condition decreases with its severity 
(Baker et al., 2004). This suggests the incidence of new severe health conditions can be a fairly 
exogenous measure of health shocks. Furthermore, even though there is no reason to assume 
severe health conditions have no correlations with individuals’ life style and socio-economic 
status, the occurrence of such conditions is very likely to be sudden and unpredictable (Jones 
et al., 2016).  
Although the extent varies, it seems that all above-mentioned health shock measures 
based on individuals self-reported information are subject to measurement error and 
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unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, self-reported health information is most 
convenient to collect, and the above-mentioned problems could be partially eliminated by 
applying appropriate econometric techniques such as differencing and/or propensity score 
matching, as well as controlling for a wide range of individual characteristics such as 
socioeconomic status, education backgrounds, risk attitude and preferences in regression 
analyses20. For above-mentioned reasons, these measures of health shocks remain one of the 
most widely used workhorses in the literature.  
A strand of studies adopt more direct and objective measures of health shocks such as the 
occurrence of accidents or injuries (Mohanan, 2013, Pohl et al., 2013, Zucchelli et al., 2010), 
prolonged stays in hospital (García-Gómez et al., 2013, Schurer, 2014, Wagstaff, 2007)21, a 
large drop in measured hand grip strength (Decker and Schmitz, 2016) or in measured body 
mass index (BMI) (Wagstaff, 2007) 22 . Compared to measures based on self-reported 
information, these measures are more objective and contain less reporting errors.  
Mohanan (2013) uses the injuries sustained in bus accidents in India and matches 
passengers who were injured with passengers travelling on the same bus route but not injured. 
In this setting, the bus accident can be regarded as a random shock which is exogenous to 
individuals’ personal characteristics. This enables casual effect inference on the possible impact 
of a shock on household consumption. Pohl et al. (2013) test the effect of health shocks on 
employment using administrative employment data combined with hospital records from Chile. 
They use traffic accidents as well as other external health shocks including injuries due to 
                                                 
20 I will discuss the estimation strategies in depth in the methodology section.  
21 Data on the occurrence of accidents and length of hospitalisation are usually taken from local administrative 
databases.  
22 Measured hand grip strength, height and weight information is used here because self-reported hand grip 
strength, height/weight information is also subject to reporting errors.  
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falling, assault or fire as proxies of health shocks. This potentially solves the endogeneity issue 
of health shocks. Additionally, in contrast to other studies which mostly use survey data, this 
study takes advantage of the administrative data and provides new evidence on the effect of 
health shocks from an administrative aspect.  
García-Gómez et al. (2013) define a health shock as a prolonged hospitalisation and 
investigate the causal effects of such a shock on employment and income in the Netherlands. 
They identify health shocks as unscheduled and urgent hospital admissions of individuals aged 
between 18 and 64 who have not been admitted in the previous year. Their measure of health 
shocks is more likely to be exogenous than self-reported measures. In addition, the prolonged 
admissions include not only external causes of injury such as road accidents, but also severe 
diseases of the circulatory and digestive system, poisoning and other injuries. Hence, it covers 
a far wider range of conditions than those caused by traffic accidents.  
Similar to García-Gómez et al. (2013), Schurer (2014) exploits healthcare utilisation data 
for Germany and defines lengthy hospital stays or having more frequent doctor visits as health 
shocks23. Similarly, Wagstaff (2007) defines those who have been hospitalized during the past 
12 months for seven days or more as individuals with health shocks. 
Decker and Schmitz (2016) define health shocks by large drops of hand grip strength 
between two survey waves. The rationale of this measure is that poor muscle strength can be 
an objective sign of general health deterioration. The hand grip strength has been proven closely 
related to overall muscular strength, onset of severe chronic diseases and mortality (Rantanen 
et al., 2003, Roberts et al., 2011). Although the loss of hand grip strength is presumably a valid 
                                                 
23 An individual is considered as suffering from a heath shock if he/she experiences an increase in the total 
number of healthcare visits/stays between two survey waves greater than one standard deviation in the sample.  
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measure of health shocks, this information is not universally available or/and is only available 
for limited waves in health-related surveys. As measuring hand grip strength requires the 
presence of a nurse or well-trained practitioner in addition to the interviewer, the cost of 
conducting this measure is higher than that of a normal interview.  
Wagstaff (2007) measures health shocks as a sharp reduction of BMI. A sharp drop is 
defined as a drop exceeding one standard deviation of the distribution of BMI change between 
survey waves24. The author argues that BMI reduction is a good proxy for a health shock 
because a very low BMI (below 18.5) has been proven associated with an increasing risk of 
death. However, as the drop of BMI can be a result of healthier diets or more exercises other 
than severe and unanticipated health events, it remains unclear if BMI reduction should be used 
as an indicator for health shocks.  
In a nutshell, there is a rigorous trade-off when choosing between measures of health 
shocks based on self-reported information and others. Self-reported measures may be subject 
to measurement errors and endogeneity issues, but objective measures are not flawless and 
more difficult to obtain. Strauss and Thomas (1998) argue that health is multidimensional and 
is usually measured with large errors. One health indicator alone is not adequate to capture all 
dimensions of health. Thus, multiple health indicators should be used. Therefore, in this study, 
I measure households’ health shocks in two ways, namely the onset of severe condition(s) and 
deterioration of activities of daily living. Besides, I also use the occurrence of an accident, the 
most exogenous health shock measure, to conduct a set of robustness tests. 
                                                 
24 This criterion does not vary across gender and age groups.  
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3.3.2. Wide impacts of health shocks 
Health shocks have been found to be associated with reduced labour participation (Riphahn, 
1999, Hagan et al., 2008, Danø, 2005, Disney et al., 2006), income loss (Gertler and Gruber, 
2002, Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005, Liu, 2016, Wagstaff, 2007), higher OOP medical 
expenditure (Nguyet and Mangyo, 2010, Mohanan, 2013) and reduced consumption on non-
medical items (Gertler and Gruber, 2002, Saksena et al., 2010, Van Doorslaer et al., 2006, 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003, Kumara and Samaratunge, 2017, Wang et al., 2006)25. Empirical 
evidence for a non-significant change of food/non-medical expenditure is also plentiful (Nguyet 
and Mangyo, 2010, Genoni, 2012, Islam and Maitra, 2012, Fang et al., 2012, Mohanan, 2013, 
Liu, 2016, Mitra et al., 2016). However, in studies which find such non-significant impact of 
health shocks in the full sample, health shocks sometimes affect certain subgroups of the 
population. For example, Genoni (2012) finds evidence for a negative impact of health shocks 
on non-medical consumption for low-educated individuals, Nguyet and Mangyo (2010) find 
similar evidence for farm households. Mitra et al. (2016) find that households with female heads 
are least able to protect consumption against health shocks. The details of these studies are 
summarised as follows.  
Taking a sample consisting of 19,509 full-time employed West-German and foreign 
individuals aged 40 to 59 from the first eleven waves (1984-1994) of the German Socio-
Economic Panel, Riphahn (1999) finds that a health shock increases the probability of leaving 
the labour force and almost doubles the unemployment risk. In addition, health shocks have a 
                                                 
25 As declined labour participation and earnings may adversely affect household’s consumption profile by reducing 
available sources for consumption, I also include several studies investigating the impact of health shocks on 
labour outcomes in the present literature review.  
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larger impact on women than on men. Although the state welfare helps mitigate the negative 
impact of health shocks for the poorest section of the population, the mitigation is insufficient.  
Using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) over the period 1994-2001, 
Hagan et al. (2008) test the effect of health shocks across nine European Union counties and 
find evidence of an increasing probability of retiring following a health shock. Using a 
longitudinal sample from Denmark for the years 1981-2000, Danø (2005) finds that a road 
accident has a significantly negative impact on individuals’ employment rates in both the short- 
and long-run, but no significant effect on disposable income. The result shows that Danish 
individuals’ disposable income is well insured after a road injury. Using the British Household 
Panel Survey (1991-1998), Disney et al. (2006) find that current adverse health shocks reduce 
individuals’ labour participations and that this effect is persistent among workers aged between 
50 and the state pension age. Using a more recent survey, the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study (UKHLS), over the period 2009-2015, Jones et al. (2016) find that an acute health shock 
leads to a 7.2 percent reduction in labour market participation and doubles the risk of leaving 
the labour market (2009-2015). Using the ECHP for the years 1994-2001, García Gómez and 
López Nicolás (2006) find that health shocks reduce the probability of remaining in full time 
employment by 5.0 percent and increase the probability of becoming labour inactive by 3.5 
percent in Spain. They also provide evidence that health shocks lead to potential spill-over 
effects on other household members’ labour decisions.  
Although the number of existing studies is limited, the empirical findings from LMICs 
also support the negative relationship between health shocks and labour related outcomes. 
Drawing data from the 1991 and 1993 Indonesian Resource Mobilization Study, Gertler and 
Gruber (2002) find that a health shock which is defined as a drop in the ADL index, leads to a 
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84 percent reduction in hours worked and a 74 percent increase in the probability of leaving the 
labour market in Indonesia.  
3.3.3. Impact of health shocks on consumption 
The empirical evidence on the effects of health shocks on consumption is mixed but abundant26. 
The results highly depend on countries, health shock measures used, as well as definitions of 
consumption.  
As LMICs are characterised by incomplete financial markets, less generous public health 
insurance schemes and limited social safety nets, consumption smoothing in the presence of 
shocks might be more difficult for households in these countries. However, empirical results 
suggest that households’ food consumption is well insured against health shocks in general, but 
the findings for non-food consumption are mixed. A large increase in OOP medical expenditure 
is consistently found following health shocks, with magnitude between 0 and 30 percent 
depending on the measures of shocks and on countries (Alam and Mahal, 2014).  
Taking a sample from the 1993, 1997, and 2000 Indonesia Family Life Survey, Nguyet 
and Mangyo (2010) find that a health shock can result in a yearly reduction of work hours by 
up to 100 hours. In their study, the health shock is defined as a change of ADLs between two 
consecutive surveys. However, they find that non-medical consumption does not largely 
respond to health shocks. A one standard error adverse change of ADLs is associated with only 
a 1-3 percent change in food consumption.  
                                                 
26 Here, I only review evidence obtained in the context of LMICs because LMICs are very distinctive from 
developed countries in terms of generosity of public health insurance schemes as well as development of credit 
and insurance markets. 
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Asfaw and Braun (2004) test the effect of health shocks on consumption in rural Ethiopia 
using data taken from the 1994 and 1995 Ethiopian Rural Household Surveys. The results 
suggest that while households’ food consumption is insured against health shocks, their non-
food consumption (medical expenditure excluded) declines significantly when the health status 
of a household’s head changes from healthy to unhealthy. This finding suggests that neither 
households themselves nor existing risk-sharing arrangements in Ethiopia are sufficient to 
smooth households’ non-food consumption against health shocks.  
Similarly, Kumara and Samaratunge (2017) find that food consumption, as well as 
consumption on housing, clothing and other non-basic items, are not insured in Sri Lanka in 
the presence of adverse health events. They reach this conclusion using a sample of 20,535 
households who were interviewed in the 2012/2013 Sri Lanka Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey. With the OOP medical expenditure increasing due to illnesses, poorer 
households are more likely to sacrifice food consumption as well as housing and clothing 
expenditures compared to the richer. However, non-basic consumption is still negatively 
affected for the rich, as they also need to finance the increasing OOP medical expenditure.  
In contrast, Genoni (2012) finds no statistically significant evidence of health shocks 
defined as deterioration of physical functioning on household’s total non-medical and food 
expenditure in Indonesia. Consumption seems fairly smooth following an adverse health event 
despite household earnings being significantly reduced after the shock. This finding contrasts 
those of Gertler and Gruber (2002), according to which, in the same country, using a similar 
health shock measure, deterioration of physical functioning compromises household non-
medical consumption. Genoni (2012) explains that the difference between her findings and that 
of Gertler and Gruber (2002) is due to different assumptions about reverse causality and omitted 
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bias. To be specific, Genoni (2012) uses an IV approach to address possible endogeneity of 
one’s health status, but Gertler and Gruber (2002) assume exogeneity of their health shock 
measures and use an IV approach to instrument household’s income change only. 
In a quasi-experimental setting of bus accidents in India, Mohanan (2013) matches 
individuals involved in bus accidents with those who travelled on the same bus route but were 
not involved in accidents, and estimates the differences in consumption items between these 
two groups. He finds that health shock defined as exposure to bus accidents does not affect 
household’s food, housing and festival consumption. Annual health spending among those 
suffering from a health shock is significantly higher than that of those who without. Education 
spending declines following the bus accident, but the magnitude of such reduction is small (548 
Indian Rupees). The author further tests the possible mechanism that helps smooth consumption. 
He finds that the likelihood of households having debt or borrowing is around five times higher 
for households with a health shock compared to that of households without. This finding 
suggests that households exposed to a health shock finance their increasing health expenditure 
mainly through borrowing rather than reducing consumption on non-medical items.  
Using a balanced panel consisting of 2,694 households in Bangladesh who participated 
in a longitudinal household level survey from 1997 to 2005, Islam and Maitra (2012) measure 
health shocks in multiple ways. They define three short-term health shock indicators, namely 
having any household member being sick during the last 15 days prior to the survey, the number 
of days of being sick and the number of days of refraining from work due to sickness; two long-
term ones, namely having any big medical expenditure in the past year and death of main earner 
in the family. They do not find a significant association between household non-medical 
consumption and any measure of health shocks. They also point out that household’s ability of 
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insuring their consumption in the presence of a health shocks comes from selling livestock 
and/or other assets. Households with access to microcredit are less likely to sell assets compared 
to those without, following a health shock. This is because those who have access to microcredit 
could take loans when the income is affected after health shocks, and this avoids them from 
having to sell assets.  
Mitra et al. (2016) also find a non-significant effect of health shocks on Vietnamese 
household’s non-medical consumption. Specifically, they use data from 3 waves of the Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey covering the years 2004, 2006 and 2008. They find that 
health shocks are not significantly associated with household’s total expenditure and non-food 
expenditure. The association between one health shock indicator (defined as days in which the 
respondent was unable to carry out regular activities) and food consumption is found to be 
statistically significant and negative, but the magnitude of such association is low. The authors 
also document that the medical expenditure increases largely after health shocks.  
In the context of China, Liu (2016) assesses the role of public health insurance in 
mitigating the adverse outcomes resulting from health shocks in rural areas. Using the 
introduction of a large-scale health insurance scheme in rural China as a natural experiment and 
data taken from the China Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS), he finds that households’ food 
consumption was fully insured against negative health shocks even before they were covered 
by the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS). However, a 10 percent increase in the size 
of a health shock was found associated with an 8 percent increase in child employment. 
Households with NCMS were less likely to reduce their children’s education compared to those 
without NCMS following health shocks. This finding suggests that the health insurance (NCMS) 
seems to relieve the financial burden for households in illness and thus smooth their 
  
84 
 
consumption. However, as the author only defines the health shock as the change of households’ 
self-reported health status and the sample is limited to rural China, his results may be subject 
to endogeneity issues as well as sample selection bias.  
Also using the CHNS, Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) investigate the impact of health 
shocks on income, labour supply, consumption as well as medical expenditure in China. In their 
study, health shocks are defined as a large drop in the individual’s self-assessed health status. 
They use fixed-effect models to address the unobserved individual heterogeneity of preferences 
or health endowments. They find that adverse health shocks are associated with substantial 
declines in income and labour supply and with a significant increase in OOP medical 
expenditure. The association is smaller, but still significant, for the poor. They also find that 
the increase in OOP medical expenditure is larger for those who have health insurance. This 
indicates that those who do not have health insurances are less likely to use healthcare services. 
The authors do not estimate the impact of health shocks on non-medical expenditure items. 
Fang et al. (2012) study the impact of ill conditions on OOP medical expenditure as well 
as on other types of consumption in Western China. Their sample consists of three western 
cities, namely Lan Zhou, Gui Lin and Xi An. The average per capita GDP of these three cities 
was about 3,200 USD in 2008, ranked in the lowest quartile among all cities in China. Based 
on 2,899 telephone interviews, the authors find a statistically significant association between 
illnesses and OOP medical expenditure. However, there is no evidence suggesting that OOP 
medical expenditure is negatively associated with consumption on non-medical items. They 
attribute this non-negative association to the fast-developing Chinese economy and high level 
of household savings.  
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In contrast, using a survey consisting of 4,553 households conducted in rural China in 
2002, Wang et al. (2006) find that rising OOP medical expenditure due to ill health is 
significantly associated with lower households’ expenditures on education, social activities, 
savings and other expenses. The negative association is more pronounced among households 
with low income. However, it is worth noting that their survey was conducted before the 
universal coverage of public health insurance was achieved. The result may change if more 
recent data was used.  
In a nutshell, with Wang et al. (2006) as an exception, empirical studies in China largely 
support the positive association between health shocks and OOP medical expenditure. Non-
medical expenditure seems to be fully insured against shocks. There are less disputes among 
studies on China compared to studies on Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka where reduction of 
non-medical consumption is often found. This difference is potentially explained by the 
difference in income across these countries. According to the World Bank Database, in 2016, 
the net national income per capita was 6,309 USD in China, 3,459 USD in Sri Lanka, 2,817 in 
Indonesia and 1,810 in Vietnam27. A higher income, compared to other LMICs, may provide 
more resources for consumption when experiencing health shocks.  
 
  
                                                 
27 These figures are in 2018 US Dollar. Data source: http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/home 
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3.4. Development of hypotheses  
3.4.1. General hypothesis  
Many studies have documented that households’ food consumption is fully insured after the 
occurrence of a health shock (Mitra et al., 2016, Mohanan, 2013, Islam and Maitra, 2012). 
Among them, Liu (2016) and Fang et al. (2012) provide evidence on China. Liu (2016) finds 
that health shocks are not associated with reductions in household food consumption even prior 
to the universal coverage of public health insurance. A positive association between adverse 
health events and OOP medical expenditure is consistently found, but it does not seem to affect 
household’s non-medical consumption28. For example, Fang et al. (2012) do not find any 
negative association between the increasing OOP medical expenditure and consumption on 
other non-medical items after an onset of illness.  
The first wave of CHARLS was conducted in 2011, two follow-up waves were conducted 
in 2013 and 2015 respectively. An universal coverage of public health insurance was achieved 
by 2011 (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013), and it has been playing an active role in reducing 
Chinese individuals’ healthcare burden (Zhang et al., 2017). As such, using this dataset, I do 
not expect a negative association between a health shock and household’s consumption on non-
medical items29. However, I do expect a positive association between a health shock and OOP 
medical expenditure because the overall healthcare expenses following a health shock will 
increase and so does the OOP medical expenditure. I thus hypothesise that:  
                                                 
28 Wang et al. (2006), as an exception, find that ill health reduces household investment in human capital, as well 
as other consumptions that are critical to human well-being in China such as expenditure on recreational items. 
Yet, the data used in their study was collected in 2002, when the current public health insurance schemes had not 
been launched and the OOP medical expenditure out of total health expenditure was as high as 58 percent.  
29 Durable consumption is excluded here. Hereafter, non-medical consumption refers to household non-durable 
consumption minus OOP medical expenditure. See Section 3.5 for more details.  
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H1: Following a health shock, Chinese households’ food consumption and other non-medical 
consumption remain unchanged, while OOP medical expenditure increases. 
3.4.2. Differentiating the effect of health shocks on OOP medical expenditure between rural 
and urban areas 
With rapid economic development, healthcare inequalities between rural and urban areas have 
been rising (Wang et al., 2016). Liu et al. (1999) document that Chinese urban residents have 
better access to and higher utilisation of healthcare compared to their rural counterparts. There 
are more rural residents who do not utilise inpatient services compared to urban residents, due 
to rural residents’ inability to pay. According to statistics released by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, in 2014, medical expenditure (OOP and non-OOP) per capita is 1,412 RMB 
for rural residents and 3,558 RMB for urban residents (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2017)30. When a health shock hits, urban residents are likely to utilise health services more 
frequently than their rural counterparts. Therefore, the OOP medical expenditure, following a 
health shock, is likely to be higher for urban residents due to more intensive utilisation of 
healthcare facilities. I thus hypothesise that:  
 
H2: In the presence of a health shock, the increase in OOP medical expenditure is higher for 
urban residents compared to their rural counterparts. 
                                                 
30 Source: 2017 China Statistical Yearbook, compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. URL: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/indexeh.htm 
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3.4.3. Differentiating the effect of health shocks on OOP medical expenditure between the poor 
and others 
The poor are more vulnerable to health shocks and economic status is positively associated with 
the utilisation of healthcare services. Wang et al. (2018) find that, compared to others, 
individuals within the lowest quintile of income in CHARLS 2015 have a higher likelihood of 
either not seeking for healthcare or dismissing from a period of hospitalisation early. This is 
due to individuals with very low income being unable to afford the OOP medical cost. Among 
those who seek for healthcare, 30 percent of the richest (top 20 percent of per capital income 
distribution) seek healthcare at county or higher level hospitals, while only 15 percent of the 
poorest (bottom 20 percent of per capital income distribution) seek healthcare at the same level 
(You and Kobayashi, 2011). This reflects that the poor utilise healthcare services less intensive 
than the non-poor. Thus, in the presence of a health shock, the poor may experience less 
frequent and intensive utilisation of healthcare compared to the rich. This leads the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: In the presence of a health shocks, individuals with lower income will experience a smaller 
increase in OOP medical expenditure compared to their counterparts with higher income.  
3.4.4. Differentiating the effect of health shocks on OOP medical expenditure across provinces 
with different levels of health service access and quality 
Regional differences in China are not limited to the rural-urban disparity. Residents living in 
some provinces have easier access to the healthcare system and receive better quality healthcare 
compared to those living in other provinces. According to the 2017 China Statistical Yearbook, 
the number of licenced doctors per 1,000 residents in Beijing was 4.11. However, this number 
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was only 1.72 in Jiangxi province. Moreover, Fang et al. (2010) document that Beijing also has 
the highest number of nurses and other health workers and receives the highest funds allocated 
to the health sector.  
The Healthcare Access and Quality (HAQ) Index, a composite index ranging from 1 (the 
lowest) to 100 (the highest), measures the overall personal healthcare access and quality across 
countries and subnational locations. The detailed methodology used to construct this index is 
explained in Barber et al. (2017). It is a comprehensive indicator based on raw data drawn from 
the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries and Risk Factors Study. The subnational HAQ indices 
are available for 33 Chinese provinces and special administrative regions in 2016. China was 
characterised by one of the largest disparity in subnational levels of HAQ. The HAQ Index 
ranged from 91.5 in Beijing to 48.0 in Tibet. The gap is as high as 43.5 points. Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and Guangdong were provinces 
(municipalities) within the highest and the second highest HAQ Index deciles. Fullman et al. 
(2018) have shown evidence of a strong relationship between the HAQ Index and total health 
spending per capita. Based on this finding, I define the above-mentioned provinces 
(municipalities) as provinces with higher HAQ Index and hypotheses that:  
H4: The association between health shocks and increase in OOP medical expenditure is larger 
for residents living in provinces with higher HAQ Index compared to residents in other 
provinces.  
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3.5. Data and summary statistics 
The data is drawn from the 2011, 2013 and 2015 waves of China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). The CHARLS consists of a large nationally representative 
sample of individuals aged 45 or over and their spouses from 450 communities across 28 
provinces in China. It is designed to be comparable with world leading studies in ageing such 
as the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). It contains 
comprehensive information on individuals’ demographics, socioeconomic status, health status 
and household income and expenditure. The baseline survey was conducted in 2011 with 
17,708 individuals from 10,257 households being interviewed. Two follow-up waves were 
conducted in 2013 and 2015, respectively. 81.0 percent of the 2011 individuals were able to 
participate in the 2013 follow-up interviews and 2,834 new individuals were added to the 2013 
sample to keep the sample’s representativeness. In 2015, 574 new individuals were added to 
the sample and 20,517 (97.3 percent of the total 2015 sample) individuals were followed.  
As health shocks are defined as either a new onset of diseases since the last wave or a 25 
percent increase in physical limitations between two consecutive waves, I only include 
individuals who have participated in at least 2 consecutive waves of CHARLS in the present 
study, leading to an exclusion of about 3,500 individuals. I further exclude 1,607 individuals 
who are younger than 45 because this study mainly focuses on the older individuals. The final 
sample consists of 10,951 individuals who participated in all waves, 2,705 individuals who 
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participated in the 2011 and 2013 waves, and 2,455 individuals who participated in the 2013 
and 2015 waves. Therefore, there are 43,173 individual-wave observations in total31.  
3.5.1. Dependent variables 
There is a distinction between consumption and expenditure. Consumption is the output of a 
home production function that uses both expenditure and time as inputs, while expenditure is 
the purchase of goods and services in a market setting regardless of time (Becker, 1965). Taking 
food consumption and expenditure as an example, following a shock which leads to a negative 
income change, a decline in household’s food expenditure may be observed because households 
may reduce expenditure on eating-out or seek for better deals of food ingredients to fund rising 
medical expenses. However, the quantity and quality of actual food intake measured by calories 
intake may remain unaffected (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). Thus, calories or macro nutrients 
intake from food is a better proxy of food consumption than monetary expenditure on 
purchasing food ingredients. In addition, after a shock, households may reduce or postpone 
durable expenditure to meet the need for basic consumption items. In this case, we may see a 
decline in household’s total yearly expenditure (including expenditure on durable goods) but 
expenditures on non-durable items may remain unaffected. Under this circumstance, equating 
consumption with expenditure including durables will lead to false rejections of consumption 
smoothing theories. To reduce consumption volatility posed by the purchase of durable goods, 
in this paper, I only study changes between waves in households’ yearly non-durable 
                                                 
31 It is worth mentioning that, as not all individuals who participated in the baseline survey could be tracked in 
follow-up surveys, the concern about attrition arises. Some of the initial sampled individuals may have dropped 
out of following surveys due to a range of factors such as death or moving home. Attrition might lead to biased 
estimation of the effects of health shocks if a large amount of first-wave observations dropped out of follow-up 
surveys due to the incidence of health shocks. I discuss attrition in the sample I use in Section 3.5.4. In a nutshell, 
I do not find evidence of severe attritions existing.  
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consumption and its components. Besides, since the food consumption measured by calories or 
macro nutrients intake is not available in CHARLS, when calculating household food 
expenditure, I only look at food-at-home expenditure and exclude eating-out expenditure to 
minimise the difference between consumption and expenditure. In this setting, household 
expenditure is a close proxy for actual household consumption. I thus use ‘consumption’ and 
‘expenditure’ interchangeably.  
The impact of health shocks and the ability of households to smooth consumption may 
vary across different consumption items (Islam and Maitra, 2012). For example, following a 
health shock, the out-of-pocket medical expenditure is likely to increase while other non-food 
consumption items may drop to compensate for the increased medical expenditure. I thus 
differentiate the impact of health shocks on households’ yearly food-at-home expenditure, OOP 
medical expenditure, non-food and non-medical expenditure, non-medical expenditure, and 
total non-durable expenditure, separately. The calculation and sub-components of each item is 
explained in Appendix 3.1.  
To take into account the fact that households larger in size have higher expenditure on 
food, I scale food-at-home expenditure and other expenditure items that include food-at-home 
expenditure by household size. Thus, except for the OOP medical expenditure and household 
total non-durable expenditure, other expenditure items are measured at per capita level. 
All money-related variables in the 2013 and 2015 waves such as household income and 
wealth as well as all expenditure items are deflated to the 2011 price level32. To reduce the 
possibility of the results being affected by extreme values, I dropped observations lower than 
                                                 
32 I use the 2012 to 2015 provincial annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (preceding year is 100) reported by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China to deflate the 2015 values. I use the 2012 and 2013 provincial annual CPI 
to deflate the 2013 values.  
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the 1st percentile or higher than the 99th percentile for each dependent variable. It is also worth 
mentioning that all dependent variables are in levels in the data description and in logarithms 
in the regressions.  
3.5.2. Health shock indicators 
3.5.2.1. Onset of severe health conditions 
The occurrence of severe health conditions increases largely with age (Jones et al., 2016). Since 
the targeted sample in this study comprises older individuals only, I use the onset of new severe 
health condition(s) between two survey waves as the first measure of a health shock. The onset 
of severe illnesses, as a measure of health shock, is well-justified by Jones et al. (2016) and 
Trevisan and Zantomio (2016). It is argued that this measure is less prone to reporting bias 
compared to other measures such as self-perceived health status differences or self-reported 
intensive medical service utilisations. Moreover, the incidence of severe illnesses is normally 
unanticipated, which reduces the concern of endogeneity of health due to the complex health 
and socio-economic nexus.  
In CHARLS, returning individuals were asked if they had been diagnosed with any 
medical condition listed in the questionnaire since their last interview33. Following Jones et al. 
(2016) and Trevisan and Zantomio (2016), I identify individuals who were diagnosed with one 
or more acute illnesses such as cancer, heart attack and stroke since the last wave as individuals 
experiencing a health shock (new_severe=1). 
                                                 
33 Full items on this condition list in CHARLS include: hypertension; dyslipidemia, diabetes, cancer or malignant 
tumour, chronic lung/liver/kidney disease (excluding tumours or cancer), heart attack, stroke, digestive disease, 
psychiatric problems, memory loss, arthritis and asthma.  
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Additionally, I also construct a dummy variable new_moderate which is equal to one if 
the respondents were diagnosed with one or more moderate health conditions including diabetes, 
hypertension, arthritis, lung/liver/kidney disease since their last interview, and zero otherwise. 
This is to capture the possible impact on household consumption posed by any newly-diagnosed 
moderate health conditions. Individuals who are diagnosed with one or more of these conditions 
are expected to take drugs in the long-run and thus have higher medical expenditure compared 
to those without.  
3.5.2.2. Deterioration of mobility  
The second health shock measure is based on respondents’ self-reported ability to perform a set 
of activities of daily living (ADLs). ADL is a widely used measure of individual physical 
function. For the elderly, physical function is an essential indicator of general health status and 
has strong impact on their life satisfaction and wellbeing. Physical function measures have been 
tested and validated as a reliable measure of health34.  
In CHARLS, there are 20 ADLs items35. A score is calculated for each individual with 
respect to whether or not s/he had difficulty in conducting each ADL item. For example, for an 
ADL item X, an individual with difficulty or unable to conduct activity X scores one, and zero 
otherwise. A total ADL score is then calculated by summing his/her score for each ADL item. 
Following Gertler and Gruber (2002), I then calculate an ADL index as follows: 
𝐴𝐷𝐿⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ⁡
(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒−min 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
(max𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒−min𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)
, 
                                                 
34 Please see Bound (1989) and Gertlet and Gruber (2002) for justifications of ADLs as a measure of health.  
35 Please see Appendix 3.2 for a list of ADLs in CHARLS.  
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where score represents each individual’s total ADL score, min score and max score are 
respectively the minimum and maximum score in each of the yearly cross-sectional. The ADL 
index takes value one if the individual cannot perform any ADLs and zero if s/he can perform 
all ADLs without difficulty. 
The second health shock indicator is constructed according to the change in the ADL 
index between two consecutive surveys. If an individual experiences a change in his/her ADL 
index larger than 0.25 since the last wave, s/he is defined as an individual experiencing a health 
shock (deteriorationADL =1)36.  
5.2.3 Other controls 
In line with other studies (Liu, 2016, Zhang et al., 2017), I employ a comprehensive set of 
control variables in addition to the health shock variables. I include, in the regression models, 
respondents’ age, education level, marital status, current employment status, household income 
and wealth, household size, home ownership, self-reported health status, as well as mental 
health status37. Considering individuals with higher health service utilisation have higher OOP 
medical expenditure compared to those who do not use health services, I include two dummy 
variables indicating respondents who did not have any inpatient visit in the last 12 months and 
respondents who had more than 1 inpatient visit in the last 1238. Table 3.1 provides detailed a 
definition of each variable. 
                                                 
36 I also tried other benchmarks to define health shock, such as ADL score dropping by 20%, 30% and 35%, 
respectively. However, the results are very similar to using 25% as the benchmark. 
37 Considering the possible non-linearity of age, I included age squared in my models. However, the coefficient of 
age squared was almost zero. I thus excluded age squared from my models.  
38 In CHARLS, outpatient care utilisation is asked on a monthly basis and the frequency of outpatient utilisation 
is not recorded. The frequency of healthcare utilisation was only asked for inpatient visits. I thus cannot calculate 
a reliable yearly measure of utilisation of outpatient visits. As a result, the utilisation variables in this study are 
based on information of inpatient care usage only.  
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3.5.3. Summary statistics  
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics and definitions of all variables. On average, yearly per 
capita expenditure on food-at-home, non-food non-medical expenditure per capita and non-
medical expenditure per capita are 3,417 RMB, 3,729 RMB and 6,582 RMB, respectively. The 
average annual household OOP medical expenditure is 3,376 RMB. The average household 
total non-durable consumption is 22,777 RMB. 4.2 percent of the sample experience the onset 
of a severe conditions such as cancer, stroke and heart attack and 13.8 percent of them 
experience the onset of moderate chronic conditions. 7.1 percent of the sample experience a 
deterioration in their ADL index. The average age in my sample is around 61. 48.5 percent of 
the sample are male and over 80 percent of them are married. More than 20 percent of the 
sample are illiterate, 10 percent have completed high school and 2.3 percent have completed a 
bachelor’s degree or above. Annual household income on average is 28,242 RMB, and 
household financial wealth is 14,380 RMB. The average household size is 3.2. 22.3 percent of 
the sample perceive their health status as excellent, very good or good and 26.2 percent perceive 
their health status as poor. 30.3 percent of the sample show clinical depression symptoms which 
is defined as CES-D score higher than 10 using the CES-D 10 items list (Andresen et al., 1994, 
Radloff, 1977). 86.3 percent of respondents did not make any inpatient visit in the last 12 
months and 4.2 percent made more than 1 inpatient visits. 1.9 percent of the sample do not have 
any kinds of medical insurance.  
Table 3.2 presents the differences in consumption items between individual experiencing 
health shocks and individuals without health shocks. The difference in OOP medical 
expenditure is significant. On average, individuals who experienced (did not experience) the 
onset of severe diseases spend 6,213 RMB (3,233 RMB) on OOP medical expenditure. The 
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difference in OOP medical expenditure between individuals with new moderate conditions and 
without is 1,183 RMB. This difference between individuals with ADL deterioration and without 
is 2,211 RMB.  
Individuals with new severe conditions spend slightly more on food compared to those 
without. But individuals with ADL deteriorations spend 361 RMB less on average compared 
to those without. The difference may be due to the fact that cooking at home would be more 
difficult for those who have physical limitations. Thus, food-at-home expenditure is likely to 
decrease following ADL deteriorations. There is no significant difference in food-at-home 
expenditure between individuals with new moderate conditions and those without.  
Non-food and non-medical expenditure, and non-medical expenditure do not 
significantly differ between individuals with new conditions and without. Yet, there are 
statistically significant differences between these expenditures for individuals with ADL 
deteriorations and without. Specifically, individuals with ADL deteriorations spend 1,014 RMB 
and 1,443 RMB less on non-food non-medical items and on non-medical items, respectively, 
compared to those without.  
Individuals with new medical conditions have higher household total non-durable 
expenditure compared to those without. This difference could be driven by the higher OOP 
medical expenditure for individuals with new medical conditions. Individuals with ADL 
deteriorations have a lower total non-durable expenditure. This can be explained considering 
that non-food and non-medical expenditure may drop following ADL deteriorations.  
The summary statistics partially support H1. By comparing group means, individuals with 
health shocks have significantly higher OOP medical expenditure compared to others. However, 
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the cross-group tabulations can only provide limited information. Expenditure on other items 
varies between groups, but the differences may be driven by factors other than health shocks. 
Thus, rigorous econometric analysis is needed.  
3.5.4. Attrition in the sample 
As the panel is unbalanced, the concern of attrition bias arises39. There exist individuals who 
have participated in the 2011 and 2013 waves but dropped out from the 2015 wave. These make 
up about 11 percent of my sample. Although this rate is relatively low considering the fact that 
attrition rates are often reported as 30 – 70 percent in health related surveys (Gustavson et al., 
2012), it is especially problematic if the reason of dropping out from the 2015 wave survey 
correlates to my independent variables of interest – health shocks. Biased estimates may be 
obtained if the correlation between attrition and health shocks is not significantly different from 
zero.  
Following Liu (2016), I test whether or not attrition is highly correlated with my health 
shocks variables by estimating the association between attrition and health shock variables 
conditioning on other control variables. I construct an indicator equal to 1 if an individual is a 
retained observation in the 2015 wave, and 0 otherwise. I then regress this indicator of attrition 
on all control variables as well as my health shock indicators using the OLS method with robust 
standard errors. The correlation between attrition and new_severe is significantly different from 
0 with a t-value of -2.14, but small in magnitude. The correlation between attrition and 
new_moderate/deteriorationADL is statistically insignificant from 0 and small in magnitude. 
The estimated coefficients of new_severe, new_moderate and deteriorationADL are -0.028, -
                                                 
39 Sample representativeness may be another concern in the context of not all initial observations being followed. 
However, CHARLS sample was refreshed with new observations being added in each follow-up survey to ensure 
sample representativeness. Thus, the sample remains representative at least at the cross-sectional level.  
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0.008 and -0.016 respectively. The robust standard errors are 0.013, 0.007 and 0.010 
respectively. This finding suggests that attrition may not pose severe biases in my estimation.  
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3.6. Methodology  
3.6.1. Main specification  
I am interested in testing the extent to which health shocks relate to different household 
consumption components. I estimate the following model:  
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜸𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                              (3.1) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡is one of the following: (1) the logarithm of per capita expenditure on food at home 
(2) the logarithm of OOP medical expenditure; (3) the logarithm of non-food and non-medical 
expenditure per capita; (4) the logarithm of non-medical expenditure per capita; (5) the 
logarithm of total non-durable consumption, for individual i at time t. 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if individual i is exposed to a health shock at time t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 is 
a vector of other control variables including individual i’s age, education level, marital status, 
household income and wealth, household size, home ownership, physical and mental health 
status, and a set of healthcare utilisation dummies. The definitions and more information on 
health shock indicators and other control variables are provided in Table 3.1. In line with Liu 
(2016) and Fang et al. (2012) who do not find consumption on non-medical items being affected 
after illnesses, I expect 𝛽1  to be significantly positive when the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of OOP medical expenditure, and insignificant when the dependent variable is one 
of the other consumption items.  
The error term in Equation 3.1 consists of an individual-specific component (𝜇𝑖), a time-
specific component (𝜇𝑡), a provincial-specific component (𝜇𝑝), and an idiosyncratic error term 
(𝜇𝑖,𝑡). The inclusion of the time-specific component (𝜇𝑡) and provincial-specific component 
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(𝜇𝑝) allows for time trends and provincial differences. These are accounted for by including 
time and provincial dummies in all my models. 
If health status is measured with errors, then taking the difference of health status between 
two observational periods should eliminate the concerns for time-invariant unobservable 
individual heterogeneity affecting the accuracy of self-reported information and/or 
consumption. However, it is worth mentioning that several control variables, namely education 
level, marital status, home ownership, household size and health status do not vary or only vary 
insignificantly between waves. Moreover, I am interested in testing whether or not the effect of 
health shocks can be differentiated according to regions and rural/urban divisions. This cannot 
be estimated in a fixed-effects or differencing setting as provinces where respondents reside in 
and urban/rural divisions do not frequently change over time. In addition, the main variable of 
interest, the health shock, is already measured through same individuals’ health differences 
between two waves. This should eliminate the concern about unobserved time-invariant factors 
affecting the accuracy of individual self-reported information. I thus adopt a random-effects 
(RE) estimator. I estimate Equation 3.1 using one health shock indicator at a time, and then, 
use all three health indicators at the same time.  
The correlations between health shock indicators are reported in Table 3.3. We can see 
that all health shock indicators are positively correlated. The correlation coefficient between 
new_severe and new_moderate is 0.120, that between new_severe and deteriorationADL is 
0.085, and that between new_moderate and deteriorationADL is 0.055.  
In line with H1, I expect 𝛽1 to be positive and significantly different from zero when the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of OOP medical expenditure but insignificantly different 
from zero when the dependent variable is one of the other expenditure items.  
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3.6.2. Urban vs. rural residents 
To test H2, I estimate the following model: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖) + ⁡𝜸𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
(3.2) 
where 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙  and 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙)  are interactions between the health shock 
indicator(s) and the rural dummy 40 . 𝛽1  represents the effect of health shock(s) for rural 
residents and 𝛽2 represents the effect of health shock(s) for urban residents. The Rural dummy 
itself is also included as one of the control variables in Equation 3.2. For H2 to hold, we must 
have: 𝛽2 > 𝛽1. 
3.6.3. Poor vs others 
To test H3, I estimate the following model: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20𝑖,𝑡) + ⁡𝜸𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜇𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
(3.3) 
where 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20  and 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20)  are interactions between the health 
shock indicator(s) and the 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20𝑖,𝑡 dummy. 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which 
equals one if individual i has income in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution in each 
wave, and 0 otherwise 41 . 𝛽1  represents the effect of health shock(s) for the poor and 𝛽2 
                                                 
40 I estimate Equation 3.2 by putting one interaction between one health shock and the rural dummy at a time and 
all interactions at the same time in one regression. The results do not change. I thus report the regression results 
with all interactions estimated in one regression in the later section.  
41 Other benchmarks for defining the poor group are attempted. I also divide my sample into the bottom 10 
percent, bottom 15 percent and bottom 25 percent and others. The results are similar.  
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represents the effect of health shock(s) for others. The 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡20 dummy itself is included as 
one of the control variables in Equation 3.3. For H3 to hold, we must have: 𝛽2 > 𝛽1. 
3.6.4. Provinces with higher HAQ Index and others 
To test H4, I estimate the following model: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖) + ⁡𝜸𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜇𝑝 +
𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
(3.4)  
where 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 and 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖)  are interactions between the health 
shock indicator(s) and the 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 ⁡dummy. 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
individual i resides in one of the provinces with high HAQ Index, and zero otherwise42. 𝛽1 
represents the effect of health shock (s) for the residents in provinces with high HAQ Index and 
𝛽2 represents the effect of health shock(s) for others. 𝐻𝐴𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 dummy itself is included as 
one of the control variables in Equation 3.4. For H4 to hold, we must have, 𝛽1 > 𝛽2. 
 
                                                 
42 Provinces with high HAQ Index are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and 
Guangdong.  
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3.7. Empirical results 
3.7.1. Main results 
Table 3.4 reports the RE regression results for Equation 3.1 aimed at investigating the effect of 
health shocks on various expenditure components. The dependent variables are one of the 
following: log of per capita expenditure on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of 
non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of non-medical expenditure per capita, 
and log of household total non-durable expenditure.  
Looking at the OOP medical expenditure (Panel 2) first, conditioning on other factors, 
individuals with a newly-diagnosed severe condition are associated with a 19.1 percent higher 
OOP medical expenditure. Having a newly-diagnosed moderate condition and large ADL 
deterioration are associated with a 10.5 percent and 9.0 percent increase in OOP medical 
expenditure respectively. The magnitude of such positive associations is smaller when I include 
all health shock indicators in one regression. In this case, having a new severe condition is 
associated with a 16.9 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure, and having a moderate 
condition and large ADL deterioration are associated with a 9.6 percent and 8.1 percent increase 
in OOP medical expenditure. All the associations between health shock indicators and OOP 
medical expenditure are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Including all health shock indicators in one estimation enables me to compare the effects 
of different health shock indicators. Having a newly-diagnosed severe condition is associated 
with the highest increase in OOP medical expenditure compared to that of the other two health 
shock indicators. ADL deterioration is associated with the lowest increase in OOP medical 
expenditure compared to that of the other two health shock indicators. Doctor-diagnosed 
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conditions, compared to ADL deterioration, have a larger impact on increase in OOP medical 
expenditure due to the higher utilisation of health care services relating to these. By contrast, 
increases in limitations do not necessary indicate a higher utilisation of health care services.  
My findings are consistent with those in other similar studies in which heath shocks are 
found to be associated with higher OOP medical expenditure and the magnitude of such 
associations increases with the severity of the health shocks. In the summary provided by Alam 
and Mahal (2014), the effect of health shocks on household OOP health spending in LMICs 
ranges from 0 to 34 percent, depending on the countries. My estimations fall into this range. 
Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) estimate the increase in OOP health spending following a health 
shock in China to be 17.6 percent on average. My estimation is consistent with theirs.  
Panel 1, 3 and 4 report the RE estimators for three non-medical expenditure components. 
New_severe is associated with a 4.9 to 5.4 percent increase in per capita expenditure on food-
at-home and a 3.9 percent increase in non-food non-medical expenditure per capita. 
New_moderate and DeteriorationADL do not have statistically significant associations with 
any non-medical expenditure components. Since my model is designed to study the immediate 
change of consumption components following a health shock rather than the long-term change, 
it is not surprising to see an increase in expenditure on food-at-home and non-food non-medical 
expenditure following the onset of severe health conditions. Firstly, individuals with newly-
diagnosed severe conditions may need better quality and more nutrient food to help recovery, 
and this may increase food bills. Secondly, utility bills, a major part of the non-food non-
medical expenditure, may increase significantly for households with household members going 
through a severe health shock because patients may need extra heating/air-conditioning to keep 
warm/cool. Thirdly, elderly people with severe health conditions are likely to perceive a shorter 
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life expectancy compared to those without. Thus, they may have strong incentives to increase 
consumption.  
In Panel 5, New_severe and new_moderate is associated with an 8.2 and 4.0 percent 
increase in household total non-durable expenditure, respectively. This is likely to be driven by 
the increase in OOP medical expenditure following health shocks.  
I find a highly significant association between experiencing a health shock and increase 
in OOP medical spending, with the magnitude of this association depending on the severity of 
health shocks. A new incidence of cancer, stroke or heart attack is associated with a 16.9-19.1 
percent increase in OOP medical expenditure, while a new incidence of moderate conditions is 
associated with a 9.6-10.5 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure. ADL deterioration is 
associated with an 8.1-9.0 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure. I do not find 
statistically significant correlations between any of the health shock indicators and non-medical 
expenditures. These findings largely support H1. 
Table 3.5 presents the coefficients of other control variables estimated in Equation 3.1. 
For brevity, I do not present coefficients of provincial and time dummies. Household income 
and financial wealth are associated with higher expenditures in general. Age is negatively 
associated with non-medical expenditures but positively associated with OOP medical 
expenditure. This age effect is consistent with the PIH. Household income is significantly and 
positively associated with all kinds of consumption, this is also consistent with the PIH as 
consumption is also proportionate to income. Household financial wealth shows a significantly 
positive association with all non-medical expenditure components, but this association is not 
significant for medical expenditure. Being male is positively associated with OOP medical 
expenditure, and also non-medical expenditures. Being married is significantly associated with 
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OOP medical expenditure. This may be due to the fact that OOP medical expenditure is 
measured at the household level, and being married means spouses’ medical expenditure is also 
considered. Compared to being illiterate, individuals who completed a high school degree, a 
bachelor’s degree or above are associated with higher expenditures. It is also worth mentioning 
that having a bachelor’s degree or above is associated with a 47.9 percent (39.4 percent) higher 
non-food non-medical expenditure (non-medical expenditure) compared to those without. 
Individuals with a higher level of education may have more items in their consumption basket 
such as purchasing books and subscribing to newspapers and magazines, compared to others. 
In addition, they may have a boarder access to bank credits in the presence of any uncertainties, 
thus they have less incentive to save for precautionary reasons and consume more compared to 
others.  
Individuals with excellent/very good/good self-perceived health status are associated with 
a higher level of non-food non-medical expenditure and a lower level of OOP expenditure. 
Individuals with poor self-perceived health status are associated with lower levels of food 
expenditure, non-food non-medical expenditure and non-medical expenditure. Poor self-
perceived health is also associated with a 17.3 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure. 
Being clinically depressed is associated with an 8.5 percent increase in OOP medical 
expenditure at the 1 percent significance level and has no significant association with other 
expenditure components. Having no inpatient visits in the last 12 months is associated with a 
large decrease (58.5 percent) in the OOP medical expenditure, and having more than one 
inpatient visit is associated with a 22.9 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure. Having 
no public medical insurance is associated with decreases of OOP medical expenditure, non-
food non-medical expenditure as well as non-medical expenditure.  
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3.7.2. The urban-rural difference 
I differentiate the effect of health shocks on each consumption item between urban and rural 
residents by estimating Equation 3.2. I expect urban residents experiencing health shocks to 
show higher increase in OOP medical expenditure compared to their rural counterparts. I also 
expect both rural and urban residents’ non-medical expenditures to remain unchanged in the 
presence of health shocks.  
Table 3.6 reports the RE estimators of Equation 3.2. Firstly, I do not find changes in non-
medical expenditure items in relation to health shocks. Secondly, I find that the association 
between health shocks and OOP medical expenditure is larger for urban residents. In column 
(2), a newly-diagnosed severe condition is associated with a 21.8 percent increase in OOP 
medical expenditure for urban residents, but only a 13.5 percent increase for rural residents. 
The onset of moderate conditions is associated with a 13.3 percent increase in OOP medical 
expenditure for urban residents, and a 7.4 percent increase for rural residents. Similarly, 
experiencing a deterioration in the ADL index is associated with a 16.1 percent increase in OOP 
medical expenditure in urban areas and this association is significant at the 1 percent level. I do 
not find a significant association between the deterioration in the ADL index and an increase 
of OOP medical expenditure in rural areas. Thus, H2 is supported. 
From column 1 and columns 3 to 5 in Table 3.6, we can see that both rural and urban 
residents’ consumption on non-medical items are insured against health shocks. This finding is 
in contrast to Wang et al. (2006) who find a negative association between illness and household 
non-medical expenditure in the rural China. However, it is worth noting that their data was 
collected in 2002 when the OOP medical expenditure share was as high as 60 percent and the 
public health insurance schemes were not universally available. The first wave of my data was 
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collected in 2011 with two subsequent waves conducted in 2013 and 2015 respectively. By 
2011, the universal health insurance coverage in both rural and urban areas was achieved. These 
schemes significantly reduce OOP medical expenditure for rural and urban residents’ alike 
(Zhang et al., 2017), which could explain my findings. Furthermore, since the OOP medical 
expenditure does not increase dramatically after health shocks43, expenditures on non-medical 
items remain unaffected44.  
3.7.3. Are the poor also insured against health shocks? 
Table 3.7 reports the RE estimators from Equation 3.3. I do not find evidence of a negative 
association between health shocks and expenditure on any non-medical items. Yet, health 
shocks are associated with increases in OOP medical expenditures. Hence H3 is supported. 
Experiencing a deterioration in the ADL index is associated with an almost 10 percent increase 
in OOP medical expenditure for those who are not in the lowest income quintile, whilst this 
association is not statistically significant for the poor. As most of the limitations of ADLs are 
not fatal, individuals with very low income may not seek for treatment at all because of their 
inability to afford corresponding treatments. This low utilisation of healthcare services may 
limit the increase in OOP medical expenditure for the poor compared to the non-poor. The onset 
of a severe condition is associated with a 17.4 percent increase in OOP medical expenditure for 
the non-poor, and a 14.1 percent increase for the poor. This association is significant at the 1 
percent level. This finding is consistent with Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) who also find the 
                                                 
43 In literature, dramatical health spending/catastrophic medical spending is defined as 40 percent increase in 
medical spending compared to that of last period.  
44 Reduced earnings also contribute to lowered expenditure on non-medical items. Expenditure on non-medical 
items could be affected by lowered labour income following health shocks. However, since my study is focused 
on older population in which a very large proportion of them are in retirement and do not have labour income. 
Thus, the income effect is small in my sample and I attribute the insignificant change of non-medical expenditure 
to the relatively small increase in OOP expenditure following health shocks.  
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increase in OOP health expenditure after a health shock to be smaller for the poor. Surprisingly, 
I find the poor experience a higher increase in OOP medical expenditure following the onset of 
moderate diseases compared to that of their non-poor counterparts. It is worth noting that, as 
the dependent variable Y is measured in logarithm, the coefficient of independent variable X 
should be interpreted as the percentage change of Y in relation to 1 unit increase in X. Thus, 
the larger increase in OOP medical expenditure for the poor may be caused by the fact that the 
OOP medical expenditure is very low for the poor prior to an onset of moderate conditions. In 
fact, according to statistics released by the NBS of China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2017), in 2014, the average medical expenditure (OOP and non-OOP) per capita is 1,412 RMB 
for rural residents and 3,558 RMB for urban residents. Considering poor households are 
clustered in rural areas, it is thus possible that, following a health shock, the poor experience a 
higher increase in OOP medical expenditure compared to the non-poor simply because their 
medical expenditure prior to the health shock is lower compared to that of the non-poor.  
3.7.4. Do individuals from provinces with high HAQ Index respond to health shocks 
differently?  
Table 3.8 reports the RE estimators from Equation 3.4. The HAQ Index measures the access to 
and the quality of healthcare services within a region. Provinces (municipalities) with high 
HAQ Index are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and 
Guangdong. These are provinces with higher GDP, which are generally more developed 
compared to other provinces.  
I do not find evidence for a negative association between health shocks and expenditure 
on non-medical items. In addition, I find health shocks are significantly associated with an 
increase in OOP medical expenditure and this association is significantly higher for individuals 
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who reside in provinces with high HAQ Index. H4 is thus highly supported. Specifically, a 
deterioration in the ADL index is associated with a 20.5 percent increase in OOP medical 
expenditure for residents from provinces with high HAQ Index, but only with a 5.2 percent 
increase for residents from other provinces. Similarly, the onset of a severe condition is 
associated with a 20.8 (15.2) percent increase in OOP medical expenditure for residents from 
provinces with high (non-high) HAQ Index. The corresponding percentages for the onset of 
moderate conditions are 12.6 percent and 8.7 percent respectively. 
Surprisingly, the deterioration in the ADL index is associated with an increase in OOP 
medial expenditure almost as high as that of the onset of a severe condition in provinces with 
high HAQ index. Both coefficients were significant at the 1 percent level. Recalling that, in the 
main specification Equation 3.1 results (Table 3.4), the coefficient associated with 
deteriorationADL is only 0.081, while that associated with new_severe is 0.169. Although ADL 
limitations are not fatal, the OOP medical expenditure still largely increases after ADL related 
health shocks in provinces with higher HAQ while this increase is not as large in other provinces. 
This difference reflects that residents from provinces with a high HAQ Index may have much 
higher utilisations of health care services compared to residents from other provinces. There 
are a few possible explanations for this difference. Firstly, individuals residing in provinces 
with higher HAQ Index may have better literacy and awareness of healthcare services and are 
therefore more likely to utilise health services when they are in need. Secondly, easier accesses 
to healthcare services leads to higher healthcare utilisations. Thirdly, better quality of healthcare 
services motivates residents to utilise these services more actively and trust healthcare providers 
more. Fourthly, the costs of utilising healthcare services in provinces with high HAQ Index 
may be higher compared to that in other provinces.  
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To the best of my knowledge, no existing studies have investigated the differences 
between regions with more developed healthcare systems and others. Thus, I cannot directly 
compare my findings with other studies. However, this study is consistent with Fang et al. (2012) 
who study the impact of illness in Western China, a region characterised by underdevelopment. 
In their study, they find no evidence for a negative association between illness and 
consumptions on non-medical items. Their finding potentially confirms that, at least in the 
short-run, after the incidence of adverse health events, the correlation between ill health and 
non-medical expenditures no longer exist in China.  
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3.8. Robustness tests 
3.8.1. Alternative health shock indicator – new accidents  
I find no evidence for a negative association between health shocks and expenditure on non-
medical items for the full sample, the urban and rural subsamples, the poor and non-poor 
subsamples, and the high HAQ and low HAQ subsamples. I find statistically significant 
associations between health shocks and the increase in OOP medical expenditure for the full 
sample and all subsamples. Furthermore, I find this association to be higher for urban residents, 
non-poor residents and residents from provinces with a high HAQ Index. To check if my 
findings are sensitive to the selection of health shock indicators, I next adopt an alternative 
health shock indicator – the incidence of accidents between waves.  
In CHARLS, returning respondents in the 2013 and 2015 waves were asked “Have you 
even been in a traffic accident or any other kind of major accidental injury and received medical 
treatments since last interview?” I identify respondents with a health shock by identifying those 
returning respondents who answered “yes” to this question.  
Table 3.9 presents the number of individuals who had an accident between two waves 
and their average expenditure in each category. There are 1,381 respondents who have 
experienced an accident between two consecutive waves. This percentage is 4.87. We can see 
that individuals who experienced an accident since the last wave have significantly higher 
(1,098 RMB more) OOP medical expenditure on average. The non-medical expenditure and 
non-food non-medical expenditure are also, on average, higher for individuals who experienced 
an accident compared to those who did not. The average non-durable expenditure is higher for 
the group with accidents than the group without. This may be caused by the higher level of 
  
114 
 
OOP medical expenditure for those who have experienced accidents. Overall, the difference 
between individuals with and without a health shock is generally consistent with the summary 
statistics presented in the Section 3.5. Those who have experienced an accident have higher 
OOP medical expenditure (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), as well as higher non-
food non-medical, nonmedical expenditure (statistically significant at the 10 percent level), and 
non-durable expenditure (statistically significant at the 5 percent level) compared to others.  
Table 3.10 reports the coefficient of all control variables (excluding provincial and time 
dummies) obtained by estimating Equation 3.1 and using newaccident as the health shock 
indicator. H1 is supported. newaccident is associated with an increase in OOP medical 
expenditure but there is no evidence suggesting an association between newaccident and 
expenditure on any non-medical items. The coefficients of other variables are also highly 
consistent with results reported in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.11 reports the coefficient of interactions between health shock indicators and each 
subsample divider. The significant association between newaccident and the increase in OOP 
medical expenditure can be confirmed for both rural and urban residents. However, the 
magnitude of such an association is very similar for both groups. The association between 
newaccident and the increase in OOP expenditure is significant for the non-poor, but 
insignificant for the poor. The insignificance for the poor may be caused by the small number 
of eligible observations as there are only few individuals who fall in the lowest income quintile 
and have an accident in the same year (N=253). Finally, the health shock - OOP expenditure 
association is higher for individuals who reside in provinces with high HAQ Index than without. 
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3.8.2. Propensity score matching  
To ensure that individuals with and without a health shock are as comparable as possible, I 
apply the propensity score matching (PSM) method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). Each individual who has experienced a health shock (treated group) since the last wave 
is matched with another individual who has not in fact experienced such a shock but has a 
similar likelihood of having one (matched control group). The likelihood of experiencing a 
health shock is estimated based on a set of individual characteristics including age, gender, 
education level and so on. Thus, two individuals who are matched in a pair share similar 
characteristics and have the same likelihood of having a health shock. I then compare each 
expenditure category between the treated group and matched control group. In this way, the 
concern of individual heterogeneity is reduced to the extent that at least observed differences 
between the treated and control groups are controlled for.  
I firstly use a probit model to estimate the probability of experiencing a health shock 
conditioning on a set of observable variables X. The health shock are, in turn, new onset of 
severe conditions between two consecutive waves (new_severe), new onset of moderate 
conditions between two consecutive waves (new_moderate), and large deterioration of ADLs 
between two consecutive waves (deteriorationADL)45. X include age, gender, marital status, 
educational dummies, household income, wealth, household size, home ownership, self-
perceived health status, a depression indicator, inpatient care utilisation dummies, as well as 
provincial and time dummies. To achieve a better balance across all observable characteristics 
between the treated and control groups, I also include the quadratic terms of all continuous 
variables (i.e. age, income, wealth and household size) (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007). The 
                                                 
45 There are defined in Section 3.5.2.  
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estimated probability of experiencing a health shock (D=1) conditioning on X is the propensity 
score (Pr(D=1|X)). The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is defined as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑿, 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑿,𝐷 = 1)                                                                     (3.5) 
where Y1 denotes a certain category of expenditure for individuals with a health shock, and Y0 
denotes that for individuals without a health shock. 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑿, 𝐷 = 1) is the counterfactual (the 
amount of an individual who did experience a health shock would have consumed if s/he did 
not experience one). This is obviously not observable. Based on estimated propensity scores, I 
pair up two or more individuals with the same or similar likelihood of having a health shock 
depending on the matching algorithms. I then use the expenditure of a matched individual who 
did not experience a health shock but has the same or closest likelihood of having one as a 
proxy for 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑿, 𝐷 = 1).  
Several matching algorithms can be used, such as one-to-one matching, k-nearest 
neighbours matching, calliper or radius matching, and kernel matching. Following García-
Gómez (2011), once the propensity score is estimated, I use the Epanechnikov kernel algorithm 
with replacement to calculate the ATT. Kernel matching assigns weights for all individuals in 
the control group. The weight depends on the difference in the estimated propensity score 
between the treated and control individuals. Kernel matching is recommended when the size of 
the control group is large because it gains better precision and lower variance in estimates 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).  
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Using kernel matching method46, the quality of matching is presented in Appendix 3.3. 
The test of covariate balance is conducted using Stata 15 command pstest. %bias is the 
percentage difference of the sample means in the treated and matched groups as a percentage 
of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and matched groups. 
Mean and median bias are the mean and median of the distribution of bias. The smaller these 
values are, the better matching is achieved. T-tests are conducted for comparing the mean 
differences between the treated and matched control groups after matching. Appendix Table 
3.3 show that the differences in covariances between the treated and matched groups are not 
statistically significant, indicating good matchings. The %biases are generally small. The values 
of Rubin’s B and Rubin’s R are 15.1 and 0.99 respectively. Rubin (2001) recommends B less 
than 25 and R between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be sufficiently balanced. Figure 3.3a and 
3.3b show graphs of the estimated propensity score before and after matching. We can see that 
the estimated propensity score distributions for the treated and matched control groups are very 
close after matching.  
Table 3.12 reports the ATT of health shocks between the treated and control groups using 
kernel matching. The difference in OOP medical expenditure is highly significant between 
groups with and without health shocks. Specifically, individuals with an onset of new severe 
conditions have 1,997 RMB higher OOP medical expenditure than those without. Individuals 
with an onset of new moderate conditions/deterioration of ADLs have 619/1,074 RMB higher 
OOP medical expenditure than those without. Thus, H1 is largely supported. I do not find 
statistically significant differences in consumption on non-medical items between treated and 
matched groups, except for one case – compared to those who without, individuals with large 
                                                 
46 My results do not change when other matching algorithms are adopted. Kernel matching results are reported 
due to its achievement of better precision. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) provide comprehensive comparisons 
among all matching algorithms.  
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deterioration of ADLs, on average, have a 200 RMB lower expenditure on non-food non-
medical items. It is worth noting that commuting and recreational expenditures are components 
of the nonfoodmedpc. Individuals with deterioration of ADLs are characterised by limited 
mobility, thus, their commuting and recreational expenditures are likely to be lower compared 
to those who without limitations.  
The PSM method has several limitations. First, the propensity score is estimated in a 
cross-sectional setting, thus one cannot take advantage of the panel data structure. Second, 
results obtained from matchings in two different subgroups are not directly comparable. For 
example, I could conduct PSM in the rural and urban subsample, separately. But comparing the 
ATTs obtained from each subsample is problematic because the observations from the rural 
subsample are not matched with individuals from the urban subsample. Thus, these two 
observations are not comparable across subsamples. This prevents me from differentiating the 
effect of health shocks between rural and urban residents, between the poor and the non-poor, 
and between provinces with high/low HAQ Index. 
To address this problem, following Berger et al. (2005), I construct a new sample after 
estimating the propensity score by only keeping the matched observations. Next, I perform a 
set of RE regressions using the new sample to estimate Equation 3.2 to Equation 3.4. It is argued 
that running regressions in a matched sample can increase efficiency (Rubin and Thomas, 2000, 
Berger et al., 2005).  
Here, I adopt the one-to-one neatest neighbour matching instead of the kernel matching 
to construct my matched sample because running RE regressions after a kernel matching 
requires accommodating the weight of each matched individual in each regression. However, 
the kernel method does not generate a consistent weight for each matched individual across 
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waves. I thus adopt the one-to-one nearest neighbour matching to construct the matched sample. 
I use new_severe, new_moderate, DeteriorationADL in turn as the treatment. After each 
matching, I only keep treated and matched observations. Hence, I have three new datasets with 
each health shock as the treatment. I then estimate Equation 3.2 to 3.4 using each constructed 
sample.  
Table 3.13 reports the coefficients of interactions between the health shock indicators and 
subsample dividers. It is worth noting that I only include interactions of one health shock 
indicator at a time because different constructed samples are used for different treatments. 
Using constructed samples, I find the association between a health shock and OOP medical 
expenditure to be larger for urban than rural residents. Probably due to the low level of 
healthcare utilisation in rural areas, the association between health shocks and OOP medical 
expenditure is smaller for the rural residents. Hence, H2 is strongly supported. 
I find that the poor show a higher increase in OOP medical expenditure following a health 
shock (defined as onset of new conditions) compared to the non-poor. The exception is that, 
the association between ADL deterioration and the increase in OOP expenditure is not 
significant and smaller for the poor compared to the non-poor. Again, since severe and 
moderate conditions require more compulsory treatments than ADL deteriorations, OOP 
medical expenditure may increase more for the poor because they have a lower level of OOP 
medical expenditure prior to the onset of new conditions than the non-poor. In addition, as ADL 
deterioration is not fatal, the poor may not seek for treatments and that leads to insignificant 
and much lower increase in OOP medical expenditure compared to the non-poor. H3 is 
therefore only partly supported. 
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In general, residents from high HAQ index provinces show higher OOP medical 
expenditure following a health shock. However, after the onset of a severe condition, residents 
from provinces with high HAQ index show a slightly lower increase in OOP medical 
expenditure compared to those who reside in other provinces. More generous reimbursement 
rates of public health insurance schemes in provinces with high HAQ Index could potentially 
explain this difference. Thus, H4 is only partly supported. 
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3.9. Conclusion 
Using the 2011, 2013 and 2015 waves of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
(CHARLS), this paper investigates the extent to which households’ consumption profile 
changes after a health shock. Following existing studies in the literature, I define health shocks 
as the onset of severe medical conditions, the onset of moderate medical conditions, as well as 
a large deterioration in the ADL index. 
I document that health shocks are associated with an 8.1-19.1 percent increase in OOP 
medical expenditure for Chinese individuals aged 45 and over. The magnitude of this 
association depends on the selection of health shock indicators and model specifications. 
Following a health shock, expenditure on non-medical items remains unchanged, indicating 
Chinese households’ non-medical consumption is insured against health shocks.  
Moreover, I find that the association between health shocks and the increase in OOP 
expenditure to be stronger for urban residents compared to their rural counterparts. This finding 
may reflect underutilisation of healthcare services by rural residents. I also find a larger increase 
in OOP expenditure following a health shock for the poor compared to the non-poor. This could 
be explained considering that the poor have a lower level of OOP expenditure compared to the 
non-poor prior to shocks. Although I do not find evidence of expenditure on non-medical items 
being affected even for the poor, if the health shock is severe and persistent, the poor’s non-
medical expenditures may have to be compromised to accommodate the large increase in OOP 
expenditure. I also find evidence that the poor may not utilise the healthcare system enough if 
the shocks are not fatal. In addition, I find evidence of provincial disparities. The association 
between health shocks and the increase in OOP medical expenditure is higher in provinces with 
better healthcare systems. For instance, in the presence of a deterioration of the ADL index, the 
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increase in OOP medical expenditure is almost 3 times higher for those who reside in provinces 
with a better healthcare system. This finding suggests a higher level of healthcare service 
utilisation in provinces with a more developed healthcare system. 
My findings suggest that, in China, non-medical consumption is generally insured in the 
presence of health shocks. OOP medical expenditure increases significantly after health shocks, 
but the extent of this increase is not dramatic. These findings are consistent with Fang et al. 
(2012) and Liu (2016). However, the insignificant change in non-medical consumption and the 
relatively small increase in OOP medical expenditure following health shocks might be resulted 
from low utilisations of healthcare services.  
Policy makers should deepen the coverage of public health insurance schemes targeted 
on special groups such as the rural residents and the poor to boost their healthcare service 
utilisations. In addition, policies should be designed to reduce disparities in healthcare systems 
across provinces.  
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3.10. Limitations and future research possibilities 
There are several limitations of the present study. First, this study is only focused on immediate 
changes of expenditure items due to data limitations. It leaves the more complicated modelling 
for long-run effects of health shocks to future research. This could be done by applying a 
dynamic framework similar to the one presented in Chapter Four. Second, since the definition 
of household member is unclear in CHARLS and inconsistent between waves, the household 
compositions cannot be clearly identified. Thus, although I am aware that household 
consumption profile is sensitive to changes in composition of household members, I cannot 
include the changes of household compositions in my model. Third, the household head is not 
clearly identified in CHARLS, and I can only identify the main respondent of each household. 
However, it is unclear if this main respondent is the household head or not. This is because in 
CHARLS surveys, the main respondent is randomly chosen in each household as long as s/he 
is aged 45 or over. To avoid misidentifying the household head, the observations in sample are 
kept at the individual level instead of household level.  
At last, this study does not investigate the reasons why non-medical expenditure is not 
affected in the presence of health shocks due to data limitations. In the literature, savings, 
formal and informal borrowings, family transfers and selling assets can be viewed as potential 
coping strategies for households exposed to health shocks to secure their non-medical 
expenditure (Kruk et al., 2009, Sparrow et al., 2013, Modena and Gilbert, 2011). However, the 
valid number of non-missing observations for saving and borrowing related variables is very 
small in CHARLS. In addition, family transfers are categorised and surveyed differently across 
waves. It is thus difficult for me to calculate household savings, borrowings and family 
transfers for each wave consistently.  
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Future research will focus on studying the dynamics of household consumption profile 
following a health shock in a longer-run setting. Furthermore, I will further explore Chinese 
households’ coping strategies in the presence of health shocks once relevant saving, borrowing 
and family transfer variables become more reliable in CHARLS.  
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Table 3. 1 Summary statistics  
 Description Type Mean S.D. 
Dependent variables     
foodinpc Per capita expenditure on food at home Continuous 3.417 3.374 
medicalexp Household total medical expenditure Continuous 3.376 6.706 
nonfoodmedpc Non-food, non-medical expenditure per capita Continuous 3.729 4.729 
nonmedpc Non-medical expenditure per capita Continuous 6.582 6.691 
nondurable Household total non-durable consumption Continuous 22.777 21.279 
Health shock indicators     
new_severe New onset of severe condition(s) [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.042 0.371 
new_moderate New onset of moderate condition(s) [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.138 0.344 
deteriorationADL ADL index dropped by more than 25% [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.071 0.257 
Other controls     
age Respondent’s age Continuous 61.070 9.690 
male Male [1]; female[0] Dummy variable 0.485 0.500 
married Married [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.820 0.384 
widowed Widowed [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.109 0.313 
illiterate Illiterate [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.261 0.439 
highschool Completed high school [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.102 0.302 
highedu Completed bachelor’s degree or above [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.023 0.150 
hhitot Total household income  Continuous 28.242 33.976 
hhfinassets Total household financial wealth  Continuous 14.380 35.050 
stillworking Still working [1]; other[0] Dummy variable 0.670 0.471 
hhsize Household size  Continuous 3.212 1.623 
homeowner Home owner [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.888 0.316 
goodhealth 
Excellent/very good/good self-perceived health status [1]; 
other[0] 
Dummy variable 0.223 0.417 
poorhealth Poor self-perceived health status [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.262 0.440 
depressed Depressed (CES-D score ≥10) [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.303 0.460 
noinpatientcare No inpatient visit in last 12 months [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.862 0.345 
mt1inpatientcare More than 1 inpatient visits in last 12 months [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.042 0.202 
noinsurance No medical insurance [1]; other [0] Dummy variable 0.019 0.140 
Notes: S.D. denotes standard deviation. The various components of the dependent variables are listed in Appendixes 3.1. Severe conditions include cancer, stroke and heart 
attack. Moderate conditions include diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, lung/liver/kidney disease. Total number of observations is 43,173. foodinpc, medicalexp, nonfoodmedpc, 
nonmedpc, nondurable, hhitot, hhfinassets are stated in 1,000 RMB (2011 price level).  
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Table 3. 2 Comparison of consumption components between individuals with health shocks and without 
Variables New_severe 
=0 
New_severe 
=1 
Diff New_moderate 
=0 
New_moderate 
=1 
Diff D.ADL 
=0 
D.ADL 
=1 
Diff 
foodinpc 3.377 3.704 -0.328*** 3.398 3.338 0.059 3.412 3.05 0.361*** 
medicalexp 3.233 6.213 -2.979*** 3.191 4.373 -1.183*** 3.206 5.417 -2.211*** 
nonfoodmedpc 3.643 3.709 -0.066 3.651 3.617 0.034 3.717 2.702 1.014*** 
nonmedepc 6.482 6.685 -0.203 6.507 6.388 0.118 6.59 5.147 1.443*** 
nondurable 22.326 26.277 -3.951*** 22.347 23.364 -1.017*** 22.597 21.235 1.362***           
No. of observation                    
Notes: Diff denotes the p-value of a t-test for the mean difference between the two groups. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
                                Table 3. 3 Correlation Matrix between health shocks 
 New_severe New_moderate DetariorationADL 
New_severe  0.120* 0.085* 
New_moderate 0.120*  0.055* 
DetariorationADL 0.085* 0.055*  
Notes: Lower-triangular cells report Pearson's correlation coefficients, upper-triangular cells are Spearman’s rank correlation. * 
denotes statistical significance is at the 5% level. 
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Table 3. 4 Health shocks and consumption: RE estimates 
Health shock 
indicators 
Consumption components  
 Panel 1  log (food expenditure p.c.)   
New_severe 0.049**   0.054***  
 (0.020)   (0.021)  
New_moderate  0.004  0.004  
  (0.011)  (0.011)  
DetariorationADL   -0.015 -0.017  
   (0.017) (0.017)  
 Panel 2 log (medical expenditure)  
New_severe 0.191***   0.169***  
 (0.030)   (0.031)  
New_moderate  0.105***  0.096***  
  (0.016)  (0.017)  
DetariorationADL   0.090*** 0.081***  
   (0.026) (0.026)  
 Panel 3 log (non-food non-medical expenditure p.c.)  
New_severe 0.039*   0.033  
 (0.021)   (0.021)  
New_moderate  0.019  0.019  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  
DetariorationADL   -0.014 -0.016  
    (0.017) (0.017)  
 Panel 4 log (non-medical expenditure p.c.)  
New_severe 0.029   0.030  
 (0.022)   (0.022)  
New_moderate  0.012  0.010  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  
DetariorationADL   -0.018 -0.021  
   (0.018) (0.018)  
 Panel 5  log (non-durable expenditure)  
New_severe 0.089***   0.082***  
 (0.026)   (0.027)  
New_moderate  0.045***  0.040***  
  (0.014)  (0.014)  
DetariorationADL   0.029 0.025  
   (0.023) (0.023)  
           
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita expenditure 
on food at home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of 
non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other control variables 
include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave dummy are included in 
all regressions. The first three columns report estimations of Equation 3.1 using one health shock indicator at 
a time, and the fourth column reports estimation of Equation 3.1 using all health shock indicators at once.  
  
128 
 
Table 3. 5 Coefficients of other control variables: RE estimates 
  
lfoodpc lmedicalexp lnonfoodmedpc lnonmedpc lnondurable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lhhitot 0.075*** 0.041*** 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.141***  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
lhhfinassets 0.036*** -0.007 0.048*** 0.066*** 0.066***  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
age -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
male -0.010* 0.017** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.021***  
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
married -0.028 0.152*** -0.040* -0.005 0.185***  
(0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) 
widowed 0.028 -0.058* 0.053* 0.008 0.009  
(0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) 
illiterate -0.069*** -0.017 -0.077*** -0.087*** -0.090***  
(0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
highschool 0.108*** 0.061*** 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.169***  
(0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
highedu 0.265*** 0.079* 0.479*** 0.394*** 0.381***  
(0.032) (0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.039) 
hhsize -0.096*** 0.034*** -0.089*** -0.112*** 0.119***  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
stillworking -0.123*** -0.107*** -0.068*** -0.096*** -0.130***  
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
homeowner -0.003 -0.005 0.017 -0.007 0.011  
(0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) 
goodhealth 0.013 -0.131*** 0.032*** 0.019* -0.007  
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
poorhealth -0.039*** 0.173*** -0.028*** -0.052*** -0.011  
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
depressed -0.014 0.085*** -0.012 -0.010 0.019  
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
noinpatientcare -0.042*** -0.585*** 0.001 -0.016 -0.172***  
(0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
mt1inpatientcare -0.012 0.229*** 0.028 0.024 0.135***  
(0.023) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) 
noinsurance -0.028 -0.097** -0.067* -0.086** -0.137***  
(0.038) (0.049) (0.039) (0.040) (0.051) 
Constant 1.880*** 1.044*** 2.120*** 2.662*** 3.040***  
(0.060) (0.091) (0.070) (0.067) (0.081)       
Observations 21,372 22,917 21,291 24,405 24,390 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Provincial dummies and one wave dummy are included in all regressions. 
Other control variables include a full set of health shock indicators. 1% outliers at each tail are dropped for all 
dependent variables as well as continuous control variables including lhhitot, lhhfinassets. Outliers for the 
variable hhsize are dropped for the top 1% only. Individuals who are younger than 45 are excluded from the 
analysis. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3. 6 Rural vs. urban 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lfoodpc lmedicalexp lnonfoodmedpc lnonmedpc lnondurable 
            
ADL_rural -0.009 0.049 -0.010 -0.009 0.039 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) 
ADL_urban -0.017 0.161*** -0.020 -0.034 0.006 
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.031) (0.031) (0.040) 
severe_rural 0.050* 0.135*** 0.025 0.029 0.081** 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) 
severe_urban 0.057* 0.218*** 0.042 0.029 0.082** 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) 
moderate_rural 0.012 0.074*** 0.036** 0.020 0.044** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
moderate_urban -0.010 0.133*** -0.010 -0.008 0.032 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
      
Observations 21,372 22,917 21,291 24,405 24,390 
Number of id 14,117 14,682 14,080 15,180 15,174 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita 
expenditure on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per 
capita, log of non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other 
control variables include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave 
dummy are included in all regressions. 
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Table 3. 7 The poor vs. non-poor  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lfoodpc lmedicalexp lnonfoodmedpc lnonmedpc lnondurable 
            
ADL_poorest20 -0.020 0.026 -0.002 -0.063 -0.019 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.036) (0.039) (0.050) 
ADL_other -0.016 0.099*** -0.021 -0.006 0.040 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
severe_poorest20 0.084 0.141** 0.068 0.034 0.078 
 (0.053) (0.071) (0.048) (0.054) (0.068) 
severe_ other 0.048** 0.174*** 0.026 0.029 0.083*** 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) 
moderate_poorest20 -0.012 0.142*** 0.005 -0.006 0.045 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) 
moderate_ other 0.008 0.084*** 0.023* 0.013 0.039** 
 (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
      
Observations 21,372 22,917 21,291 24,405 24,390 
Number of id 14,117 14,682 14,080 15,180 15,174 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita expenditure 
on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of 
non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other control 
variables include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave dummy are 
included in all regressions. Poorest20 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual falls within the lowest 
quintile income of each wave, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 3. 8 Province with higher HAQ index vs. provinces without 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lfoodpc lmedicalexp lnonfoodmedpc lnonmedpc lnondurable 
            
ADL_HAQhigh -0.026 0.205*** -0.017 -0.056 0.040 
 (0.039) (0.063) (0.041) (0.041) (0.052) 
ADL_noHAQhigh -0.016 0.052* -0.017 -0.013 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
severe_HAQhigh 0.109*** 0.208*** 0.103** 0.105** 0.177*** 
 (0.039) (0.066) (0.043) (0.045) (0.055) 
severe_noHAQhigh 0.037 0.152*** 0.011 0.008 0.052* 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) 
moderate_HAQhigh -0.033 0.126*** 0.013 -0.033 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) 
moderate_noHAQhigh 0.016 0.087*** 0.021 0.023 0.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
      
Observations 21,372 22,917 21,291 24,405 24,390 
Number of id 14,117 14,682 14,080 15,180 15,174 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita expenditure 
on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of 
non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other control variables 
include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave dummy are included in 
all regressions. HAQhigh is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides in are Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and Guangdong, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3. 9 New accident – an alternative measure of health shocks  
 New accidents 
(1) 
(N=1,381) 
No accidents 
(2) 
(N=28, 324) 
Diff 
(1)-(2) 
foodinpc 3.481 3.415 0.066 
medicalexp 4.422 3.324 1.098*** 
nonfoodmedpc 3.978 3.719 0.260* 
nonmedepc 6.936 6.568 0.368* 
nondurable 24.198 22.715 1.483** 
Notes: Diff denotes the p-value of a t-test for the mean difference between two groups. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 1% level. All values are converted according to 
the 2011 price level. The unit is 1,000 RMB.  
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Table 3. 10 Coefficients of newaccident and other variables on consumption components 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lfoodpc lmedicalexp lnonfoodmedpc lnonmedpc lnondurable 
            
newaccident -0.006 0.082*** 0.031 0.027 0.056** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
lhhitot 0.075*** 0.039*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.142*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
lhhfinassets 0.037*** -0.006 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
age -0.005*** 0.003*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
male -0.008 0.017** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
married -0.027 0.152*** -0.026 0.001 0.189*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
widowed 0.029 -0.052* 0.076*** 0.018 0.020 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) 
illiterate -0.070*** -0.012 -0.078*** -0.087*** -0.091*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
highschool 0.119*** 0.053** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.167*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
highedu 0.253*** 0.072* 0.485*** 0.376*** 0.363*** 
 (0.030) (0.044) (0.041) (0.035) (0.039) 
hhsize -0.097*** 0.037*** -0.090*** -0.113*** 0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
stillworking -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.066*** -0.095*** -0.131*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
homeowner -0.006 0.007 0.016 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
goodhealth 0.013 -0.134*** 0.031*** 0.019* -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
poorhealth -0.034*** 0.190*** -0.023** -0.046*** 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
depressed -0.013 0.087*** -0.017* -0.015 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
noinpatientcare -0.040*** -0.596*** -0.004 -0.014 -0.174*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
mt1inpatientcare -0.008 0.247*** 0.028 0.027 0.141*** 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) 
noinsurance -0.018 -0.135*** -0.051 -0.080** -0.144*** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) 
Constant 1.885*** 1.079*** 2.168*** 2.687*** 3.072*** 
 (0.057) (0.087) (0.067) (0.064) (0.077) 
      
Observations 23,571 25,291 23,476 26,926 26,907 
Number of id 14,588 15,056 14,551 15,470 15,469 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita expenditure 
on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of 
non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other control variables 
include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave dummy are included in 
all regressions.  
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Table 3. 11 Coefficients of interactions between newaccident and subsample dividers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp 
        
newaccident_rural 0.080**   
 (0.033)   
newaccident_urban 0.087**   
 (0.042)   
newaccident_poorest20  0.092  
  (0.063)  
newaccident_nonpoor  0.080***  
  (0.029)  
newaccident_HAQhigh   0.138*** 
   (0.051) 
newaccident_noHAQhigh   0.061** 
   (0.030) 
    
Observations 25,291 25,291 25,291 
Number of id 15,056 15,056 15,056 
Notes: * indicates statistical significance is at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are one of the following: log of per capita expenditure 
on food-at-home, log of medical expenditure, log of non-food and non-medical expenditure per capita, log of 
non-medical expenditure per capita, and log of household total non-durable expenditure. Other control variables 
include all regressors defined and listed in Table 3.1. Provincial dummies and a wave dummy are included in 
all regressions. Poorest20 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual’s income is in the lowest quintile of 
income in each wave, and 0 otherwise. HAQhigh is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reside in are 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and Guangdong, and 0 otherwise.  
  
135 
 
Table 3. 12 ATT of health shock indicators after propensity score matchings 
Variables  New_severe New_moderate DeteriorationADL 
 Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff 
foodinpc 3.719 3.387 0.332*** 3.330 3.318 0.012 3.064 3.098 -0.034 
medicalexp 6.314 4.317 1.997*** 4.376 3.757 0.619*** 5.395 4.320 1.074*** 
nonfoodmedpc 3.664 3.506 0.158 3.524 3.438 0.086 2.721 2.920 -0.200* 
nonmedepc 6.655 6.288 0.366* 6.300 6.206 0.093 5.190 5.387 -0.196 
nondurable 26.323 22.639 3.684*** 23.021 22.104 0.917** 21.224 20.186 1.038* 
Notes: A Kernel matching algorithm is adopted. Diff is the mean difference between the treated group and control group. *** indicates statistical significance 
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 1% level. Number of treated (T) and controls (C): foodinpc: Tnew_severe=897, Cnew_severe=21,255, 
Tnew_moderate=3,045, Cnewe_moderate=19,109, TADL=1,368, CADL=20,055, medicalexp: Tnew_severe=962, Cnew_severe=22,793, Tnew_moderate=3,299, Cnewe_moderate=20,459, 
TADL=1,513, CADL=21,456, nonfoodmedpc: Tnew_severe=892, Cnew_severe=21,172, Tnew_moderate=3,032, Cnewe_moderate=19,034, TADL=1,363, CADL=19,979, 
nonmedepc: Tnew_severe=1,042, Cnew_severe=24,268, Tnew_moderate=3,501 Cnewe_moderate=21,812, TADL=1,651, CADL=22,810, nondurable: Tnew_severe=1,038, 
Cnew_severe=24,259, Tnew_moderate=3,500, Cnewe_moderate=21,800, TADL=1,645, CADL=22,800.  
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Table 3. 13 Estimates of interactions using constructed datasets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp lmedicalexp 
                   
severe_rural 0.184***         
 (0.0517)         
severe_urban 0.247***         
 (0.0700)         
severepoorest20  0.319***        
  (0.0889)        
severenopoorest20  0.184***        
  (0.0466)        
severe_HAQhigh   0.191**       
   (0.0947)       
severe_noHAQhigh   0.215***       
   (0.0459)       
moderate_rural    0.115***      
    (0.0269)      
moderate_urban    0.154***      
    (0.0380)      
moderatepoorest20     0.182***     
     (0.0493)     
moderatenopoorest20    0.116***     
     (0.0248)     
moderateHAQhigh      0.159***    
      (0.0457)    
moderatenoHAQhigh     0.121***    
      (0.0251)    
ADL_rural       0.0567   
       (0.0412)   
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ADL_urban       0.224***   
       (0.0629)   
ADL_poorest20        0.0192  
        (0.0703)  
ADL_nopoorest20        0.137***  
        (0.0391)  
ADL_HAQhigh         0.115 
         (0.0855) 
ADL_noHAQhigh         0.106*** 
         (0.0372) 
          
Observations 1,822 1,822 1,822 5,775 5,775 5,775 2,704 2,704 2,704 
Number of id 1,702 1,702 1,702 5,053 5,053 5,053 2,548 2,548 2,548 
Notes: Column (1) to (3) are based on the constructed dataset using new_severe as the treatment, column (4) to (6) using new_moderate and column (7) to (9) using 
deteriorationADL. The dependent variable of each estimation is the logarithm of OOP medical expenditure. All provincial and wave dummies are included in each 
estimation. Other control variables include all variables listed and defined in Table 3.1. The sample size is much smaller than that of previous tables because only 
treated and matched observations are kept.  
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Appendix 3.1 Consumption compositions 
Variable  Variable code in 
CHARLS 
Description  
foodin [GE006] Food at home expenditure  
 
medicalexp [GE010_6] Household total direct and indirect OOP medical expenditure 
 
nondurable  [GE006] Food at home expenditure 
[GE007] Expenditure on eating out 
[GE008] Expenditure on alcohol, cigarettes, cigars and tobacco 
[GE009_1] Communication fees including postage, internet telephone and 
mobile bills 
[GE009_2] Utilities (water and electricity) 
[GE009_3] Fuels (gas and coal) 
[GE009_4] Hiring housekeepers and servants  
[GE009_5] Local commuting  
[GE009_6] Household items  
[GE009_7] Books, newspapers, CDs and magazines  
[GE010_1] Clothing  
[GE010_2] Trips and vocations  
[GE010_3] Heating  
[GE010_5] Education and training  
[GE010_6] Total direct and indirect OOP medical expenditure 
[GE010_7] Fitness  
[GE010_8] Personal care products 
[GE010_11] Property management fees  
[GE010_12] Taxes and fees payable to government  
[GE010_13] Donations  
Notes: nonmed= nondurable – medicalexp  
nonfoodmed =nonmed – foodin 
Source: The 2011, 2013 and 2015 CHARLS 
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Appendix 3.2 A list of ADLs in CHARLS 
Code Difficulty of … 
[DB001] Running or jogging 1km 
[DB002] Walking 1km 
[DB003] Walking 100m 
[DB004] Getting up from a chair after sitting for a long period 
[DB005] Climbing several flights of stairs without resting  
[DB006] Stooping, kneeling or crouching  
[DB007] Reaching or extending your arms above shoulder level 
[DB008] Lifting or carrying weights over 5kg  
[DB009] Picking up a small coin from a table  
[DB0010] Dressing  
[DB0011] Bathing or showering  
[DB0012] Eating  
[DB0013] Getting out of bed 
[DB0014] Using toilet 
[DB0015] Controlling urination and defecation 
[DB0016] Doing household chores  
[DB0017] Cooking 
[DB0018] Shopping for grocery  
[DB0019] Managing money 
[DB0020] Taking medication  
Source: The 2011, 2013 and 2015 CHARLS. 
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Appendix 3.3 Tests for covariate balance after propensity score matching 
 Mean  t-test 
 Treated  Control %bias t P-value 
agesq 3996.6 4012.7 -1.4 -0.3 0.761 
hhsizesq 12.233 12.177 0.4 0.1 0.921 
incomesq 8.5136 8.1391 5.4 1.19 0.235 
wealthsq 3.7305 3.4715 4 0.91 0.363 
lhhitot 2.5863 2.5155 5.2 1.15 0.249 
lhhfinassets 1.2829 1.2084 5.1 1.14 0.254 
age 62.562 62.701 -1.5 -0.33 0.738 
male 0.43555 0.4158 4 0.88 0.381 
married 0.81809 0.81601 0.5 0.12 0.906 
widowed 0.12058 0.11123 3 0.64 0.522 
illiterate 0.27963 0.30146 -4.9 -1.05 0.292 
highschool 0.10603 0.09252 4.4 0.99 0.322 
highedu 0.03119 0.02703 2.6 0.54 0.588 
hhsize 3.1206 3.0998 1.3 0.29 0.775 
stillworking 0.55301 0.5738 -4.3 -0.92 0.358 
homeowner 0.86383 0.85863 1.6 0.33 0.742 
goodhealth 0.0738 0.06341 3 0.9 0.367 
poorhealth 0.50208 0.50936 -1.6 -0.32 0.75 
depressed 0.40644 0.43763 -6.5 -1.38 0.166 
noinpatientcare 0.64345 0.65177 -2 -0.38 0.703 
mt1inpatientcare 0.14969 0.12994 6.9 1.25 0.212 
noinsurance 0.0104 0.00936 0.9 0.23 0.818 
Mean bias           3.2 Rubin’s B  15.1    
Median bias        3.0 Rubin’s R 0.99    
Notes: The quality of matching is tested using Stata 15 command pstest. %bias is the % difference of 
the sample means in the treated and matched groups as a percentage of the square root of the average 
of the sample variances in the treated and matched groups. Mean and median bias are the mean and 
median of the distribution of bias. T-tests are conducted for comparing the mean differences between 
the treated and matched groups after matching. Rubin (2001) recommends B less and 25 and R 
between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to sufficiently balanced.  
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Appendix 3.3 Continued  
 
Figure 3.3 a The estimated propensity score before matching  
 
 
Figure 3.3 b The estimated propensity score after matching  
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Chapter Four: Financial Stress and Body Weight: An Empirical Investigation among 
European Older Adults 
4.1. Introduction 
Two clear trends have been observed in Europe over the past decades. On the one hand, 
European household debt has risen rapidly in many countries (Guiso and Sodini, 2013). The 
increasing availability of credit cards, loans and credit purchases as a result of consumption 
boosting policies, as well as the relaxed credit constraints after the global financial crisis have 
led to a massive explosion of household debt. 
According to OECD Statistics (2016), household debt, measured as a percentage of net 
disposable income ratio ranged from 47.5 (Lithuania) to 285.8 (Demark). The average among 
the EU 28 countries is 121.5. The debt-income ratio of Demark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Finland, Spain, and Belgium is above the EU 
average. With easier access to credit, many EU citizens are struggling to repay their debts and 
thus face substantial financial difficulties. According to European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) Survey, in 2015, nearly 30 percent of surveyed individuals 
reported they felt the repayment of debts from hire purchases or loans as a financial burden; 
and 43 percent of them reported financial burden due to housing costs. Moreover, almost one 
in eight of them (12.6 percent) were in arrears on mortgage or rent payments, and/or hire-
purchase/loan agreements due to financial difficulties in the last 12 months.  
On the other hand, the prevalence of obesity has more than doubled in the WHO European 
Regions since 1980 (WHO, 2014). According to the latest WHO estimation, obesity (Body 
Mass Index (BMI) ≥ 30) affects 20-30 percent of adults in European Regions, and overweight 
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(BMI ≥ 25) affects 45-70 percent of them47. Obesity has been recognised as one of the greatest 
public health challenges of the 21st century in the western world. Apart from causing physical 
disabilities and psychological problems, excess weight contributes to a higher risk of 
developing cardiovascular diseases, cancer and diabetes. In addition to reducing personal well-
being, the public cost of obesity is extremely high. In 2012, obesity was estimated to be 
responsible for €81 billion direct and indirect medical costs, which is equivalent to 7 percent of 
the total health expenditure in the EU. If no action is taken, the magnitude of these obesity-
related costs is likely to continue rising over time and latent effects, such as possible genetic 
changes, may occur in the next and subsequent generations (Hunt and Ferguson, 2014).  
Although it is well recognised that weight gain results from caloric imbalances where 
calories consumed are higher than calories used, it remains unclear what are the factors causing 
this imbalance and ultimately leading to the prevalence of obesity. Genetic factors have been 
found correlated to the occurrence of obesity since obesity tends to concentrate within a family. 
Specifically, the risk of being obese is two to eight times higher for a person with a family 
history of obesity compared to a person without (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2018). Yet, these findings have rather limited power to explain the increasing prevalence of 
obesity over the past decades since generically human beings have not changed dramatically 
during this period.  
More recently, the focus of obesity-related studies has been shifted to socioeconomic 
factors, which have been argued to be major determinants of obesity, as food consumption and 
body weight are both economic decisions in the end (Ruhm, 2012). Consumers balance the 
utility gain from food consumption against the utility loss from future weight gains as well as 
                                                 
47 Source: http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/obesity/data-and-statistics. Body 
Mass Index (BMI) is defined as weight (kg)/height (m)2. It is the most widely used body weight indicator in 
literature and practice.  
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from potential health risks. In the literature, various socioeconomic factors have been related to 
obesity, such as race, ethnicity, age, income, education and employment status (Rashad, 2006, 
Villar and Quintana-Domeque, 2009, von Hippel and Lynch, 2014, Webbink et al., 2010) 
However, to the best of my knowledge, only very little attention has been paid to financial 
difficulties, a direct consequence of the credit expansion in the modern economy.  
Worsening financial circumstances have been found to be associated with deteriorating 
mental and physical health for individuals (Bridges and Disney, 2010, Selenko and Batinic, 
2011, Sweet et al., 2013, Keese and Schmitz, 2014). However, evidence of a possible 
correlation between financial health and body weight is not well-established in the literature. 
Intuitively, on the one hand, individuals living with ongoing financial difficulties are more 
vulnerable to chronic stress. Evidence has shown chronic life stress (long-term stress) is 
causally linked to possible weight gain (Kandiah et al., 2006, Torres and Nowson, 2007). In 
addition, in laboratorial studies, a positive association between chronic stress and energy-dense 
food intake has been confirmed (Rowland and Antelman, 1976, Dallman et al., 2003). When 
exposed to chronic stress, people tend to eat comfort food containing high fat or carbohydrate 
caloric content to lower the activities of the stress-response network in the brain. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to propose a link between financial stress and weight gain. In the presence of 
financial difficulties, which are common stressors in modern society, stress-induced eating may 
result in an increased intake of calories, and ultimately in a higher prevalence of obesity. 
On the other hand, financial difficulties such as over-indebtedness may be a consequence 
of having a high time preference rate, which has been found to be correlated with a higher body 
weight (Smith et al., 2005, Zhang and Rashad, 2008). Time preference is the rate at which 
people are willing to trade current utility for future benefit (Smith et al., 2005). Individuals with 
a higher time preference rate generally value the present more than the future. Thus, they are 
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more likely to enjoy all the gratifications in the present and save less for the future compared 
to others with lower time preference rates. Intuitively, when borrowing is available, those with 
higher rates of time preference are more likely to take debts to increase consumption in the 
current period, ceteris paribus. Moreover, since individuals with high rates of time preference 
discount the future more compared to those with lower rates, they are less likely to be active in 
exercises because the health benefit of exercising is usually delivered in the future. For the same 
reasons, they are also more likely to over-eat in the present, which may lead to a higher chance 
of gaining weight. 
This paper investigates the extent to which financial difficulties and body weight are 
correlated in European countries. Recalling the fact that 43 percent individuals reported having 
financial burdens in the EU-SILC survey, I question if financial stress can partially explain the 
high prevalence of obesity observed in European countries nowadays. To this end, I make use 
of a cross-nationally comparable and representative panel dataset, the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) over the period 2004 to 2015. By applying a dynamic 
analysis framework and controlling for a comprehensive set of confounders, I find a high level 
of state dependence of body weight status in all sampled countries48. This suggests a necessity 
of taking the state dependence of body weight into consideration. In addition, I find little 
evidence of a positive link between financial stress and body weight, with such a link is being 
found only in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, France, Italy and Switzerland. This link is 
generally robust to using corrected self-reported weight measures, as well as different financial 
stress measures.  
                                                 
48 These are Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland and Belgium. All sample 
selection criteria are illustrated in Section 4.3.  
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In the context of an increasing prevalence of obesity and overweight, this study sheds 
new light on reasons for this epidemic in European countries. It also contributes to the existing 
literature in the following ways.  
First, I conduct a comparative study across nine European countries by utilising the 
representative, cross-nationally comparable, and recent SHARE dataset. To the best of my 
knowledge, none of the existing studies analyse the finance-health nexus in a country-specific 
comparative setting. Second, I specifically estimate the relationship between financial stress 
and body weight. Although a better understanding of possible body weight responses to 
financial stress is of great importance in the context of the recent global financial crisis and the 
increasing prevalence of obesity, most of existing studies on financial stress focus on mental 
health-related outcomes. Third, I take into account the state dependence of obesity. There is a 
strong persistence in one’s body weight. An individual who is obese in the past is likely to 
remain obese in the future (in the absence of dramatic changes of behaviours or health status). 
However, only few studies in the literature, have treated obesity in a dynamic setting. Fourth, I 
also consider the initial condition of one’s body weight status at the beginning of the sampled 
period. If body weight is persistent over time, ignoring the initial condition may lead to an 
overestimation of the true state dependence of obesity. To the best of my knowledge, no study 
in the literature has taken into account the initial condition of obesity. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a comprehensive 
literature review. Section 4.3 describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 illustrates 
the econometric specifications. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 
4.6 provides robustness checks. Section 4.7 discusses possible policy implications and 
limitations of this study. Section 4.8 concludes.  
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4.2. Literature review 
The literature review is divided into two parts: I firstly review papers discussing existing 
empirical evidence on the relationship between various measures of socioeconomic status (SES) 
and body weight49. I then provide a selective review of studies looking at time preferences, 
financial circumstances and their impact on body weight.  
4.2.1. SES and obesity  
The relationship between SES and an individuals’ body weight has long been discussed in the 
literature. Socioeconomic status is a complex combination of one’s social and economic 
situation in relation to others. Income and education level are widely used to represent one’s 
SES. In the literature, SES has been found to be closely associated to body weight. 
Rashad (2006) estimates the possible determinants of BMI using confidential micro-level 
data from the First, Second, and Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys 
(NHANES I, II, and III, respectively), which consist of a pooled sample of 28,696 individuals 
from the US 50. After controlling for caloric intake and physical activity level, she finds that 
having a college degree and higher household income are in general associated with a lower 
BMI in women.  
                                                 
49 A number of studies have shown that macroeconomic factors, such as food prices and the prevalence of 
restaurants (Cutler et al., 2003, Chou et al., 2004, Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005), cigarette prices and taxes 
(Gruber and Frakes, 2006, Baum, 2009), technology advancement (Finkelstein et al., 2005, Lakdawalla and 
Philipson, 2009), and urbanisations (Eid et al., 2008, Baum and Chou, 2011) are associated with the prevalence of 
obesity. I limit this discussion to studies attributing the prevalence of obesity to variations in socioeconomic status 
at the micro level. 
50 NHANES I was conducted between 1971 and 1975 by the National Centre for Health Statistics, US; NHANES 
II, between 1976 and 1980; NHANES III, between 1988 and 1994.  
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Villar and Quintana-Domeque (2009) conduct a similar study in Europe using the 1994-
2001 European Community Household Panel. They find a negative association between income 
and BMI in women, but not in men, and this negative association increases over the BMI 
distribution. They attribute the mixed results to biases including measurement errors in self-
reported weight and income, omitted variables that affect both income and BMI, and reverse 
causality. In addition, they argue that different results between men and women may be driven 
by the wage penalty for women in the labour market, whereby obese women are penalised with 
lower wages.  
Ljungvall and Gerdtham (2010) study income-related inequalities in obesity using a 
Swedish longitudinal dataset taken from the Swedish Survey of Living Conditions (1980 to 
1997, three waves in total). They find obesity is less common in women with relative higher 
income. Furthermore, the difference in obesity among different income groups decreases with 
age. The authors argue that the decreasing difference in obesity among Swedish women is due 
to the increasing prevalence of obesity in all age groups. 
As for the education level, there exists more consensus in the literature. Better educated 
individuals have been found to have a lower BMI and are less likely to be overweight/obese. 
This link can be explained by selection (von Hippel and Lynch, 2014, Benson et al., 2017): 
those with lower BMI are more likely to complete higher levels of education compared to those 
with higher BMI; or causation (Webbink et al., 2010): higher education is associated with 
advantages such as a higher income and better knowledge of the importance of keeping fit 
which help maintain a healthy weight.  
Using data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) which tracks 
body weight in a sample of individuals aged 15 to 29, von Hippel and Lynch (2014) favour the 
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selection explanation. They find male adolescents who are overweight/obese have 16 
percent/31 percent lower likelihood of completing higher education. The corresponding 
percentages for female adolescents are 47 percent and 60 percent, respectively. The authors 
conclude that the association between body weight and education is mainly due to selection 
rather than causation because only 25 percent of the body weight gradient can be explained by 
higher education attainment. However, the causal effect of education could increase for 
respondents older than 29. Hence, later, Benson et al. (2017) use the NLSY79 which covers 
older respondents compared to the NLSY97 and apply the same analytical framework as von 
Hippel and Lynch (2014). They confirm the findings from von Hippel and Lynch (2014). 
Specifically, at age 48, most of the negative association between body weight and education is 
found to be due to selection rather than causation51.  
Using longitudinal data from the Australian Twin Register, which consists of 5,967 adult 
twin pairs, Webbink et al. (2010) attempt to identify causation by utilising the within-twin 
estimator. They argue that the within-twin estimator controls for all unobserved genetic and 
family factors between a pair of twins. They find that education reduces the probability of being 
overweight within pairs of twins in men but not women. However, although twins share many 
genetic and socioeconomic commons, they are not identical. The differences are especially 
prevalent towards their late adulthood when each twin within a pair leaves the family and may 
acquire a different SES. The results may therefore still be affected by individual-specific 
heterogeneities. In addition, the results might be biased if unobserved family factors affect both 
education and body weight. 
                                                 
51 The NLSY79 is made up of individuals born between 1956 and 1964. This sample is followed up until 2012, 
when this study is conducted. In 2012, the NLSY79 participants were aged 48 to 56. von Hippel and Lynch (2014) 
restrict their sample to NLSY79 participants who were aged 17-18 in 1979 and 48-49 in 2012. 
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These studies suggest the need for investigating the effects of alternative SES measures 
other than income and education on body weight, as neither income nor education have a 
consistently large impact on body weight. To address this issue, by applying gene-environment 
interaction analyses to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) genetic sample, Liu and Guo 
(2015) find that persistent low SES over the life course, or moving from high SES to low SES 
enlarges the effect of genetic influence on BMI. In contrast, persistent high SES or moving 
from low SES to high SES over the life course compensates for this effect. Liu and Guo (2015) 
measure childhood SES by father’s occupation. The SES of young adults is measured as years 
of education, and that of middle/late adults as total household wealth. Their finding suggests a 
link between individual’s SES and BMI after controlling for the genetic differences. 
As for SES factors other than income and education, Godard (2016) estimates the effect 
of retirement on BMI, as well as on the probability of being overweight/obese of the older 
population in Europe using the 2004, 2006 and 2010-2011 waves of SHARE. Her results show 
men retiring from strenuous jobs have a higher probability of being obese/overweight. Yet, the 
same pattern does not apply to women. In addition, the state dependence of body weight is 
confirmed in this study. This finding indicates the importance of considering the dynamics of 
weight in relevant studies.  
In a nutshell, findings on income are mixed. Empirical studies find a negative association 
between body weight and income in women only (Rashad, 2006, Villar and Quintana-Domeque, 
2009, Ljungvall and Gerdtham, 2010, Baum and Chou, 2011), as well as in both men and 
women (Salmasi and Celidoni, 2017). Higher education has been found to be consistently 
linked to lower weight (von Hippel and Lynch, 2014, Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010, Ogden 
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et al., 2010, Benson et al., 2017), although the direction of this association is controversial. In 
other words, it is unclear if a lack of education causes higher body weight or vice versa.
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4.2.2. Financial circumstances, time preferences and obesity  
Financial circumstances are closely associated, but not interchangeable, with socioeconomic 
status (SES). Therefore, they deserves specific attention compared to conventional SES such as 
income, education, housing tenure and social class (Conklin et al., 2013). There is a strand of 
literature studying the effect of financial situation on obesity. In addition, since financial 
situation could be a reflection of one’s time preference52, I also include studies look at the 
impact of time preferences on body weight in this literature review. These studies are mainly 
conducted on the US (Adams and Moore, 2007, Averett and Smith, 2014, Courtemanche et al., 
2015, Komlos et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2005), Australia (Siahpush et al., 2014, Rohde et al., 
2017), or Japan (Ikeda et al., 2010, Kang and Ikeda, 2016). To the best of my knowledge, in 
European countries, empirical evidence is only available for the Netherlands (Webley and 
Nyhus, 2001, Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006), Germany (Münster et al., 2009, Keese and 
Schmitz, 2014), Switzerland (Guerra et al., 2015), and the UK (Guariglia et al., 2018, Pickering 
et al., 2017, Conklin et al., 2013). Furthermore, there are no cross-country comparative studies 
available.  
4.2.2.1. Financial circumstances and health  
In the context of recovering from the 2008 financial crisis and the following sovereign debt 
crisis, individuals were found to struggle with financial difficulties in developed countries 
(Prentice et al., 2017). However, existing studies on financial stress largely focus on its effects 
on psychological health, while its possible effects on body weight are rarely mentioned53. 
                                                 
52 Many studies have used individuals’ indebtedness as measure of their time preference rates. See, for example, 
Guariglia et al. (2018) and Pickering et al. (2017).  
53 Richardson et al. (2013) conducted a comprehensive review of studies on the relationship between personal 
unsecured debt and mental and physical health. 65 papers are included in the review but only 5 of them look at the 
effect of debt on body weight as one of the health outcomes.  
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Empirical evidence suggests that financial difficulties, a very common stressor in modern 
society, are associated with high stress and depression (Bridges and Disney, 2010, Selenko and 
Batinic, 2011, Hojman et al., 2016, Koltai et al., 2018), as well as with a worse general health 
status (Drentea and Lavrakas, 2000, Sweet et al., 2013, Keese and Schmitz, 2014, Clayton et 
al., 2015). As for the effect of financial circumstances on body weight, conditioning on a set of 
other socio-economic and demographic factors, a few empirical studies provide evidence of an 
association between financial hardship and weight gain or higher likelihood of being 
overweight/obese (Guariglia et al., 2018, Münster et al., 2009, Siahpush et al., 2014, Averett 
and Smith, 2014, Rohde et al., 2017).  
Bridges and Disney (2010) examine the effect of household indebtedness on depression 
using data from the UK’s Families and Children Survey for the period 1999-2005. They find a 
strong correlation between subjective self-reported financial difficulties and depression, while 
the link is much weaker for objective financial difficulties. They argue that the effect of 
objective financial difficulties on depression is mediated by individuals’ self-perception of 
financial difficulties which result from individual-specific heterogeneity.  
Selenko and Batinic (2011) contact 106 clients of an Austrian debt-counselling institution 
who were in the process of filing for bankruptcy and examine their mental health status by using 
a 12-item mental health related questionnaire. They find that individuals who perceive financial 
difficulties in the present have significantly worse mental health scores compared to others. The 
actual amount of debt is, surprisingly, neither correlated with perceived financial strain nor the 
mental health score. This suggests once more that there is a clear distinction between objective 
and subject financial stress relating to debt. It is the self-perceived financial situation, rather 
than the objective amount of debt, that affects one’s mental health. However, since this study 
is based on a rather small sample, the findings may not be representative. 
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Clayton et al. (2015) investigate the debt-health relationship at the aggregate level. Using 
country-level data covering 17 European countries over the period 1995 to 2012, they find that 
long-term debts are associated with poor health outcomes, while short- and medium-term debts 
are positively related to health outcomes. However, this study is limited to country-level data, 
and the measures of health outcome indicators are fairly simple, namely life expectancy and 
mortality. In addition, no heterogeneities across sample countries are discussed.  
Using data from waves 1 (1994/1995), 3 (2002/2003), and 4 (2007/2008) of the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), Sweet et al. (2013) find a higher 
financial debt-to-asset ratio to be associated with higher levels of perceived stress and 
depression, worse self-reported general health, and higher diastolic blood pressure. Their 
findings provide evidence for the impacts of debt on both physical and mental health. However, 
since the financial debt-related information is only available in Add Health wave 4, their 
econometric analysis is performed at a cross-sectional level. This raises the concern that the 
results may be driven by reverse causality or individual heterogeneity.  
Hojman et al. (2016) study the relationship between household debt and mental health 
status using a large dataset consisting of 10,900 Chilean households from 2002 to 2009. They 
find that those with persistent over-indebtedness have higher depressive symptoms. They also 
find households who transited from high indebtedness to moderate indebtedness have no 
additional depressive symptoms compared to those who have been in moderate indebtedness 
for the whole data period. Household debt trajectories between different indebtedness statuses 
are calculated between 2006 and 2009. However, since most debts considered are consumer 
debts which normally have less than 1-year maturity, it is possible that households classified as 
never in debt in fact had debts but paid them off between the two survey interviews. Thus, the 
debt-depression link highlighted in this paper may be biased. 
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Using three waves (conducted in 2011, 2013, and 2015 respectively) of the Canadian 
Work, Stress, and Health Study, Koltai et al. (2018) also find a poorer financial situation to be 
linked to poorer mental health. Moreover, they state mastery, a psychological force that 
stimulates an individual to solve problems individually54 , weakens this association. Time 
invariant unobservables are taken into account, but the utilisation of fixed-effects models rules 
out the possibility of studying the effects of persistent financial strain and low income on health 
outcomes because households without any changes in financial situation are automatically 
excluded from the analysis.  
Overall, these empirical studies consistently show that financial hardships are associated 
with poorer mental and physical health55. However, as for the effect of financial difficulties on 
body weight, the literature lacks consensus.  
By analysing data from the National College Health Assessment (2002-2003), Adams 
and Moore (2007) find a positive association between high risk credit debt and BMI in US 
college students aged 18 to 25. However, their analysis’ frame is only cross-sectional. The 
results are likely to be biased by not accounting for individual heterogeneity. In addition, being 
at the early stage of the life-cycle, college students aged 18 to 25 may not yet have accumulated 
enough debt for a full effect of debt burden on health to be detected.  
Münster et al. (2009) assess the association between indebtedness and obesity using a 
cross-sectional dataset including 949 over-indebted clients of debt counselling centres in 
Germany in 2006-2007. They observe a higher prevalence of overweight/obesity among over-
                                                 
54 Koltai et al. (2018) do not give clear definition of mastery. The definition here is found in Morgan et al. (1990).  
55 I summarise studies on the impact of financial difficulties on physical/mental health because health, especially 
mental health status, is arguably the mediator explaining the finance-weight link.  
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indebted individuals after controlling for other confounders such as age, gender, education, 
income and mental health status. However, no causality can be identified from this study 
because of the cross-sectional data structure.  
Using the US Add Health, a school based longitudinal study conducted between 1994 and 
1995 when the interviewees were aged 11-21, and between 2001 and 2002, when they were 
aged 18-28, Averett and Smith (2014) find a positive relationship between having trouble 
paying bills and being overweight/obese in women. Yet, the data they use is conducted almost 
two decades ago when the prevalence of obesity was not a global epidemic. In addition, as the 
maximum age of their subjects is only 28, the prevalence of financial debt might be 
underestimated as younger adults are less likely to have major debts compared to their older 
counterparts.  
Siahpush et al. (2014) estimate the association between financial stress and obesity in 
Australia. Using data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamic in Australia (HILDA), 
they find the risk of being obese in 2010 is 20 percent higher for individuals who experienced 
financial stress in both 2008 and 2009, compared to those who did not experience financial 
stress in either year. Yet, other factors that are likely to affect both financial situation and body 
weight are not considered in this study, and individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity is not taken 
into account. The estimation is thus likely to be biased.  
Keese and Schmitz (2014) study the relationship between household indebtedness and 
different health outcomes such as health satisfaction, mental health and obesity in Germany 
from 1999 to 2009. The fixed-effects setting enables them to control for time-invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity. They find significant negative associations between indebtedness 
and health satisfaction, as well as mental health, but the same does not hold for obesity. 
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However, as the prevalence of both obesity and debts has increased dramatically in the past 
decades, a stronger correlation between indebtedness and obesity could appear if more recent 
datasets were used.  
Using data from the Cohorte Lausannoise (CoLaus) Study, a population-based health-
related study which was firstly conducted in Lausanne Switzerland between 2003 and 2006 and 
followed up between 2009 and 2012, Guerra et al. (2015) find that the financial difficulties 
indicated by receiving social help are associated with a more than five kilograms increase in 
body weight. They argue that diet quality changes following financial difficulties, which leads, 
in turn, to weight gain. Yet, the time gap between two waves of the CoLaus is problematic since 
the follow-up study is conducted almost 6 years after the first study. In such a long time span, 
body weight is very likely to be affected by many other factors such as physical/mental health 
status, that are not controlled for in the analysis. Also, it is hard to justify the argument that 
one’s financial difficulties 6 years ago affect current body weight.  
Conklin et al. (2013) analyse the effect of financial hardships on obesity focusing on older 
British people living in Norfolk, UK. They find that financial hardship defined as having less 
than enough money for one’s needs is associated with a 1.1 (0.8) times higher probability of 
being obese in women (men) compared to those who reported having more than enough money. 
Financial hardship defined as always or often not having enough money for food/clothing is 
associated with a 0.4 and 0.8 times higher probability of being obese in women and men, 
respectively (compared to those who never have this money shortage). The strongest 
association is found when financial hardship is defined as having difficulty paying bills. 
Compared to those who do not have this difficulty, women and men with difficulty paying bills 
show a 1.2 and 1.4 times higher probability of being obese.  
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More recently, using the 2006 to 2011 HILDA survey and an OLS estimator, Rohde et al. 
(2017) find that those with economic insecurity are more likely to have a higher BMI in 
Australia. They also find the correlation to be stronger in individuals with higher BMI and/or 
with more economic insecurities using quantile regressions. However, their econometric 
analysis is only conducted at the cross-sectional level, and possible individual heterogeneity is 
not considered.  
The closest-related study to ours is Guariglia et al. (2018). Instead of looking at financial 
stress, they find that the absence of financial debt or high savings are associated with a lower 
probability of being obese/overweight. To this end, they make use of the English Longitudinal 
Survey of Aging over the period 2002-2012. In addition to BMI, they also use waist 
circumference which is argued to be a better measure of adiposity compared to BMI. They find 
having no debt is strongly related to a lower chance of being overweight/obese, especially 
among women. It is worth mentioning that, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the only 
one in the literature which has controlled for state dependence as well as initial conditions of 
body weight status.  
4.2.2.2. The role of time preferences 
Another strand of literature studies the impact of time preferences on body weight, because 
ultimately an individual’s financial situation could be a reflection of his/her time preference56. 
In addition, time preferences may affect body weight also through food consumption and 
exercise decisions. In the literature, time preferences are found to be significantly correlated 
with the chance of being overweight/obese. Individuals with a higher time preference rate 
                                                 
56 The rate of time preference is the rate at which individuals are willing to trade current utility for future benefit. 
Individuals with a higher rate of time preference value the present more than the future in general, and therefore 
are less patient.  
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discount future consumption more, and, as such, are less patient and more interested in current 
consumption, compared to those with a lower rate. In developed countries, as both monetary 
and time costs of caloric intake are very low, individuals with a higher rate of time preference 
are more likely to consume more calories than others (Ikeda et al., 2010). In addition, since the 
benefits of exercising and keeping a balanced diet are more likely to happen in the future, people 
with a higher rate of time preference are less likely to over-eat and procrastinate exercises, 
leading to higher body weight. 
At the aggregate level, Komlos et al. (2004) use the net domestic saving rate and debt-to-
income ratio as two proxies of time preferences. The lower the savings and the higher the debt-
to-income ratios are, the higher the time preference rates. They find a positive relationship 
between time preferences and obesity in the US. However, this conclusion is drawn in the 
absence of a micro-level econometric analyses, and without controlling for other confounders. 
Drawing data from the NLSY79 for the US, Smith et al. (2005) test the relationship between 
rate of time preference and BMI. In this study, saving indicates a low time preference rate and 
dissaving indicates a high time preference rate. They find that the rate of time preference and 
BMI are positively correlated among black and Hispanic men and black women. Their findings 
also suggest a positive association between the rate of time preference and the likelihood of 
being obese among black men.  
Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) estimate the relationship between changes in the rate of 
time discounting rate and differences in body weight among Dutch individuals. To this end, 
they make use of a large dataset from the DNB Household Survey, which covers the period 
1992-2004. By applying 25 proxies of individual time preferences covering risk attitude, future 
attitude, financial planning horizon, and values of savings, assets, and liabilities, they find that 
  
160 
 
individuals with higher time-preference rates show higher BMI. Furthermore, this association 
is found to be more prevalent in women. However, not all time preference proxies are 
significantly associated with body weight. In another word, their findings are very sensitive to 
the selection of time preference proxy. Specifically, proxies of time preference rates related to 
the ability to manage expenditure are more closely correlated to BMI. Additionally, the state 
dependence of body weight is not considered in this study.  
Using data taken from the Japan Household Survey on Consumer Preferences and 
Satisfaction 2005, Ikeda et al. (2010) study the impact of time preference on body weight. They 
document three aspects of time preference, namely impatience, hyperbolic discounting and the 
sign effect. Impatience represents a stronger preference for present consumption. Hyperbolic 
discounting implies agents having a high time discounting rate for very short horizons, while 
having a relatively lower rate for longer horizons. The sign effect implies agents discounting 
future gains at a higher rate than losses. The authors find that relative to their patient 
counterparts, individuals who are impatient show a higher BMI and a higher probability of 
being obese. Furthermore, procrastination, which is used as a measure of hyperbolic 
discounting is positively associated with BMI. Finally, individuals who do not show the sign 
effect are more likely to be obese. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, the 
dynamics of body weight is not accounted for.  
Courtemanche et al. (2015) utilise hypothetical intertemporal trade-off questions from the 
2006 NLSY to calculate a series of discount factors which reflect respondents’ impatience. 
They find impatience measured by higher discounting rates to be associated with higher BMI, 
as well as a higher probability of being overweight/obese. As the cost of obtaining food declined 
dramatically over the past decades, impatient consumers gained more weight compared to 
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patient consumers because they responded more strongly to the falling prices. This finding may 
explain why increases in BMI have been concentrated in the right tail of the weight distribution. 
Finally, the authors also find that impatient consumers are more likely to respond to economic 
changes such as lowered food price compared to those who are patient.  
Pickering et al. (2017) also investigate the relationship between time preference and body 
weight. Using data taken from six waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 
and adopting saving as a proxy for time preference, they find an unclear association between 
savings and the probability of being overweight/obese. Specifically, the decision to save is 
negatively associated with BMI, and placing savings in low risk investments is associated with 
a lower likelihood of being obese. Yet, these associations are not significant in all models. In 
addition, the authors do not observe any statistically significant association between the 
proportion of savings relative to total income and the probability of being overweight/obese.  
4.2.3. Contributions to the literature  
The majority of the above-mentioned studies have used cross-sectional data to study the links 
between financial stress/time preference and BMI/obesity/overweight. Associations from 
simple cross-sectional studies may be largely driven by unobservable individual heterogeneity 
and reverse causality. In addition, these studies have treated body weight as static and ignored 
the state dependence of obesity. This study aims at filling these gaps in the literature by applying 
a dynamic framework which considers the state dependence of body weight and controls for 
individuals’ unobservables. Furthermore, my study compares, for the first time, the differences 
in impact of financial status on body weight across nine EU countries, focusing on older 
European individuals. This is particularly important in the context of population ageing and 
rising obesity in Europe. 
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4.3. Data and descriptive analysis 
4.3.1. The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)  
I use data from the SHARE, a harmonised, longitudinal cross-national panel database of micro 
data for more than 120,000 individuals aged 50 and above. Not only is the questionnaire ex-
ante designed to be unified across participating countries, but also the data collection procedures 
are standardised. It thus provides truly comparable data, which enables comparative studies 
across surveyed European countries.  
The SHARE consists of 6 waves over the period 2004 (wave 1) to 2015 (wave 6)57. It is 
conducted on a biennial basis. I exclude wave 3 (SHARELIFE) from the analysis because it 
only asks questions relating to respondents’ life histories58. As it is a retrospective survey, 
information contained in wave 3 is highly different from that of other waves. It is also worth 
mentioning that, although the SHARE sample covers 21 European countries and Israel, I only 
keep countries which have participated in all waves in order to track the dynamics of obesity. 
After selection, my final sample consists of 9 countries, namely Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland, and Belgium. I form a balanced sample of 
respondents by including those who have participated in wave 1 and all subsequent waves 
(wave 3 is not considered) and provided non-missing information to all questions used to 
construct the regressors.  
                                                 
57 Although wave 7 has been undertaken and its questionnaire are available online, only data for wave 1 to 6 have 
been released. 
58 Although I have excluded all observations in wave 3 from my analysis, I make use of some information from 
wave 3. To be specific, I identify respondents in later waves who have also participated in wave 3 and merge 
their historical information in wave 3 to other waves.  
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Table 4.1 presents the structure of the balanced panel dataset. The basic observation unit 
is individual-wave. The sample size for each country is above 2,000, with Austria and 
Switzerland as two exceptions. In SHARE, these two countries have the smallest baseline 
sample kept in the latest wave (wave 6) compared to other countries in the longitudinal setting59. 
Since I restrict the sample to respondents who have participated in all waves and reported non-
missing information for all relevant questions, the final sample size is relatively small for these 
two countries.  
It is also worth mentioning that extra care should be taken when interpreting results 
because the balanced sample may not be representative of the full sample. This is resulted from 
observations dropping out from subsequent surveys (attrition) and the refreshed sample not 
being included in my sample since I only track the baseline sample over time. However, as the 
main focus of this paper is accommodating the dynamics of body weight while taking individual 
heterogeneity into account, a balanced panel dataset which tracks the baseline sample over years 
is required. In addition, previous studies have shown that attrition of panel data has limited 
impact on econometric estimations. Behr et al. (2005) analyse the extent of panel attrition in 
the European Community Household Panel and find no evidence of substantial attrition biases. 
They also find that the ranking of countries in terms of household mover-stayer structure is not 
affected by attrition, which justifies comparative studies for European countries using survey 
datasets in the presence of attrition. Although their research question is not directly linked to 
ours, stayer-leaver analysis is supposed to be very sensitive to attrition because mover-stayer 
transitions reflect income changes and are further related to residential mobility and changes of 
household compositions. Evidence has shown that low income, residential mobility and 
                                                 
59 For details of sample structure, please see http://www.share-project.org/data-documentation/sample.html 
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changes of household composition highly contribute to respondent drop-outs from a survey 
Behr et al. (2005). Hence, if the estimations for this topic show no sign of significant attrition 
biases, this alleviates the concerns for the presence of attrition in other comparative studies. 
Using the British Household Panel Survey and the European Community Household Panel, 
Jones et al. (2006) estimate the association between socioeconomic status and self-assessed 
health and test whether or not estimations results are sensitive to non-responses and attritions. 
This topic is more relevant to ours compared to Behr et al. (2005). They compare the estimations 
obtained from a balanced sample and an unbalanced panel with corrections for non-response 
and attrition by using inverse probability weights and find no major differences in the 
estimations of the variables of interest.  
4.3.2. Body weight variables:  
I use self-reported height and weight information to calculate the BMI of each individual. An 
individual is considered overweight if s/he has a BMI greater or equal to 25, and obese if his/her 
BMI is greater or equal to 3060. It has been argued that BMI is not a perfect measure of body 
fatness because it does not distinguish fat from fat-free mass such as weight of muscles and 
bones, especially for men (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008). However, studies have shown that 
body fat mass increases and muscle mass decreases with age (St-Onge, 2005). Hence, BMI is 
justified as a valid indicator of weight at least for elderly people.  
I am aware that self-reported weight is likely to be biased especially at the right-end of 
the weight distribution because individuals with higher weight have incentives to underreport 
                                                 
60 My overweight sample also includes those who are obese. In the following text, overweight means both 
overweight and obese.  
  
165 
 
their weight. This may lead to a downward biased BMI and proportion of overweight/obese 
respondents in my sample.  
To avoid these problems, I adjust the self-reported weight following Cawley et al. (2017) 
by using information from a validation dataset, the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) which 
contains both self-reported and measured body weight. This enables me to estimate the 
relationship between self-reported and measured body weight controlling for other individual 
characteristics such as age and gender. I then check if my results are robust to estimated report 
errors of self-reported weight. In a nutshell, despite the increasing prevalence of 
obesity/overweight observed in the sample, the regression results based on the corrected weight 
are similar to the ones using self-reported weight to construct dependent variables. State 
dependence of body weight is confirmed, although the link between financial situation and 
likelihood of being obese/overweight is weaker in this case. More details about this method and 
corresponding results are discussed in Section 4.6.1.  
4.3.3. Financial stress  
In each wave of SHARE, respondents are asked: “Thinking of your household’s total monthly 
income, would you say that your household is able to make ends meet?” The answers to this 
question are “with great difficulty/ with some difficulty/ fairly easily/ easily”. Those who answer 
“with great difficulty” or “with some difficulty” are defined as experiencing financial stress. I 
construct a dummy variable finstress equal to 1 in this case, and 0 otherwise.  
One may argue that financial indebtedness could be a better measure of financial stress. 
However, in SHARE, one of the inconsistencies in terms of household debt between waves 1 
and 2, on the one hand, and waves 4, 5, and 6, on the other is that the total amount of household 
  
166 
 
debt is calculated including mortgages in the first two waves, but not in the latter. Also, bearing 
mortgages is considered as possessing financial debt in wave 1 and 2, but not in wave 4, 5, and 
6. Thus, I cannot separate mortgages from other financial debts in the first two waves. Moreover, 
the amount of debt does not necessarily reflect financial hardship because wealthy households 
may have higher debt compared to others, without necessarily experiencing financial hardship. 
In addition, those with higher financial literacy may carry more debts than others simply 
because they have a higher demand for debts. By contrast, “having great/some difficulty” to 
make monthly ends qualifies as a direct reflection of households’ real financial situation. 
However, considering that the amount of financial debt is a widely used indicator of financial 
stress, I have tested the effects of having high financial debt on body weight as a robustness 
check. More details are discussed in Section 4.6.2.  
In line with other similar studies (Guariglia et al., 2018, Rohde et al., 2017, Pickering et 
al., 2017), I control for individuals’ demographics (age, gender, marital status), education level 
measured as years of education attainment, retirement status, household size, risky behaviours 
(smoking and being physical inactive), self-perceived health status, mental health status 
measured as the standard EURO-D 12 items depression scale, whether or not one’s daily 
activities are limited because of health issues, food consumption per capita in the household, as 
well as the value of household real assets and total household income. A set of wave dummies 
are included in all models to control the general time effect. Table 4.2 provides a summary 
description of all variable definitions, their sample means and standard deviations. It is worth 
noting that continues variables, namely food consumption per capital (foodpc), household real 
assets (hrass), household total annual income (thinc) and the body mass index (BMI) are 
winsorised at the bottom 1 percent and top 1 percent to address concern of outliers.  
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In Table 4.2, the mean of BMI is 26.68, which is higher than the overweight benchmark, 
indicating the prevalence of overweight in my sample. 20 percent of the respondents are obese 
and 62 percent of them are overweight or obese. 29 percent of the respondents are experiencing 
financial stress. 60 percent of the individuals are retired, 57 percent are female. The average 
education attainment among all respondents is 10.67 years. The average household real assets 
and total income are 247,400 and 38,400 Euro (2010 price level), respectively. 77 percent are 
home owners. 69 percent of the respondents have reported a good/very good/excellent self-
perceived health status whilst 7 percent have rated their health status as poor.  
Table 4.3 presents the differences in weight variables between financial stressed and non-
stressed groups. In general, the difference in body weight between the stressed and non-stressed 
groups are found for all countries. Over 50 percent of the observations in Spain and Italy 
experience financial stress. The proportion of financially stressed observations is in the range 
of 19 percent to 30 percent in Austria, Germany, France and Belgium. Sweden, Denmark and 
Switzerland have significantly lower proportion of financially stressed observations compared 
to other countries. These statistics are highly consistent with the EU-SILC where the proportion 
of households not able to make monthly ends meet is the highest in Southern European 
countries and lowest in Nordic countries.  
As for body weight, Spain has the highest prevalence of obesity (27.3 percent) and 
overweight (73.2 percent), while Switzerland has the lowest (12.0 percent and 51.1 percent 
respectively). For the rest of the countries, the occurrence of obesity is between 15.8 percent 
(Denmark) to 26.3 percent (Austria), and that of overweight is between 55.2 percent (Denmark) 
to 66.0 percent (Austria). These statistics show that over half of the observations in my sample 
are overweight regardless of country differences, indicating a high prevalence of overweight in 
  
168 
 
the sampled countries. It is also worth mentioning that the mean of BMI for all countries is 
higher than 25, the benchmark for identifying overweight for adults. 
The statistics also show great differences in weight variables between the financially 
stressed and non-stressed groups. The differences are highly statistically significant. In general, 
financially stressed observations are more likely to be obese/overweight and have a higher BMI. 
The difference between the stressed and non-stressed groups is considerably large in Germany. 
74.5 percent (27.8 percent) of the financially stressed observations in Germany are overweight 
(obese), while 59.9 percent (16.5 percent) of other observations are overweight and obese. 
Austria and Switzerland display insignificant difference between the two groups in terms of the 
percentage of being overweight. In addition, the percentage difference of being obese between 
the financially stressed and non-stressed groups tends to be higher than that of overweight for 
most of the countries in my sample. This may indicate financial stress is more likely to affect 
the occurrence of obesity other than that of overweight.  
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4.4. Econometric approach  
4.4.1. The dynamics of obesity  
I firstly estimate the determinants of overweight/obesity allowing for state dependence of body 
weight and individual unobservables. To this end, I follow Wooldridge (2005) and Hernández-
Quevedo et al. (2008). To be specific, I estimate the probability of an individual being 
overweight/obese (𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1) using a dynamic random-effects (RE) probit model of the form:  
𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
1𝐹𝑓𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜷𝒋
𝟐𝑿𝒋,𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝒋𝒁𝒋,𝒊 + 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡,
𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇 
(4.1) 
where 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the latent likelihood of individual i being obese or overweight at time t. Subscript 
j denotes whether the equation is for dependent variable obesity or overweight.⁡𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
lagged value of the weight variable for individual i. 𝑓𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡⁡is the financial situation of individual 
i at wave t. 𝑿𝒋𝒊𝒕 is a vector of time-varying control variables and 𝒁𝒋𝒊 is a vector of time-constant 
control variables. 𝛿𝑗𝑖  denotes the individual-specific error term and 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡  represents an 
idiosyncratic error component that is standard normally distributed. 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∗  is not directly 
observable. Instead, we only observe whether or not individual i is overweight/obese. The 
relationship is defined as: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = {
1⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0
0⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
(4.2) 
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The lagged value of the weight variable 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1  is included to control for the state 
dependence of weight since current weight highly depends on past weight. Using the NLSY79 
(1985-2010), Daouli et al. (2014) document that 68.4 percent of the respondents who are obese 
in the baseline wave remain obese in the following wave, 42.3 percent remain obese after five 
waves, and about 35.1 percent after nine waves. 29.0 percent of the baseline respondents remain 
obese throughout all waves. Their finding highlights the importance of treating obesity as a 
dynamic matter. Moreover, the inclusion of past weight also reduces the concern of past weight 
affecting the current financial situation and other SES (Hernández-Quevedo et al., 2008).  
 In Equation 4.1, the presence of 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 makes the composite error term 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 correlated 
over time. Moreover, to obtain consistent estimators, independence between the initial value of 
the outcome and 𝛿𝑗,𝑖  is required. However, this assumption is too strong even if we could 
observe the whole process of 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 (Wooldridge, 2005). For example, it is very unlikely that 
unobserved individual-specific genetic factors are not associated with the individual’s initial 
weight at all, not to mention that the first weight observation in my sample is clearly not the 
true initial weight. In addition, 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 may be correlated with some of the regressors in the model. 
To reduce these concerns, following Hernández-Quevedo et al. (2008), I model the distribution 
of the unobserved heterogeneity (𝛿𝑗,𝑖) conditional on the initial value of both the outcome and 
other time-varying variables in the form of:  
𝛿𝑗,𝑖 = 𝝆𝒋𝑿𝒋,𝒊,𝟏 + 𝜋𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑖,1 + 𝜇𝑗,𝑖 
(4.3) 
where 𝑿𝒋,𝒊,𝟏 is a set of initial values of time-varying variables including the financial situation 
variable finstressj,i,1, and 𝑤𝑗,𝑖,1 is the initial obesity/overweight status for individual i. 𝜇𝑗,𝑖  is 
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assumed to be independent of all regressors as well as 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 for individual i at wave t. Thus, 
Equation 4.1 becomes: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
1𝑓𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜷𝒋
𝟐𝑿𝒋,𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝒋𝒁𝒋,𝒊 + 𝝆𝒋𝑿𝒋,𝒊,𝟏 + 𝜋𝑗𝑤𝑗,𝑖,1 + 𝜇𝑗,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
⁡⁡𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇 
(4.4) 
where 𝛼𝑗,𝛽𝑗
1,𝜷𝒋
𝟐,𝜸𝒋,𝝆𝒋,𝜋𝑗  are parameters to be estimated. I estimate Equation 4.4 for each 
country separately. Selected results of estimating Equation 4.4 are presented in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5. Full results are presented in Appendix 4.1.  
4.4.2. Quantile regression estimates  
In addition to the dynamic RE Probit estimations, I also estimate a set of conditional quantile 
functions initially proposed by Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) to accommodate the fact that the 
effects of the covariates may differ along the distribution of BMI. Quantile regression (QR) 
allows me to analyse such effects by estimating parameters conditional on a set of covariates 
for every quantile specified. This provides a more complete picture about the relationship 
between BMI and individuals’ characteristics at different points in the distribution of BMI. The 
QR model is specified as follows:  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡|𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕) = 𝛼
𝜏 + 𝛽𝜏𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜸
𝝉𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖, i=1, …, N                     (4.5) 
where τ denotes the τth quantile of the distribution of BMI, and 0<τ<1. 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜏(·) denotes the 
τth quantile function of BMI conditional on lagged BMI and all covariates. I estimate Equation 
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4.5 for the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles of the entire BMI distribution for each country61. The 
corresponding results are reported in Table 4.9.  
4.5. Empirical results  
4.5.1. The persistence of body weight  
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 report the marginal effects of lagged dependent variables, the initial 
obesity/overweight status and the financial situation measure finstress on the probability of 
being obese and overweight.  
The results suggest strong state dependence of being obese and overweight. The marginal 
effects of lagged body weight and initial observation of weight status are both positive for all 
countries and such effects are strongly significant in general. The marginal effect of being obese 
in the previous wave on the probability of being obese now is higher in Italy (0.198) and Spain 
(0.160) and lower in Switzerland (0.027) compared to other countries. In a nutshell, being obese 
in the previous wave is associated with a 6.8 percent to 19.8 percent higher likelihood of being 
obese. Being overweight or obese in the previous wave is associated with an 11.5 to 19.7 percent 
higher chance of being overweight or obese. Such association is significant at the 1 percent 
significance level.  
It is interesting to note that the marginal effect of the initial observation of being 
obese/overweight is almost twice as large as that of lagged obese/overweight status. To be 
specific, being obese in the first wave is associated with an 18.6 to 31.0 percent higher chance 
of being obese now, whilst being overweight in the first wave is associated with 24.0 to 35.6 
                                                 
61 I also estimated Equation 4.5 at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th quantiles of BMI for each country. The results 
(not reported for brevity, but available upon request) only show marginal differences compared to those at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th quantiles. Specifically, the magnitude trends of lagged BMI and financial stress remain unchanged. 
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percent higher chance of being overweight now. The large marginal effect of the initial 
observation of one’s weight states can be partially explained as follows. Firstly, the initial 
observation here is not the true initial weight of each individual. Secondly, although I control 
for the individual heterogeneities at my best by modelling the initial weight as a function of the 
initial observations of all time-varying confounds, it is likely that there are other omitted factors 
that affect one’s initial weight such as parents’ weight, childhood socioeconomic status and diet. 
The effects of the true initial weight and the omitted variables are thus included in the effect of 
Obesity1 / Overweight1 in the estimations, which is, consequently, higher.  
To sum up, the estimated marginal effects suggest that there is a positive and significant 
link between previous and current body weight. This confirms that individuals who are 
obese/overweight are much more likely to be obese/overweight subsequently. In addition, the 
large marginal effect of initial body weight may also reflect a positive link between the initial 
weight and unobserved individual heterogeneities that contribute to a higher body weight.  
4.5.2. The role of financial distress  
In Table 4.4, I find a significantly positive association between financial stress and the 
probability of being obese in Austria, Sweden, but a negative one in Belgium. Not being able 
to make monthly ends meet is associated with a 4.1 percent and a 2.9 percent higher chance of 
being obese in Austria and Sweden respectively, and a 1.9 percent lower chance of being obese 
in Belgium. In Table 4.5, the association between financial stress and being overweight is found 
for Spain only. Having financial stress is linked to a 3.6 percent higher chance of being 
overweight in the Spanish sample. Although in the summary statistics, I observe significantly 
higher prevalence of obesity in the financial stressed sample for all countries, the results show 
that financial situation is only weakly linked to being obese/overweight in general and even 
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works in the opposite way for one country (Belgium). It is only significant for specific countries 
and the magnitude of such effect is rather small after controlling for the dynamics of obesity 
and individual heterogeneity.  
My findings are consistent with Keese and Schmitz (2014) where no significant 
association between debt and obesity is found after controlling for individual time-invariant 
heterogeneity in Germany. My results contrast with those in Guariglia et al. (2018) who find a 
strongly negative correlation between a better financial situation (proxied by not having any 
debt) in the UK and the probability of being obese/overweight. The difference in my findings 
may be attributed to the different measures of financial situation used. In line with this argument, 
Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) have shown their finding on the relationship between time 
preference and body weight to be highly sensitive to the time preference proxies used. In 
Guariglia et al. (2018), not having debt, as a measure of financial health, reflects only one aspect 
of the objective financial situation within a household, it may not provide enough information 
on households’ ability of monthly ends meet and capability of repaying debts. In other words, 
not having debt does not necessarily indicate not having financial stress. In addition, regional 
differences may also play a role, since the prevalence of household financial debt in the UK is 
higher than that of countries in my sample, with the exception of Sweden and Denmark. 
However, I do find a positive link between having financial stress and being obese in Sweden, 
but not in Denmark. Besides, neither do I find a statistically significant link between being 
financially stressed and being overweight in Sweden nor in Denmark, indicating that the first 
explanation for the difference in significance between this study and Guariglia et al. (2018) may 
be more valid. 
My findings are also different from those in similar studies conducted in the US (Adams 
and Moore, 2007, Averett and Smith, 2014), Australia (Siahpush et al., 2014, Rohde et al., 
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2017), Germany (Münster et al., 2009) and Switzerland (Guerra et al., 2015) in which a strongly 
significant correlation between financial stress and body weight have been found. A possible 
explanation to this difference is twofold.  
First, the majority of the above-mentioned studies have adopted a cross-sectional 
econometrics framework. It is thus impossible for them to address the individual heterogeneity 
issue since each sample is observed only once. Second, for the studies using longitudinal data, 
body weight and body weight status are not treated as dynamic matters. If there exists a strong 
dependence between current and historical weight, ignoring historical weight information may 
lead to biased estimates.  
4.5.3. Does financial distress affect all individuals equally?  
Considering men and women have many genetic and behavioural differences and are likely to 
respond to financial stress differently, I further test if the effect of financial stress on 
obesity/overweight differs for males and females. To this end, I replace the financial stress 
dummy in Equation 4.4 by two interaction terms between weight variables and the gender 
dummy62. The marginal effects of the two interactions are reported in Table 4.6 where Panel A 
presents the results for obesity and Panel B presents those of overweight.  
For Austria and Sweden, where I have found a significant positive association between 
financial stress and the probability of being obese, I further find that this association only exists 
for women in Austria and for men in Sweden. Having financial stress is associated with a 6.1 
percent higher chance of being obese for Austrian women and a 5.2 percent higher chance for 
Swedish men. In addition, I also find such a link for Spanish and Swiss women, and Italian men. 
                                                 
62 The two interactions are finstress*female, and finstress*(1-female) 
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Having financial stress is associated with a 3.4, 3.5 and 8.7 percent higher chance of being 
obese in the Spanish women, Italian men, and Swiss women sample respectively.  
In Panel B, in addition to Spain, the positive link between financial stress and being 
overweight is also found for Germany. Having financial stress contributes to a 5.0 percent 
higher probability of being overweight for German women and a 3.4, and 3.9 percent higher 
probability for both Spanish men and women, respectively. 
4.5.4. Demographics, SES factors and beyond  
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 report the marginal effects of other covariates in Equation 4.4 on the 
probability of being obese and overweight respectively. There are several consistencies among 
countries.  
The effects of age and gender are generally not significant. After controlling for the state 
dependence of body weight status, one additional year of education attainment is significantly 
associated with a 0.69 percent lower chance of being obese in Germany. The corresponding 
percentages for Spain, Italy, Denmark and Switzerland are 0.43, 0.61, 0.50 and 0.40. Having 
limited mobility is associated with a higher probability of being obese. Such association is 
statistically significant for Spain, Italy, France, Denmark and Belgium. One additional point in 
the EURO-D depression scale is associated with a 0.64, 0.73 and 0.57 percent lower probability 
of being obese for France, Denmark and Belgium. This finding indicates worsening mental 
health is associated with weight loss. A good self-perceived health status is associated with a 
2.36, 2.33, 2.40 and 4.24 percent lower chance of being obese for Sweden, Italy, France, and 
Switzerland, respectively. 
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Marital status plays a mixed role. Marital status is found to be significantly correlated to 
the probability of being obese in Denmark. Compared to single individuals, those who are 
married, divorced or widowed are associated with an 18.2, 17.1, and 19.4 percent higher chance 
of being obese in Denmark. However, being widowed is negatively associated with the 
occurrence of obesity in Germany and Belgium.  
The marginal effect of being retired is only significant for Germany and Sweden. Being 
retired is associated with a 3.7 percent higher probability of being obese in Germany but a 2.3 
percent lower probability in Sweden. These mixed results may be due to different sedentariness 
levels of jobs prior to retirement. Intuitively, those who retire from strenuous jobs may 
experience a large drop in work-related exercise and gain weight as a consequence, while others 
do not experience similar drops. These results are consistent with Goldman et al. (2008) and 
Godard (2016) who do not find a significant and generalised relationship between retirement 
and weight gain.  
Income is found to be negatively associated with the probability of being obese in Sweden. 
Household real assets are negatively associated with the probability of being obese in Belgium. 
Yet, both marginal effects are only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This finding 
is consistent with Cawley et al. (2010) who find only very small impacts of income and wealth 
on body weight in natural experiments.  
I do not find a significant association between having a history of smoking and the 
probability of being obese. The sign of the impact of smoking history on obesity is negative in 
general but the marginal effect is not significant in general. Being physical inactive is 
significantly associated with a 6.2 and 2.3 percent higher chance of being obese in Austria and 
Italy respectively, but the same does not hold for other countries. Those who have reported a 
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poor self-perceived health status are associated with a 6.4 percent higher chance of being obese 
in Switzerland only.  
Similar above-mentioned patterns are found for the probability of being overweight with 
the exception of poor self-perceived health status where good health is found to be associated 
with a lower chance of being overweight. This is because weight loss could be a consequence 
of poor health (Willett, 1997). Education level is negatively associated with the estimated 
probability of being overweight, but such effect is only significant in Spain and Switzerland. 
Marital status does not affect the estimated probability of being overweight in general. Income 
and assets are negatively associated with the probability of overweight, but the magnitude of 
such impact is small and not statistically significant. Having limited mobility is positively 
linked to being overweight and such link is significant in Austria, Sweden and Spain. The 
marginal effect of the EURO-D score is negative in general and significant for Austria, 
Germany, Spain and France. Poor self-perceived health status is negatively associated with the 
probability of being overweight and such effect is significant in Sweden, Italy and Belgium. 
These associations are consistent with the existing literature such as Siahpush et al. (2014) and 
Guariglia et al. (2018).  
4.5.5. Quantile regressions  
It is plausible that individuals with different weight status do not response to financial stress 
identically. To allow for the possibility that the effect of financial stress changes over the 
distribution of BMI, I estimate Equation 4.5 in a QR setting.  
Table 4.9 reports the quantile regression results of selected variables. The full QR results 
are reported in Appendix 4.2. The results show that the magnitude of lagged BMI increases 
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with the quantiles of BMI. The estimated coefficients of BMIt-1 are smallest at the 25
th quantile, 
and largest at the 75th quantile for all countries. The highly significant and positive coefficients 
of lagged BMI confirm the general existence of the state dependence of body weight, and such 
dependence is stronger at the higher quantiles of BMI for all countries.  
As for financial stress, although the magnitude of the coefficients associated with 
financial stress increase with BMI, they are not statistically significant in most cases with the 
exceptions of two countries. Specifically, for Spain, being financially stressed is positively 
associated with a 0.34 units higher BMI (that is about 1kg heavier in weight for a 170cm person) 
at the 75th quantile. For France, being financially stressed is associated with a BMI higher by 
0.11 units and 0.20 units at the 50th and 75th quantiles respectively.  
4.5.6. Summary of main findings 
Overall, my results show strong state dependence of body weight measured by the occurrence 
of obesity, overweight, and BMI in all country subsamples. Such state dependence is robust to 
different model specifications and body weight indicators. The positive link between financial 
stress and body weight are found in few countries, namely Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, 
Italy and France. But such positive link is sensitive to the model specifications and/or gender. 
Being financially stressed increases the estimated probability of being obese by 4.1 
percent in the full sample and by 5.8 percent in the female subsample in Austria. Yet, the same 
link is not found for the probability of being overweight and for BMI. In the German female 
subsample, I find that having financial stress is associated with a 4.8 percent higher chance of 
being overweight. In the Swedish and Italian male subsamples and in the Swiss female 
subsample, having financial stress is respectively associated with a 5.2, 3.5, and 6.3 percent 
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higher probability of being obese, but the same does not hold for the probability of being 
overweight and for BMI.  
Only in Spain, I consistently find a positive link between being financially stressed and 
body weight regardless of different model specifications. To be specific, having financial stress 
is associated with a 3.4 percent higher chance of being obese in the female subsample, a 3.2 
and 4.2 percent higher chance of being overweight in the male and female subsamples, and 1 
kg higher weight at the 70th quantiles of BMI63. 
                                                 
63 This estimation is made for a 170cm person.  
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4.6. Robustness tests  
4.6.1. Corrected self-reported weight  
In this study, BMI is calculated using respondents’ self-reported weight information because 
the SHARE lacks actual weight information which is normally collected by a nurse or trained 
interviewer when the survey is taken place. The use of self-reported weight information raises 
several concerns. First, the weight variables might be underestimated if overweight/obese 
respondents underreport their weight in the surveys. Second, the estimators obtained in Section 
4.5 would be biased if this reporting error is correlated with other characteristics included in 
my regression models such as education, gender and age. Third, the direction of this bias is hard 
to estimate because of the non-linear property of the probit specification I use. 
To address these concerns, I follow Cawley et al. (2017) to correct the potential reporting 
errors exiting in the SHARE by using a validation dataset, namely the HRS, which contains 
both self-reported and measured weight information. The HRS is designed to study ageing 
issues in the US. The SHARE has closely followed the HRS regarding questionnaire design, 
sample selection and interviewer training (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005). Given the high level of 
comparability, the HRS is justified as the validation dataset for my study64.  
Starting from 2006, in each subsequent wave, half of the respondents in the HRS are 
randomly pre-selected for a face-to-face interview in which their weight is measured by a 
trained interviewer. The main interview is conducted prior to this weight measure and the 
respondents are not aware that their weight would be measured later when they report weight. 
                                                 
64 Although the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is also highly comparable to SHARE and could be 
considered as a better candidate than the HRS because the UK is more closely related to other European countries 
in terms of geographic and cultural factors, it does not have both self-reported and measured weight information 
at the same time.  
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This approach ensures minimum timing difference between reported and measured weight. It 
also reflects actual reporting errors because the respondents do not know their actual weight 
would be measured later (Cawley et al., 2017).  
I draw a sample from HRS wave 8 (2006) to wave 13 (2016) with non-missing 
measured/self-reported weight and age information65. I then estimate the following equation 
using the OLS method for men and women separately:  
weightactual = f (constant, weightreported, weight
2
reported, weight
3
reported, agedummy50, 
agedummy5155, agedummy5660, agedummy6165, agedummy6670, agedummy7175, 
agedummy7680, agedummy80)                                                                                             (4.6) 
The OLS coefficients (reported in Appendix 4.2) obtained in the HRS are then used to 
predict the measured weight based on self-reported weight, age and gender information in the 
SHARE. This step assumes the relationship between actual weight and self-reported weight are 
the same in both datasets. This is, of course, a strong assumption. However, considering that 
HRS is a sibling study of SHARE and comparability widely exists between them (Börsch-
Supan et al., 2005), I expect this transportability truly exists.  
 The relationship between corrected weight and self-reported weight in the SHARE are 
presented in Table 4.10. Using corrected weight, the prevalence of obesity and overweight in 
my sample is reported in Table 4.11. I then reconstruct the binary weight variables overweight 
and obese, and repeat the analyses described in Section 4.4.1. 
                                                 
65 Wave 8 is the first wave to include measured body weight and wave 13 is the most recent wave available in the 
HRS.  
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The average corrected weight is 1.71 kg and 6.57 kg higher than average self-reported 
weight for females and males respectively. After correcting the self-reported body weight, the 
prevalence of obesity/overweight and BMI both increase compared to that using original 
respondents’ self-reported weight. Regression results using corrected weight information are 
reported in Tables 4.12 and 4.13.  
The results confirm the general existence of body weight status persistence. Being 
obese/overweight in the previous wave is strongly correlated with a higher probability of being 
obese/overweight in the subsequent wave. However, the link between financial stress and body 
weight is weakened. To be specific, the positive association between experiencing financial 
stress and the probability of being obese or overweight is only found in the Austrian and 
German female subsample. I still find such an association for both obesity and overweight in 
the Spanish female subsample. After controlling for possible reporting errors, the difference in 
obesity/overweight between individuals with financial stress and those without drops and so 
does the significance level of financial stress in my models. Since the difference between self-
reported weight and corrected weight is larger in the male subsample, the significance level of 
the interaction finstresst*male declines significantly.  
4.6.2. An objective measure of financial stress – high financial debt (highdebt) 
I further test if I still find difference in weight status between the financially stressed and non-
stressed groups using an objective measure of financial stress. Bridges and Disney (2010) have 
questioned the precision of using the self-perceived financial situation as a proxy for the real 
financial situation. The self-reported financial situation is likely to be affected by individuals’ 
characteristics. For example, those who are depressed or anxious may perceive financial 
difficulties in a different way from other individuals (Bridges and Disney, 2010). Furthermore, 
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respondents who receive government subsides may have incentives to underreport their 
financial situation if they see self-reported financial difficulties as a justification for receiving 
aid. To address this issue, I construct an objective indicator of financial stress. To be specific, I 
classify those who own financial liabilities higher than the average financial liability within the 
same country in the same wave as financially stressed individuals66. Table 4.14 presents the 
percentage of individuals having high financial liabilities. Among all countries, Sweden and 
Denmark have the highest and second highest proportion of individuals with high financial debt. 
This is consistent with the fact that household debt is more prevalent in Nordic countries 
compared to that of other European counties (EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 
2016). Italy and Spain have a relatively low proportion of individuals with high financial 
liabilities compared to that of other sampled countries. I also find that Switzerland has the 
lowest proportion of respondents having high financial debt. This is due to the average financial 
liability being high in Switzerland, thus the benchmark of highdebt is higher than other 
countries. Therefore, the proportion of respondents having high debt is low in Switzerland.  
Table 4.15 and 4.16 present the marginal effects of financial stress measured by having 
high financial debt on the probability of being obese and overweight. I find having high 
financial debt is associated with a 4.98 percent higher chance of being obese and a 9.38 percent 
higher chance of being overweight in the German female subsample. In the Spanish female 
subsample, having high financial debt is associated with a 7.85 percent higher probability of 
being overweight, but the same does not apply to obesity. I find an opposite effect of financial 
stress in the Italian female subsample – having high financial debt is associated with a 4.04 
percent lower chance of being obese. It is worth mentioning that I do not find a statistically 
                                                 
66 I have tried the median of financial liabilities as another benchmark for defining highdebt. The results do not 
change. The correlation between financial stress and body weight status does not generally exist in all countries. 
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significant relationship between having high financial debt and being obese/overweight in 
Nordic countries where household debt is more prevalent compared to other countries.  
Selenko and Batinic (2011) and Drentea and Lavrakas (2000) find a clear distinction 
between measuring debt objectively and subjectively. Subjective perceptions of bearing debts 
are significantly associated with mental and physical health outcomes, while the actual amount 
of debt is not as significant. In the present study, when the subjective financial stress measure 
is used, the positive link between financial stress and body weight is more evident. When the 
objective financial stress measure is used, the link disappears in most of the sampled countries. 
This suggests that financial stress itself may have limited impact on body weight. It is one’s 
perception of his/her financial situation which matters. That is to say, objective financial stress 
does not necessary indicate the presence of subjective financial stress. Table 4.17 reports the 
correlation coefficient between finstress and highdebt where we can see that the correlation 
between the subjective financial stress (finstress) and the objective financial stress (highdebt) 
is only 0.03 and significant at the 5 percent level. Individuals who are less confident in their 
ability to cope with difficulties may be more likely to report subjective financial difficulties and 
more likely to respond to their financial difficulties.  
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4.7. Discussion  
4.7.1. Does financial stress matter at all?  
My findings show a weak link between financial stress and body weight. After controlling for 
the state dependence of body weight, the significance level of the financial situation decreases 
dramatically67, indicating the incidence of obesity/overweight in my sample is largely driven 
by the history of being obese or overweight. Financial stress matters for some countries 
(subgroups), but the extent of such effect is limited. My findings also suggest that having 
subjective financial stress is more likely to be associated with a higher chance of being 
overweight/obese than having objective financial stress. By contrast, high levels of financial 
debt are generally not found to be associated with a higher probability of being 
overweight/obese.  
A possible explanation for the insignificance of financial difficulty in several of my 
models is twofold. First, the effect of financial stress may be captured by other factors, for 
example, the EURO-D, which is a measure of mental health. There is a well-established 
literature which has found that financial difficulty is associated with worsened mental health 
(Bridges and Disney, 2010, Selenko and Batinic, 2011). Second, the effect of financial stress 
on body weight may be both positive and negative, i.e. financial stress may cause both weight 
losses or weight gains, which may lead to an overall ambiguous effect. More specifically, when 
experiencing financial stress, individuals are prone to binge eating or eating more calorie-dense 
                                                 
67 The marginal effect of financial stress is strongly significant at the 1 percent level for all countries if the lagged 
dependent variable and initial observations of body weight are not controlled for. These results are not reported 
for brevity, but available upon request. 
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food leading to increase of body weight. However, stress may also lead to lower appetite which 
contributes to weight losses.  
In addition, I also notice that the positive association between financial stress and body 
weight is less prevalent when I measure financial stress objectively. Subjective financial stress 
measured by finstress is associated with a higher chance of being obese/overweight in Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland. By contrast, my objective measure of financial stress 
is found to be associated with a higher probability of being obese/overweight in Germany and 
Spain. In addition, in Italy, a negative association is found between a high amount of debt and 
the probability of being obese is detected in the female subsample. These difference are in line 
with Selenko and Batinic (2011) and Drentea and Lavrakas (2000), who find that subjective 
perceptions of bearing debts are significantly associated with health outcomes, while the actual 
amount of debt is not as significant.  
4.7.2. Limitations 
Although I apply a rigorous econometric framework which controls for the state dependence of 
body weight as well as individual heterogeneity, only associations between financial situation 
and body weight (rather than causal effects) can be identified. Moreover, the possible 
endogeneity of the financial stress indicator has not been addressed. In addition, the sample I 
construct may not be representative for the whole population in Europe due to the balanced 
panel structure. Besides, only nine EU countries are analysed in this comparative study while 
other EU countries are left out because of data limitations. Finally, I have not yet investigated 
the possible mediators or moderators of the relationship between financial stress and body 
weight in countries where evidence for such a link is established. Furthermore, my approach of 
correcting self-reported weight is not flawless. This method is highly based on the assumption 
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that the extent and direction of misreports in the SHARE are identical to those of the HRS. This 
assumption is very strong. 
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4.8. Conclusion  
Obesity has been identified as a global epidemic in the last decade. According to the recent 
WHO estimation, obesity affects at least 20-30 percent and overweight affects at least 30-70 
percent of adults in European regions. Excess body weight is linked to a higher risk of 
developing cardiovascular diseases, certain cancers and type II diabetes. It also causes physical 
disabilities and psychological problems. Moreover, the public cost of obesity is extremely high. 
In 2012, €81 billion public medical expenditure in the EU was directly or indirectly spent on 
treating obesity or obesity-related health (Hunt and Ferguson, 2014). In the context of 
household credit expansion and increasing financial fragility of European households following 
the Global Financial Crisis, I study the extent to which financial stress and weight gain are 
related among European adults aged 50 and over. 
Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), I 
analyse 6,446 individuals from nine EU countries who have participated in all waves of SHARE 
from 2004 to 2014. The longitudinal setting of SHARE allows me to investigate the dynamics 
of body weight controlling for individual heterogeneity. The high level of cross-country 
comparability of SHARE enables me to conduct a comparative analysis across sampled 
European countries. I find some evidence for a positive link between financial stress and body 
weight in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France and Switzerland. This link is robust 
to correcting self-reported weight measures in Austria, Germany and Spain, and to using an 
alternative financial stress measure in Germany and Spain.  
This study is the first to provide a comparative study on the topic of finance-obesity nexus 
among EU countries. It is also one of the first studies on obesity to consider the state dependence 
of obesity and to control for the initial conditions. In the context of increasing prevalence of 
  
190 
 
obesity and overweight, this study sheds some light on understanding the epidemic of obesity 
in European countries. My findings suggest that policies targeted at improving citizens’ 
financial stress coping strategy and reducing self-perceived financial stress may play a role in 
tackling the obesity epidemic in EU countries especially in Germany and Spain. 
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Table 4. 1 Structure of the balanced panel 
Country 3-digit country code No. of obs. 
Austria AUT 1,915 
Germany DEU 2,815 
Sweden SWE 4,150 
Spain ESP 3,595 
Italy ITA 4,680 
France FRA 3,520 
Denmark DNK 3,125 
Switzerland CHE 1,720 
Belgium BEL 6,710 
Total  32,230 
Source: SHARE, wave1/2/4/5/6  
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Table 4. 2 Summary statistics for data pooled across countries 
Variable      Obs.  Mean SD 
BMI 32,230 Body Mass Index (Kg/m2) 26.68 4.29 
obesity 32,230 1 if BMI≥30, 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 
overweight 32,230 1 if BMI≥25, 0 otherwise 0.62 0.49 
finstress 32,230 1 if financial stressed, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45 
retired 32,230 1 if retired, 0 otherwise 0.60 0.49 
female 32,230 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.57 0.49 
yedu 32,230 Years of education attained 10.67 4.60 
married 32,230 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.73 0.44 
divorced 32,230 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.25 
widowed 32,230 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 0.15 0.35 
age 32,230 Age at interview 67.70 9.26 
hhsize 32,230 Number of household members 2.08 0.90 
homeowner 32,230 1 if a homeowner, 0 otherwise 0.77 0.42 
esmoked 32,230 1 if ever smoked, 0 otherwise 0.56 0.50 
phinact 32,230 1 if being physical inactive, 
0 otherwise 
0.09 0.29 
gali 32,230 1 if activity limited, 0 otherwise 0.42 0.49 
goodhealth 32,230 1 if in good/very good/excellent self-
perceived health status, 0 otherwise  
0.69 0.46 
poorhealth 32,230 1 if in poor self-perceived health status, 
0 otherwise 
0.07 0.25 
eurod 32,230 Euro-D depression score (0-12) 2.27 2.16 
foodpc 32,230 Food consumption per capita 0.33 0.19 
hrass 32,230 Household real assets 24.74 30.66 
thinc 32,230 Household total annual income 3.84 4.17 
Notes: The unit of monetary variables namely foodpc, hrass and thinc is per 10,000 Euro (2010 price level); 
foodpc, hrass, thinc and BMI are winsorised at the bottom 1% and top 1%. 
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Table 4. 3 Sample means of weight variables by country and by financial situation 
  No of obs. BMI Overweight Obese 
AUT Financially stressed 373 27.802* 0.654 0.310** 
 (% of full sample) (19.48 %)    
 Not stressed 1,542 27.353 0.662 0.252 
 Full sample  1,915 27.441 0.660 0.263 
DEU Financially stressed 582  28.081*** 0.745*** 0.278*** 
 (% of full sample) (20.67 %)    
 Not stressed 2,233 26.449 0.599 0.165 
 Full sample 2,815 26.774 0.629 0.188 
SWE Financially stressed 527  27.047*** 0.629*** 0.256*** 
 (% of full sample) (12.69 %)    
 Not stressed 3,623 26.042 0.558 0.157 
 Full sample 4,150 26.169 0.567 0.169 
ESP Financially stressed 1,839  28.425*** 0.778*** 0.322*** 
 (% of full sample) (51.15 %)    
 Not stressed 1,756 27.357 0.685 0.222 
 Full sample 3,595 27.804 0.732 0.273 
ITA Financially stressed 2,739  27.289*** 0.667*** 0.249*** 
 (% of full sample) (58.52 %)    
 Not stressed 1,941 26.302 0.604 0.159 
 Full sample 4,680 26.880 0.641 0.211 
FRA Financially stressed 959  27.280*** 0.642*** 0.264*** 
 (% of full sample) (27.24 %)    
 Not stressed 2,561 26.238 0.554 0.183 
 Full sample 3,520 26.522 0.578 0.205 
DNK Financially stressed 359  26.873*** 0.646*** 0.233*** 
 (% of full sample) (11.48 %)    
 Not stressed 2,776 25.831 0.540 0.148 
 Full sample 3,125 25.951 0.552 0.158 
CHE Financially stressed 203  26.154*** 0.522 0.192*** 
 (% of full sample) (11.80 %)    
 Not stressed 1,517 25.312 0.509 0.111 
 Full sample 1,720 25.411 0.511 0.120 
BEL Financially stressed 1,632  27.350*** 0.676*** 0.257*** 
 (% of full sample) (24.32 %)    
 Not stressed 5,078 26.502 0.608 0.189 
 Full sample 6,710 26.708 0.625 0.205 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes the mean difference between financial stressed and non-stressed group is significant 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using standard t-tests.  
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Table 4. 4 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being obese 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
Obesityt-1 0.0973*** 0.0680*** 0.0721*** 0.160*** 0.198*** 0.0855*** 0.0699*** 0.0273 0.0996*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0210) (0.0170) (0.0266) (0.0245) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0151) 
Obesity1 0.310*** 0.276*** 0.252*** 0.265*** 0.186*** 0.288*** 0.247*** 0.261*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0233) (0.0192) (0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0349) (0.0153) 
finstresst 0.0411* -0.00248 0.0290** 0.0190 0.0134 0.0111 -0.00807 0.0288 -0.0195** 
 (0.0211) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0134) (0.0173) (0.0191) (0.00992) 
          
Observa
tions 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included in all 
regressions. Other controls include age, female, yedu, married, widowed, divorced, retired, hhsize, thinc, hrass, gali, smoked, phinact, foodpc, eurod, goodhealth, poorhealth. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 5 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being overweight 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
Overweightt-1 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.153*** 0.115*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0277) (0.0229) (0.0261) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0286) (0.0339) (0.0213) 
Overweight1 0.327*** 0.339*** 0.356*** 0.240*** 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.345*** 0.353*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0250) (0.0216) (0.0228) (0.0193) (0.0237) (0.0276) (0.0335) (0.0216) 
finstresst -0.0160 0.0176 -0.0279 0.0363** -0.00475 -0.00620 0.0239 0.0142 -0.00287 
 (0.0237) (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0160) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0248) (0.0293) (0.0121) 
          
Observation
s 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included in all 
regressions. Other controls include age, female, yedu, married, widowed, divorced, retired, hhsize, thinc, hrass, gali, smoked, phinact, foodpc, eurod, goodhealth, poorhealth. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 6 Differentiating the effect of financial stress on the probability of being obese/overweight for males and females 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Variables AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
Panel A                     
 
Obesity 
 
finstresst*female 0.0613** -0.00110 0.0133 0.0341* -0.00344 0.0175 -0.0191 0.0875** -0.0183 
 (0.0280) (0.0170) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0152) (0.0169) (0.0208) (0.0445) (0.0113) 
finstresst*male 0.00179 -0.00454 0.0526** -0.00473 0.0355** 0.000334 0.00563 -0.0141 -0.0199 
  (0.0380) (0.0217) (0.0286) (0.0228) (0.0171) (0.0214) (0.0263) (0.0249) (0.0152) 
Panel B           
 
Overweight 
 
finstresst*female -0.0235 0.0504* -0.0426 0.0347* -0.00384 -0.00434 0.0158 0.0357 -0.0211 
 (0.0286) (0.0271) (0.0260) (0.0205) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0317) (0.0360) (0.0154) 
finstresst*male 0.00202 -0.0220 -0.00180 0.0394* -0.00600 -0.0106 0.0376 -0.0326 0.0274 
  (0.0434) (0.0290) (0.0341) (0.0236) (0.0198) (0.0266) (0.0397) (0.0527) (0.0192) 
           
 Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included in all 
regressions. Other controls include age, female, yedu, married, widowed, divorced, retired, hhsize, thinc, hrass, gali, smoked, phinact, foodpc, eurod, goodhealth, poorhealth. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 7 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being obese 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
age 0.0144 0.0284 0.0262 -0.0133 -0.0253 0.00266 -0.00809 0.0269 -0.00360 
 (0.0321) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0330) (0.0443) (0.0134) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0107) 
female -0.00786 -0.0197 -0.00786 -0.00125 -0.00401 -0.00516 -0.0208 0.00485 -0.00897 
 (0.0257) (0.0174) (0.0123) (0.0235) (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0120) 
yedu -0.00182 -0.00690** -0.00228 -0.00436** -0.00606*** -0.00255 -0.00500** -0.00404** -0.00195 
 (0.00252) (0.00294) (0.00161) (0.00199) (0.00191) (0.00206) (0.00255) (0.00166) (0.00159) 
married 0.0143 -0.132 -0.130 -0.0279 0.0243 -0.0376 0.182** -0.0420 -0.231 
 (0.197) (0.107) (0.138) (0.0540) (0.0412) (0.0737) (0.0812) (0.0534) (0.144) 
widowed -0.0646 -0.188* -0.141 -0.0571 -0.0163 -0.00740 0.171** 0.00546 -0.259* 
 (0.200) (0.113) (0.138) (0.0478) (0.0320) (0.0731) (0.0851) (0.0418) (0.146) 
divorced 0.195 -0.149 -0.126 -0.0729 0.177* -0.0285 0.194** -0.102 -0.189 
 (0.231) (0.104) (0.143) (0.135) (0.0972) (0.0748) (0.0863) (0.0752) (0.141) 
retired -0.0140 0.0374** -0.0227* -0.0243 0.0175 -0.0182 0.0173 0.0157 0.00803 
 (0.0213) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.00998) 
hhsize -0.00753 -0.000235 -0.000385 0.00311 -0.00736 -0.0229* -0.00721 -0.0141 -0.00847 
 (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.00729) (0.0119) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.00846) 
thinc -0.00760 -0.00198 -0.00334* -0.00514 -0.00122 0.00267 -0.00291 0.000319 0.000782 
 (0.00516) (0.00299) (0.00195) (0.00628) (0.00349) (0.00281) (0.00321) (0.000692) (0.000644) 
hrass -0.000255 -0.000622 -0.000129 0.000205 -0.000248 0.000145 -0.000236 0.000122 -0.000575** 
 (0.000491) (0.000396) (0.000160) (0.000312) (0.000301) (0.000232) (0.000248) (8.38e-05) (0.000254) 
gali 0.0227 0.00153 0.0117 0.0273* 0.0227* 0.0286** 0.0240* -0.0211 0.0299*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0138) (0.00967) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.00891) 
esmoked -0.0374 -0.00481 -0.0243 -0.00688 -0.0228 -0.0213 -0.0274 -0.0169 0.00892 
 (0.0291) (0.0220) (0.0164) (0.0294) (0.0221) (0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0147) 
phinact 0.0615** 0.0145 0.0149 0.0135 0.0230* 0.00695 0.0356 0.0136 -0.0202 
 (0.0275) (0.0238) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0136) (0.0183) (0.0242) (0.0227) (0.0128) 
foodpc 0.105 0.0581 0.0128 0.0979 0.0519 -0.0202 -0.0139 -0.0493** 0.0211 
 (0.0696) (0.0514) (0.0421) (0.0618) (0.0452) (0.0272) (0.0460) (0.0248) (0.0229) 
eurod -0.00560 0.00341 -0.00173 -0.000709 -0.00107 -0.00640** -0.00729** -0.00433 -0.00570*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00344) (0.00285) (0.00310) (0.00241) (0.00293) (0.00367) (0.00361) (0.00219) 
goodhealth 0.00768 0.000428 -0.0236** -0.0118 -0.0233* -0.0240* -0.00992 -0.0424** -0.00966 
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 (0.0200) (0.0145) (0.0112) (0.0168) (0.0126) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0101) 
poorhealth -0.0295 -0.0156 -0.0280 -0.0184 -0.0145 0.0227 0.0172 0.0640** -0.00625 
 (0.0322) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0269) (0.0320) (0.0186)           
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included in all 
regressions. Other control variables include obesityt-1, obesity1, finstress. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 8 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being overweight 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
age 0.00518 0.0488** 0.000799 -0.0168 0.0266 0.00922 0.0232 -0.000350 -0.0105 
 (0.0355) (0.0242) (0.0209) (0.0359) (0.0470) (0.0150) (0.0288) (0.0309) (0.0147) 
female -0.0247 -0.0657*** -0.00999 -0.0568** -0.0377** -0.0390** -0.0289 -0.0510** -0.0224 
 (0.0274) (0.0231) (0.0165) (0.0256) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0256) (0.0138) 
yedu -0.00248 -0.00479 -0.00170 -0.00641*** -0.00327 -9.87e-06 0.00384 -0.00813*** -0.00116 
 (0.00259) (0.00317) (0.00208) (0.00210) (0.00228) (0.00231) (0.00296) (0.00261) (0.00173) 
married -0.00913 0.172 0.0649 -0.0249 -0.0160 0.0770 0.0570 0.0546 0.0399 
 (0.144) (0.165) (0.108) (0.0578) (0.0523) (0.0960) (0.144) (0.0717) (0.222) 
widowed -0.0803 0.170 0.103 0.0352 -0.00985 0.0973 0.0934 -0.0458 -0.0464 
 (0.150) (0.169) (0.112) (0.0505) (0.0421) (0.0956) (0.146) (0.0583) (0.223) 
divorced -0.0339 0.144 0.0871 0.0716 -0.0592 0.0429 0.00446 0.174 -0.00247 
 (0.230) (0.186) (0.124) (0.120) (0.125) (0.114) (0.140) (0.127) (0.219) 
retired -0.0101 0.00657 -0.00964 0.0189 0.0271 0.0342** -0.0171 -0.00968 0.0202 
 (0.0249) (0.0207) (0.0175) (0.0202) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0126) 
hhsize -0.0157 0.0216 0.00902 0.0180 -0.0140 0.0109 0.0252 -0.0250 -0.0118 
 (0.0142) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.00914) (0.0132) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.00977) 
thinc 0.00319 0.00499 -0.00104 0.00213 -0.00134 -0.00541* -0.00270 -0.000673 0.000962 
 (0.00568) (0.00335) (0.00257) (0.00637) (0.00376) (0.00315) (0.00405) (0.00105) (0.000804) 
hrass -0.000581 -0.000940** 0.000386* 0.000430 1.68e-05 -0.000351 0.000253 1.68e-05 -4.98e-05 
 (0.000515) (0.000409) (0.000222) (0.000339) (0.000328) (0.000248) (0.000272) (0.000127) (0.000273) 
gali 0.0366* -0.0244 0.0308** 0.0380** 0.00812 6.55e-05 -0.00389 0.0194 0.0125 
 (0.0209) (0.0175) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0140) (0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0209) (0.0108) 
esmoked -0.00171 -0.0446 -0.0218 0.0174 -0.00555 -0.0102 -0.0314 -0.0216 0.0158 
 (0.0349) (0.0279) (0.0222) (0.0316) (0.0233) (0.0224) (0.0276) (0.0322) (0.0179) 
phinact 0.00292 -0.0250 0.0109 0.00635 0.0167 -0.00290 -0.0320 0.00335 0.0179 
 (0.0309) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0213) (0.0157) (0.0234) (0.0344) (0.0442) (0.0173) 
foodpc -0.120 -0.0259 -0.00162 0.0245 0.0439 -0.00743 -0.0545 0.00587 0.0225 
 (0.0745) (0.0641) (0.0567) (0.0662) (0.0510) (0.0311) (0.0581) (0.0353) (0.0276) 
eurod -0.0149*** -0.0131*** -0.000689 -0.00773** 0.00209 -0.00910*** -0.00729 -0.00794 -0.00284 
 (0.00512) (0.00454) (0.00385) (0.00335) (0.00282) (0.00325) (0.00472) (0.00574) (0.00271) 
goodhealth 0.0575** 0.00190 -0.0202 -0.00426 -0.0119 0.0135 0.00301 0.0188 0.00446 
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 (0.0237) (0.0194) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0215) (0.0288) (0.0130) 
poorhealth 0.00326 -0.0480 -0.0663** -0.0342 -0.0423** 0.00217 0.0218 0.103 -0.0694*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0244) (0.0208) (0.0253) (0.0362) (0.0775) (0.0256)           
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included in all 
regressions. Other control variables include overweightt-1, overweight1, finstress. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 9 Quantile regressions with clustered standard errors 
   (1) (2) (3) 
  0.25 0.5 0.75 
         
AUT 
BMIt-1 0.882*** 0.949*** 0.960*** 
 (0.0172) (0.00861) (0.0142) 
finstresst 0.0944 0.0198 0.327 
 (0.142) (0.108) (0.204) 
DEU 
BMIt-1 0.905*** 0.975*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00849) (0.0114) 
finstresst 0.0973 0.0257 0.133 
 (0.120) (0.0682) (0.128) 
SWE 
BMIt-1 0.918*** 0.981*** 1.001*** 
 (0.00934) (0.00441) (0.00748) 
finstresst -0.0152 0.00252 0.123 
 (0.127) (0.0681) (0.128) 
ESP 
BMIt-1 0.719*** 0.845*** 0.848*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0140) (0.0196) 
finstresst 0.0454 0.152 0.344** 
 (0.133) (0.0955) (0.167) 
ITA 
BMIt-1 0.843*** 0.917*** 0.931*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00965) (0.0116) 
finstresst -0.0306 -0.0288 0.134 
 (0.0881) (0.0616) (0.0882) 
FRA 
BMIt-1 0.905*** 0.961*** 0.996*** 
 (0.00776) (0.00551) (0.0112) 
finstresst 0.0717 0.110* 0.197** 
 (0.0877) (0.0574) (0.0949) 
DNK 
BMIt-1 0.924*** 0.975*** 0.996*** 
 (0.00880) (0.00622) (0.00949) 
finstresst 0.225* 0.0750 0.0141 
 (0.129) (0.0898) (0.128) 
CHE 
BMIt-1 0.923*** 0.965*** 0.991*** 
 (0.0151) (0.00948) (0.0115) 
finstresst 0.0231 -0.0103 0.185 
 (0.142) (0.122) (0.177) 
BEL 
BMIt-1 0.921*** 0.969*** 0.983*** 
 (0.00674) (0.00451) (0.00668) 
finstresst 0.00177 -0.0169 0.0707 
 (0.0634) (0.0402) (0.0626) 
Notes: Other controls include age, female, yedu, married, widowed, 
divorced, retired, hhsize, thinc, hrass, gali, smoked, phinact, foodpc, 
eurod, goodhealth, poorhealth. *indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Clustered 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for 
complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 10 Mean difference of reported and corrected body weight in SHARE 
 Female Male 
Country Weight Corrected weight Weight Corrected weight 
AUT 72.82 74.60 84.43 91.67 
DEU 71.16 72.96 84.17 91.45 
SWE 70.27 71.98 84.45 91.64 
ESP 69.67 71.32 78.57 84.38 
ITA 68.72 70.41 78.66 84.49 
FRA 68.20 69.89 80.38 86.65 
DNK 69.56 71.32 84.11 91.24 
CHE 66.80 68.47 78.79 84.64 
BEL 69.92 71.65 82.34 88.99 
Average diff.  +1.71  +6.57 
 
Table 4. 11 Prevalence of overweight and obesity using corrected weight information  
 Female Male 
Country BMI Obesity  Overweight  BMI Obesity  Overweight  
AUT 28.10 0.33 0.65 29.94 0.43 0.84 
DEU 27.21 0.23 0.64 29.45 0.34 0.84 
SWE 26.52 0.20 0.59 28.82 0.33 0.79 
ESP 28.66 0.33 0.77 29.89 0.40 0.89 
ITA 27.40 0.26 0.66 29.10 0.35 0.83 
FRA 27.04 0.24 0.57 28.85 0.35 0.78 
DNK 26.23 0.19 0.54 28.69 0.33 0.79 
CHE 25.80 0.16 0.49 27.73 0.24 0.74 
BEL 27.07 0.15 0.62 29.27 0.38 0.84 
Average  27.166 0.24 0.62 29.12 0.36 0.82 
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Table 4. 12 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being obese using corrected weight information 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
Obesityt-1 0.134*** 0.0865*** 0.0953*** 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.0975*** 0.0861*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0249) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.0236) (0.0267) (0.0216) (0.0305) (0.0179) 
finstresst*female 0.0561* 0.0149 0. 0150 0.0382* 0.0147 0.0183 -0.000947 0.0305 -0.0155 
 (0.0325) (0.0218) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0268) (0.0337) (0.0134) 
finstresst*male 0.0216 -0.00831 0.0233  -0.00199 0.0198 0.00951 0.00453 0.00943 0.00370 
 (0.416) (0.0273) (0.0289) (0.0258) (0.0202) (0.0239) (0.0303) (0.0344) (0.0175) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included 
in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 13 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being overweight using corrected weight information 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
          
Overweightt-1 0.141*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.132*** 0.114*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0246) (0.0212) (0.0244) (0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0263) (0.0349) (0.0191) 
finstresst*female -0.0259 0.0747*** -0.0279 0.0338* -0.00691 0.00118 0.0409 -0.0244 -0.0119 
 (0.0275) (0.0267) (0.0238) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0200) (0.0295) (0.0379) (0.0148) 
finstresst*male -0.0447 -0.0000078 0.0399 -0.0188 -0.0148 -0.0174 0.000407 -0.0185 -0.00175 
 (0.0430) (0.0286) (0.0317) (0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0264) (0.0389) (0.0464) (0.0188) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions. Wave dummies are included 
in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete 
definitions of all variables. 
  
205 
 
Table 4. 14 Percentage of respondents having high financial debt by country 
Country Statistics highdebt=1 
AUT Mean 0.090862 
 Sd 0.287487 
   
DEU Mean 0.111545 
 Sd 0.314862 
   
SWE Mean 0.180482 
 Sd 0.384635 
   
ESP Mean 0.073714 
 Sd 0.261340 
   
ITA Mean 0.081838 
 Sd 0.274146 
   
FRA Mean 0.142046 
 Sd 0.349146 
   
DNK Mean 0.163200 
 Sd 0.369607 
   
CHE Mean 0.040116 
 Sd 0.196289 
   
BEL Mean 0.094188 
 Sd 0.292112 
   
Total Mean 0.111573 
 Sd 0.314845 
Notes: highdebt is a dummy variable which indicates having financial 
liability higher than the country/wave average, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 4. 15 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being obese 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
highdebtt*male -0.0106 0.0361 -0.0107 0.0404 0.0338 0.00578 0.0222 0.00923 0.00327 
 (0.0439) (0.0336) (0.0166) (0.0447) (0.0290) (0.0226) (0.0249) (0.0404) (0.0206) 
highdebtt*female -0.00981 0.0498* -0.0123 0.0350 -0.0404* -0.0252 -0.0139 -0.0199 0.00974 
 (0.0350) (0.0269) (0.0146) (0.0368) (0.0244) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0286) (0.0172) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Lagged dependent variable, as well as initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all 
regressions. Wave dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
 
Table 4. 16 Marginal effects of selected variables on the probability of being overweight 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
highdebtt*male -0.0755 0.0559 0.0199 0.0136 -0.00675 -0.0281 -0.0339 -0.0399 -0.0344 
 (0.0561) (0.0391) (0.0248) (0.0450) (0.0333) (0.0262) (0.0312) (0.0668) (0.0253) 
highdebtt*female 0.0430 0.0938*** -0.00272 0.0785** 0.0312 -0.0200 0.0310 -0.0182 0.0144 
 (0.0446) (0.0327) (0.0238) (0.0377) (0.0309) (0.0239) (0.0291) (0.0589) (0.0241) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. Lagged dependent variable, as well as initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all 
regressions. Wave dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4. 17 Correlation matrix between finstress and highdebt 
 finstress highdebt 
finstress  0.03* 
highdebt 0.03*  
Notes: Lower-triangular cells report Pearson's correlation coefficients, upper-triangular cells are Spearman’s 
rank correlation. * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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Appendix 4.1 Regression Tables  
Appendix Table 4.1a. Marginal effects of all regressors on the probability of being obese 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
lobesity 0.0973*** 0.0680*** 0.0721*** 0.160*** 0.198*** 0.0855*** 0.0699*** 0.0273 0.0996*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0210) (0.0170) (0.0266) (0.0245) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0151) 
intobesity 0.310*** 0.276*** 0.252*** 0.265*** 0.186*** 0.288*** 0.247*** 0.261*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0233) (0.0192) (0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0349) (0.0153) 
finstress1 0.0411* -0.00248 0.0290** 0.0190 0.0134 0.0111 -0.00807 0.0288 -0.0195** 
 (0.0211) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0134) (0.0173) (0.0191) (0.00992) 
intfinstress1 0.00912 0.0662*** -0.000188 0.0291 -0.00133 0.0248 0.0146 0.00929 0.0207* 
 (0.0269) (0.0200) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0174) (0.0208) (0.0230) (0.0120) 
age 0.0144 0.0284 0.0262 -0.0133 -0.0253 0.00266 -0.00809 0.0269 -0.00360 
 (0.0321) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0330) (0.0443) (0.0134) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0107) 
female -0.00786 -0.0197 -0.00786 -0.00125 -0.00401 -0.00516 -0.0208 0.00485 -0.00897 
 (0.0257) (0.0174) (0.0123) (0.0235) (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0120) 
yedu -0.00182 -0.00690** -0.00228 -0.00436** -0.00606*** -0.00255 -0.00500** -0.00404** -0.00195 
 (0.00252) (0.00294) (0.00161) (0.00199) (0.00191) (0.00206) (0.00255) (0.00166) (0.00159) 
married 0.0143 -0.132 -0.130 -0.0279 0.0243 -0.0376 0.182** -0.0420 -0.231 
 (0.197) (0.107) (0.138) (0.0540) (0.0412) (0.0737) (0.0812) (0.0534) (0.144) 
widowed -0.0646 -0.188* -0.141 -0.0571 -0.0163 -0.00740 0.171** 0.00546 -0.259* 
 (0.200) (0.113) (0.138) (0.0478) (0.0320) (0.0731) (0.0851) (0.0418) (0.146) 
divorced 0.195 -0.149 -0.126 -0.0729 0.177* -0.0285 0.194** -0.102 -0.189 
 (0.231) (0.104) (0.143) (0.135) (0.0972) (0.0748) (0.0863) (0.0752) (0.141) 
retired -0.0140 0.0374** -0.0227* -0.0243 0.0175 -0.0182 0.0173 0.0157 0.00803 
 (0.0213) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.00998) 
hhsize -0.00753 -0.000235 -0.000385 0.00311 -0.00736 -0.0229* -0.00721 -0.0141 -0.00847 
 (0.0128) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.00729) (0.0119) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.00846) 
thinc -0.00760 -0.00198 -0.00334* -0.00514 -0.00122 0.00267 -0.00291 0.000319 0.000782 
 (0.00516) (0.00299) (0.00195) (0.00628) (0.00349) (0.00281) (0.00321) (0.000692) (0.000644) 
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hrass -0.000255 -0.000622 -0.000129 0.000205 -0.000248 0.000145 -0.000236 0.000122 -0.000575** 
 (0.000491) (0.000396) (0.000160) (0.000312) (0.000301) (0.000232) (0.000248) (8.38e-05) (0.000254) 
gali 0.0227 0.00153 0.0117 0.0273* 0.0227* 0.0286** 0.0240* -0.0211 0.0299*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0138) (0.00967) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.00891) 
esmoked -0.0374 -0.00481 -0.0243 -0.00688 -0.0228 -0.0213 -0.0274 -0.0169 0.00892 
 (0.0291) (0.0220) (0.0164) (0.0294) (0.0221) (0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0147) 
phinact 0.0615** 0.0145 0.0149 0.0135 0.0230* 0.00695 0.0356 0.0136 -0.0202 
 (0.0275) (0.0238) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0136) (0.0183) (0.0242) (0.0227) (0.0128) 
foodpc 0.105 0.0581 0.0128 0.0979 0.0519 -0.0202 -0.0139 -0.0493** 0.0211 
 (0.0696) (0.0514) (0.0421) (0.0618) (0.0452) (0.0272) (0.0460) (0.0248) (0.0229) 
eurod -0.00560 0.00341 -0.00173 -0.000709 -0.00107 -0.00640** -0.00729** -0.00433 -0.00570*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00344) (0.00285) (0.00310) (0.00241) (0.00293) (0.00367) (0.00361) (0.00219) 
goodhealth 0.00768 0.000428 -0.0236** -0.0118 -0.0233* -0.0240* -0.00992 -0.0424** -0.00966 
 (0.0200) (0.0145) (0.0112) (0.0168) (0.0126) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0101) 
poorhealth -0.0295 -0.0156 -0.0280 -0.0184 -0.0145 0.0227 0.0172 0.0640** -0.00625 
 (0.0322) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0269) (0.0320) (0.0186) 
w3 -0.0513 -0.141* -0.0946 0.0567 0.0729 0.0172 0.0234 -0.113 -0.00587 
 (0.140) (0.0855) (0.0747) (0.141) (0.181) (0.0680) (0.0952) (0.0937) (0.0467) 
w4 -0.0838 -0.171 -0.150 0.0717 0.109 0.0250 0.0255 -0.157 0.0135 
 (0.201) (0.121) (0.107) (0.205) (0.268) (0.0933) (0.139) (0.132) (0.0675) 
w5 -0.116 -0.242 -0.191 0.0991 0.163 0.0118 0.0399 -0.223 0.00822 
 (0.265) (0.159) (0.139) (0.271) (0.357) (0.120) (0.184) (0.173) (0.0888) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE Probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions but omitted for brevity. Wave dummies 
are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for 
complete definitions of all variables. 
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Appendix Table 4.1b Marginal effects of all regressors on the probability of being overweight 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
loverweight 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.153*** 0.115*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0277) (0.0229) (0.0261) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0286) (0.0339) (0.0213) 
intoverweight 0.327*** 0.339*** 0.356*** 0.240*** 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.345*** 0.353*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0250) (0.0216) (0.0228) (0.0193) (0.0237) (0.0276) (0.0335) (0.0216) 
finstress1 -0.0160 0.0176 -0.0279 0.0363** -0.00475 -0.00620 0.0239 0.0142 -0.00287 
 (0.0237) (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0160) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0248) (0.0293) (0.0121) 
intfinstress1 0.0243 -0.0195 -0.0154 0.000273 -0.0515*** 0.0315 -0.00527 0.0241 0.0191 
 (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0231) (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0257) (0.0332) (0.0140) 
age 0.00518 0.0488** 0.000799 -0.0168 0.0266 0.00922 0.0232 -0.000350 -0.0105 
 (0.0355) (0.0242) (0.0209) (0.0359) (0.0470) (0.0150) (0.0288) (0.0309) (0.0147) 
female -0.0247 -0.0657*** -0.00999 -0.0568** -0.0377** -0.0390** -0.0289 -0.0510** -0.0224 
 (0.0274) (0.0231) (0.0165) (0.0256) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0256) (0.0138) 
yedu -0.00248 -0.00479 -0.00170 -0.00641*** -0.00327 -9.87e-06 0.00384 -0.00813*** -0.00116 
 (0.00259) (0.00317) (0.00208) (0.00210) (0.00228) (0.00231) (0.00296) (0.00261) (0.00173) 
married -0.00913 0.172 0.0649 -0.0249 -0.0160 0.0770 0.0570 0.0546 0.0399 
 (0.144) (0.165) (0.108) (0.0578) (0.0523) (0.0960) (0.144) (0.0717) (0.222) 
widowed -0.0803 0.170 0.103 0.0352 -0.00985 0.0973 0.0934 -0.0458 -0.0464 
 (0.150) (0.169) (0.112) (0.0505) (0.0421) (0.0956) (0.146) (0.0583) (0.223) 
divorced -0.0339 0.144 0.0871 0.0716 -0.0592 0.0429 0.00446 0.174 -0.00247 
 (0.230) (0.186) (0.124) (0.120) (0.125) (0.114) (0.140) (0.127) (0.219) 
retired -0.0101 0.00657 -0.00964 0.0189 0.0271 0.0342** -0.0171 -0.00968 0.0202 
 (0.0249) (0.0207) (0.0175) (0.0202) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0126) 
hhsize -0.0157 0.0216 0.00902 0.0180 -0.0140 0.0109 0.0252 -0.0250 -0.0118 
 (0.0142) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.00914) (0.0132) (0.0173) (0.0160) (0.00977) 
thinc 0.00319 0.00499 -0.00104 0.00213 -0.00134 -0.00541* -0.00270 -0.000673 0.000962 
 (0.00568) (0.00335) (0.00257) (0.00637) (0.00376) (0.00315) (0.00405) (0.00105) (0.000804) 
hrass -0.000581 -0.000940** 0.000386* 0.000430 1.68e-05 -0.000351 0.000253 1.68e-05 -4.98e-05 
 (0.000515) (0.000409) (0.000222) (0.000339) (0.000328) (0.000248) (0.000272) (0.000127) (0.000273) 
gali 0.0366* -0.0244 0.0308** 0.0380** 0.00812 6.55e-05 -0.00389 0.0194 0.0125 
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 (0.0209) (0.0175) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0140) (0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0209) (0.0108) 
esmoked -0.00171 -0.0446 -0.0218 0.0174 -0.00555 -0.0102 -0.0314 -0.0216 0.0158 
 (0.0349) (0.0279) (0.0222) (0.0316) (0.0233) (0.0224) (0.0276) (0.0322) (0.0179) 
phinact 0.00292 -0.0250 0.0109 0.00635 0.0167 -0.00290 -0.0320 0.00335 0.0179 
 (0.0309) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0213) (0.0157) (0.0234) (0.0344) (0.0442) (0.0173) 
foodpc -0.120 -0.0259 -0.00162 0.0245 0.0439 -0.00743 -0.0545 0.00587 0.0225 
 (0.0745) (0.0641) (0.0567) (0.0662) (0.0510) (0.0311) (0.0581) (0.0353) (0.0276) 
eurod -0.0149*** -0.0131*** -0.000689 -0.00773** 0.00209 -0.00910*** -0.00729 -0.00794 -0.00284 
 (0.00512) (0.00454) (0.00385) (0.00335) (0.00282) (0.00325) (0.00472) (0.00574) (0.00271) 
goodhealth 0.0575** 0.00190 -0.0202 -0.00426 -0.0119 0.0135 0.00301 0.0188 0.00446 
 (0.0237) (0.0194) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0215) (0.0288) (0.0130) 
poorhealth 0.00326 -0.0480 -0.0663** -0.0342 -0.0423** 0.00217 0.0218 0.103 -0.0694*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0244) (0.0208) (0.0253) (0.0362) (0.0775) (0.0256) 
w3 -0.0263 -0.177 0.0209 0.0632 -0.135 -0.0514 -0.0819 0.0531 0.00708 
 (0.156) (0.110) (0.0963) (0.153) (0.192) (0.0759) (0.124) (0.144) (0.0637) 
w4 -0.0173 -0.286* -0.0147 0.0885 -0.201 -0.0492 -0.140 0.0462 0.0366 
 (0.224) (0.156) (0.137) (0.223) (0.285) (0.104) (0.181) (0.204) (0.0922) 
w5 -0.0504 -0.407** -0.00623 0.107 -0.274 -0.0721 -0.186 0.00523 0.0625 
 (0.295) (0.205) (0.179) (0.294) (0.379) (0.134) (0.239) (0.266) (0.122) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE Probit model. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all regressions but omitted for brevity. Wave 
dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. See Table 
4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Appendix Table 4.1c1 Quantile regression results: AUS  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.882*** 0.949*** 0.960*** 
 (0.0172) (0.00861) (0.0142) 
finstress1 0.0944 0.0198 0.327 
 (0.142) (0.108) (0.204) 
age -0.00985 -0.0117** -0.0161** 
 (0.00778) (0.00501) (0.00727) 
female -0.107 -0.0270 0.0718 
 (0.104) (0.0725) (0.125) 
yedu -0.0136 -0.00411 -0.0158 
 (0.0117) (0.00857) (0.0115) 
married 0.122 0.0661 0.307 
 (0.197) (0.151) (0.203) 
widowed -0.145 -0.103 0.106 
 (0.217) (0.156) (0.230) 
divorced 0.334 0.0801 0.404 
 (0.214) (0.177) (0.268) 
retired -0.00539 -0.0837 -0.224* 
 (0.143) (0.0963) (0.135) 
hhsize -0.0369 -0.0845** -0.172*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0344) (0.0520) 
thinc -0.00827 -0.0293 -0.0180 
 (0.0216) (0.0256) (0.0303) 
hrass 0.00120 0.000312 -0.00262 
 (0.00242) (0.00151) (0.00207) 
gali 0.288** 0.270*** 0.360*** 
 (0.131) (0.0839) (0.128) 
esmoked -0.215* -0.174** -0.0631 
 (0.129) (0.0804) (0.130) 
phinact 0.303* 0.140 0.127 
 (0.176) (0.157) (0.253) 
foodpc 0.310 0.183 -0.519 
 (0.391) (0.287) (0.389) 
eurod -0.0636* -0.0674*** -0.00522 
 (0.0340) (0.0259) (0.0370) 
goodhealth -0.00501 -0.0107 0.158 
 (0.132) (0.0919) (0.139) 
poorhealth -0.527 0.251 0.684* 
 (0.597) (0.289) (0.388) 
w3 -0.0129 -0.00347 -0.0512 
 (0.159) (0.117) (0.190) 
w4 0.129 0.163 0.355** 
 (0.144) (0.112) (0.162) 
w5 -0.217 -0.229** -0.253 
 (0.165) (0.105) (0.173) 
Constant 3.297*** 2.585*** 3.399*** 
 (0.727) (0.522) (0.709) 
Observations 1,532 1,532 1,532 
R-squared 0.775 0.776 0.775 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c2 Quantile regression results: DEU 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.905*** 0.975*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00849) (0.0114) 
finstress1 0.0973 0.0257 0.133 
 (0.120) (0.0682) (0.128) 
age -0.00626 -0.0102** -0.0165** 
 (0.00649) (0.00420) (0.00673) 
female -0.175** -0.0108 0.0789 
 (0.0853) (0.0517) (0.0869) 
yedu -0.00259 -0.00970 -0.0194* 
 (0.0137) (0.00716) (0.0109) 
married 0.0896 0.141 -0.571 
 (0.146) (0.176) (0.352) 
widowed -0.345* 0.0711 -0.574 
 (0.195) (0.179) (0.382) 
divorced 0.102 0.159 -0.455 
 (0.229) (0.187) (0.401) 
retired 0.0774 0.0412 -0.0107 
 (0.101) (0.0656) (0.112) 
hhsize 0.113* 0.0831 -0.0377 
 (0.0623) (0.0568) (0.0784) 
thinc -0.00625 -0.0216 -0.0306 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0295) 
hrass -0.00275 -0.000399 0.000423 
 (0.00220) (0.00128) (0.00203) 
gali 0.0625 0.128** 0.164* 
 (0.0971) (0.0601) (0.0944) 
esmoked -0.168* -0.173*** -0.114 
 (0.0914) (0.0603) (0.0954) 
phinact -0.575*** -0.0824 0.237 
 (0.204) (0.177) (0.286) 
foodpc 0.0209 -0.157 -0.687* 
 (0.303) (0.223) (0.398) 
eurod -0.0224 -0.0301** -0.0461 
 (0.0232) (0.0144) (0.0293) 
goodhealth 0.108 -0.0130 -0.102 
 (0.111) (0.0712) (0.116) 
poorhealth -0.0980 -0.229* -0.239 
 (0.156) (0.122) (0.254) 
w3 -0.0428 0.0647 0.0652 
 (0.132) (0.0954) (0.143) 
w4 0.312*** 0.141* 0.0499 
 (0.0916) (0.0746) (0.129) 
w5 -0.0160 -0.0356 -0.254** 
 (0.103) (0.0725) (0.129) 
Constant 2.112*** 1.482*** 3.720*** 
 (0.625) (0.480) (0.699) 
Observations 2,252 2,252 2,252 
R-squared 0.801 0.803 0.802 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c3 Quantile regression results: SWE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.918*** 0.981*** 1.001*** 
 (0.00934) (0.00441) (0.00748) 
finstress1 -0.0152 0.00252 0.123 
 (0.127) (0.0681) (0.128) 
age -0.0215*** -0.0110*** -0.00966* 
 (0.00511) (0.00305) (0.00547) 
female -0.167*** -0.0147 0.111* 
 (0.0526) (0.0340) (0.0570) 
yedu -0.00406 0.00277 -0.000768 
 (0.00758) (0.00451) (0.00857) 
married -0.0362 0.138** 0.192 
 (0.124) (0.0631) (0.135) 
widowed 0.0121 0.182** 0.183 
 (0.148) (0.0740) (0.144) 
divorced -0.196 0.129* 0.236 
 (0.153) (0.0758) (0.162) 
retired 0.0336 -0.0431 -0.142 
 (0.0707) (0.0490) (0.0907) 
hhsize -0.0801 -0.107*** -0.0784 
 (0.0662) (0.0385) (0.0554) 
thinc -0.00247 -0.00398 -0.0141 
 (0.0102) (0.00725) (0.0120) 
hrass 0.000696 0.000153 8.35e-06 
 (0.00115) (0.000431) (0.000746) 
gali 0.0832 0.0825** 0.148** 
 (0.0610) (0.0379) (0.0683) 
esmoked -0.0506 -0.0100 0.0798 
 (0.0573) (0.0375) (0.0631) 
phinact 0.188 0.145 0.254 
 (0.249) (0.116) (0.193) 
foodpc -0.318 -0.179 0.0237 
 (0.226) (0.160) (0.238) 
eurod -0.0332* -0.0177 -0.0208 
 (0.0184) (0.0116) (0.0223) 
goodhealth -0.113 -0.0907* -0.296*** 
 (0.0779) (0.0488) (0.0972) 
poorhealth -0.416 -0.121 -0.0547 
 (0.280) (0.105) (0.158) 
w3 -0.0632 -0.0234 0.114 
 (0.0895) (0.0593) (0.103) 
w4 0.0504 0.0242 0.156* 
 (0.0699) (0.0517) (0.0815) 
w5 -0.0764 0.00889 0.0225 
 (0.0815) (0.0513) (0.0722) 
Constant 3.598*** 1.523*** 1.562*** 
 (0.505) (0.280) (0.494) 
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320 
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.828 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c4 Quantile regression results: ESP 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.719*** 0.845*** 0.848*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0140) (0.0196) 
finstress1 0.0454 0.152 0.344** 
 (0.133) (0.0955) (0.167) 
age -0.0200** -0.0112** -0.00339 
 (0.00797) (0.00514) (0.0102) 
female -0.280* -0.120 -0.0319 
 (0.156) (0.106) (0.214) 
yedu 0.00156 -0.0134 -0.0423*** 
 (0.0123) (0.00979) (0.0155) 
married 0.282 0.143 -0.0165 
 (0.288) (0.223) (0.417) 
widowed 0.238 0.128 -0.332 
 (0.309) (0.224) (0.430) 
divorced -0.419 -0.157 -0.264 
 (0.662) (0.282) (0.514) 
retired -0.0315 -0.0947 -0.268 
 (0.142) (0.105) (0.184) 
hhsize -0.0465 0.0495 0.0974 
 (0.0761) (0.0471) (0.0993) 
thinc -0.00613 -0.0230 -0.0355 
 (0.0391) (0.0265) (0.0517) 
hrass 0.00330 0.00226 -0.00153 
 (0.00423) (0.00200) (0.00247) 
gali 0.433*** 0.122 0.108 
 (0.146) (0.0975) (0.180) 
esmoked 0.0915 0.0897 -0.161 
 (0.154) (0.101) (0.192) 
phinact -0.0190 0.230 0.355 
 (0.209) (0.141) (0.222) 
foodpc -0.336 0.489 1.519** 
 (0.444) (0.378) (0.732) 
eurod -0.0797*** -0.0489** 0.00527 
 (0.0302) (0.0219) (0.0332) 
goodhealth -0.0609 -0.0564 0.00908 
 (0.147) (0.104) (0.169) 
poorhealth -0.263 -0.0165 0.384 
 (0.240) (0.166) (0.247) 
w3 -0.205 -0.180 0.111 
 (0.188) (0.133) (0.249) 
w4 -0.422** -0.103 0.249 
 (0.203) (0.131) (0.237) 
w5 -0.310 -0.157 -0.0432 
 (0.204) (0.121) (0.191) 
Constant 8.033*** 4.913*** 5.517*** 
 (0.985) (0.602) (1.221) 
Observations 2,876 2,876 2,876 
R-squared 0.499 0.503 0.501 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c5 Quantile regression results: ITA 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.843*** 0.917*** 0.931*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00965) (0.0116) 
finstress1 -0.0306 -0.0288 0.134 
 (0.0881) (0.0616) (0.0882) 
age -0.0219*** -0.0138*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.00684) (0.00467) (0.00680) 
female -0.229*** -0.0954 -0.117 
 (0.0877) (0.0599) (0.101) 
yedu -0.00686 -0.0173** -0.0282*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00725) (0.00946) 
married 0.182 -0.156 -0.667*** 
 (0.273) (0.144) (0.208) 
widowed 0.262 -0.0501 -0.558** 
 (0.296) (0.172) (0.224) 
divorced 0.180 -0.230 -0.177 
 (0.319) (0.187) (0.364) 
retired 0.276*** 0.0664 -0.159 
 (0.107) (0.0685) (0.106) 
hhsize -0.0512 0.0341 -0.00767 
 (0.0484) (0.0309) (0.0421) 
thinc -0.00439 0.0119 -0.00683 
 (0.0217) (0.0129) (0.0183) 
hrass 0.00213 0.000402 0.000575 
 (0.00153) (0.00141) (0.00165) 
gali 0.00826 0.0871 0.225** 
 (0.0804) (0.0660) (0.0981) 
esmoked 0.0271 -0.0116 -0.0644 
 (0.0947) (0.0642) (0.103) 
phinact 0.0776 0.209** 0.380*** 
 (0.134) (0.0899) (0.127) 
foodpc 0.582* 0.329* 0.0305 
 (0.324) (0.195) (0.278) 
eurod -0.0173 0.00590 -0.00349 
 (0.0226) (0.0144) (0.0190) 
goodhealth 0.0344 -0.0638 -0.123 
 (0.0936) (0.0649) (0.0996) 
poorhealth -0.377* -0.143 0.0261 
 (0.210) (0.135) (0.162) 
w3 -0.239** -0.108 0.0616 
 (0.113) (0.0819) (0.119) 
w4 -0.228** 0.00500 0.158 
 (0.114) (0.0842) (0.111) 
w5 -0.322** -0.176** 0.138 
 (0.132) (0.0823) (0.133) 
Constant 4.634*** 3.309*** 4.954*** 
 (0.716) (0.499) (0.702) 
Observations 3,744 3,744 3,744 
R-squared 0.685 0.689 0.686 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c6 Quantile regression results: FRA 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.905*** 0.961*** 0.996*** 
 (0.00776) (0.00551) (0.0112) 
finstress1 0.0717 0.110* 0.197** 
 (0.0877) (0.0574) (0.0949) 
age -0.0199*** -0.0159*** -0.0228*** 
 (0.00498) (0.00327) (0.00636) 
female -0.168** 0.0260 0.132 
 (0.0719) (0.0456) (0.0893) 
yedu -0.00687 -0.00287 -0.0111 
 (0.00967) (0.00531) (0.00871) 
married 0.258** 0.151* 0.175 
 (0.116) (0.0869) (0.173) 
widowed 0.141 0.214** 0.357* 
 (0.129) (0.0936) (0.205) 
divorced 0.185 0.173 0.171 
 (0.139) (0.106) (0.198) 
retired 0.209** 0.135** -0.00652 
 (0.0981) (0.0612) (0.109) 
hhsize -0.0410 -0.0124 -0.0903 
 (0.0590) (0.0330) (0.0613) 
thinc -0.00182 -0.00956 -0.0246* 
 (0.0173) (0.00930) (0.0127) 
hrass -0.00261* -0.00140 -0.00124 
 (0.00145) (0.000984) (0.000909) 
gali -0.0410 0.00957 0.0859 
 (0.0798) (0.0445) (0.0897) 
esmoked -0.0171 -0.0480 -0.0662 
 (0.0749) (0.0512) (0.0836) 
phinact 0.119 0.107 0.0157 
 (0.126) (0.0740) (0.195) 
foodpc -0.0310 0.116 0.0233 
 (0.144) (0.109) (0.205) 
eurod -0.0866*** -0.0429*** -0.0467* 
 (0.0204) (0.0129) (0.0247) 
goodhealth -0.0542 -0.101* -0.121 
 (0.0953) (0.0559) (0.0940) 
poorhealth -0.0666 0.135 0.425** 
 (0.202) (0.120) (0.186) 
w3 -0.0236 0.131* 0.485*** 
 (0.112) (0.0713) (0.130) 
w4 0.0561 0.109* 0.367*** 
 (0.0882) (0.0584) (0.105) 
w5 0.0149 0.0201 0.102 
 (0.0807) (0.0545) (0.104) 
Constant 3.465*** 2.137*** 2.609*** 
 (0.447) (0.308) (0.596) 
Observations 2,816 2,816 2,816 
R-squared 0.815 0.817 0.816 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c7 Quantile regression results: DNK 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.924*** 0.975*** 0.996*** 
 (0.00880) (0.00622) (0.00949) 
finstress1 0.225* 0.0750 0.0141 
 (0.129) (0.0898) (0.128) 
age -0.0157*** -0.00863* -0.0213*** 
 (0.00551) (0.00476) (0.00562) 
female -0.188*** -0.0364 0.00972 
 (0.0721) (0.0482) (0.0597) 
yedu 0.0134 -0.00697 -0.0114 
 (0.0141) (0.00779) (0.01000) 
married 0.213 -0.00898 0.00136 
 (0.147) (0.0841) (0.113) 
widowed 0.371** 0.116 0.396*** 
 (0.160) (0.104) (0.138) 
divorced 0.303* 0.211* 0.201 
 (0.180) (0.110) (0.128) 
retired -0.0515 -0.000505 0.0395 
 (0.0911) (0.0703) (0.0969) 
hhsize -0.0687 0.00600 -0.00765 
 (0.0562) (0.0478) (0.0660) 
thinc 0.00679 0.00603 0.00631 
 (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0203) 
hrass 0.00104 0.000700 0.00108 
 (0.00120) (0.000724) (0.00105) 
gali -0.00319 0.0878 0.160** 
 (0.0789) (0.0591) (0.0783) 
esmoked 0.0637 0.126** 0.213*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0534) (0.0694) 
phinact -0.287 -0.112 0.154 
 (0.392) (0.146) (0.323) 
foodpc -0.318 -0.0637 -0.243 
 (0.268) (0.194) (0.282) 
eurod -0.0307 -0.0139 0.0176 
 (0.0223) (0.0177) (0.0208) 
goodhealth 0.0891 0.0147 -0.271** 
 (0.136) (0.0976) (0.108) 
poorhealth -0.163 -0.266 -0.145 
 (0.270) (0.182) (0.232) 
w3 -0.216** -0.102 -0.0567 
 (0.0982) (0.0897) (0.126) 
w4 -0.115 -0.0318 -0.202** 
 (0.0999) (0.0730) (0.0877) 
w5 0.0456 0.0201 -0.139 
 (0.101) (0.0687) (0.103) 
Constant 2.204*** 1.208*** 2.495*** 
 (0.593) (0.374) (0.536) 
Observations 2,500 2,500 2,500 
R-squared 0.825 0.826 0.824 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix Table 4.1c8 Quantile regression results: CHE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.923*** 0.965*** 0.991*** 
 (0.0151) (0.00948) (0.0115) 
finstress1 0.0231 -0.0103 0.185 
 (0.142) (0.122) (0.177) 
age -0.0113 -0.00679 -0.0235*** 
 (0.00871) (0.00480) (0.00702) 
female -0.0336 0.0179 0.194** 
 (0.104) (0.0635) (0.0900) 
yedu 0.00510 -0.0166*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00525) (0.00979) 
married 0.0724 0.0366 -0.255 
 (0.170) (0.154) (0.237) 
widowed -0.117 -0.0637 -0.0418 
 (0.212) (0.162) (0.312) 
divorced 0.151 0.00625 -0.191 
 (0.207) (0.163) (0.299) 
retired -0.0102 -0.0633 -0.0606 
 (0.122) (0.0821) (0.100) 
hhsize -0.128* -0.0347 -0.0258 
 (0.0652) (0.0408) (0.0739) 
thinc 0.00810 0.00571* -0.00135 
 (0.00560) (0.00329) (0.00524) 
hrass 0.000302 0.000151 0.000303 
 (0.000763) (0.000488) (0.000664) 
gali 0.149 0.0466 0.222** 
 (0.114) (0.0844) (0.1000) 
esmoked -0.0545 -0.0398 -0.0292 
 (0.0976) (0.0614) (0.115) 
phinact 0.279 0.339 0.567** 
 (0.581) (0.301) (0.273) 
foodpc -0.142 -0.00117 -0.125 
 (0.207) (0.144) (0.207) 
eurod -0.0547* -0.0475** -0.0613** 
 (0.0304) (0.0190) (0.0278) 
goodhealth 0.256 0.0834 -0.0108 
 (0.227) (0.117) (0.142) 
poorhealth 0.478 0.107 0.155 
 (0.484) (0.249) (1.349) 
w3 -0.0905 0.0534 0.242 
 (0.129) (0.105) (0.173) 
w4 -0.0279 0.0850 0.272** 
 (0.106) (0.0967) (0.125) 
w5 -0.310* -0.0658 0.0549 
 (0.164) (0.0900) (0.128) 
Constant 2.253*** 1.647*** 3.071*** 
 (0.739) (0.537) (0.755) 
Observations 1,376 1,376 1,376 
R-squared 0.851 0.852 0.851 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
  
220 
 
Appendix Table 4.1c9 Quantile regression results: BEL 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 0.25 0.5 0.75 
lbmi 0.921*** 0.969*** 0.983*** 
 (0.00674) (0.00451) (0.00668) 
finstress1 0.00177 -0.0169 0.0707 
 (0.0634) (0.0402) (0.0626) 
age -0.0172*** -0.0144*** -0.0207*** 
 (0.00354) (0.00232) (0.00367) 
female -0.0644 0.0690** 0.127** 
 (0.0540) (0.0330) (0.0541) 
yedu 0.000808 -0.00775* -0.0220*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00440) (0.00629) 
married -0.0795 -0.0722 0.0231 
 (0.137) (0.0748) (0.118) 
widowed -0.167 -0.0858 0.0719 
 (0.152) (0.0774) (0.119) 
divorced -0.167 -0.102 0.0298 
 (0.154) (0.0926) (0.135) 
retired 0.101* 0.0880** -0.00437 
 (0.0538) (0.0369) (0.0606) 
hhsize -0.0126 0.0257 -0.00347 
 (0.0444) (0.0265) (0.0406) 
thinc 0.00504 -0.00152 -0.00307 
 (0.00394) (0.00235) (0.00375) 
hrass 0.00115 -0.000190 -0.000528 
 (0.000902) (0.000618) (0.00117) 
gali 0.0648 0.0580 0.146** 
 (0.0547) (0.0382) (0.0574) 
esmoked -0.00869 0.0367 0.120** 
 (0.0517) (0.0354) (0.0572) 
phinact 0.0702 0.169** 0.354*** 
 (0.108) (0.0713) (0.126) 
foodpc 0.0943 0.229*** 0.00705 
 (0.140) (0.0860) (0.126) 
eurod -0.0644*** -0.0257*** -0.0179 
 (0.0161) (0.00903) (0.0134) 
goodhealth 0.289*** 0.0888* -0.0639 
 (0.0804) (0.0500) (0.0692) 
poorhealth -0.111 0.0501 -0.0414 
 (0.196) (0.123) (0.250) 
w3 -0.107 -0.0212 0.181** 
 (0.0738) (0.0511) (0.0835) 
w4 -0.0254 0.0105 0.128** 
 (0.0635) (0.0433) (0.0646) 
w5 -0.0927 -0.0903** 0.0246 
 (0.0671) (0.0403) (0.0664) 
Constant 2.500*** 1.745*** 2.707*** 
 (0.399) (0.249) (0.384) 
Observations 5,368 5,368 5,368 
R-squared 0.802 0.804 0.803 
Notes: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; 
** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. See Table 4.2 for definitions of all variables.  
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Appendix 4.2 Regressing measured body weight in the HRS 
Appendix Table 4.2a Regressing measured body weight using HRS  
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Nurse measured body weight 
female male 
weight 0.800*** 0.649*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0745) 
weight2 0.00257*** 0.00364*** 
 (0.000380) (0.000525) 
weight3 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
agedum1 0.0990 0.831 
 (0.488) (0.776) 
agedum2 -0.512 0.712 
 (0.468) (0.755) 
agedum3 -0.433 0.748 
 (0.474) (0.762) 
agedum4 -0.692 0.811 
 (0.483) (0.767) 
agedum5 -0.568 0.786 
 (0.480) (0.763) 
agedum6 -1.246** 0.878 
 (0.493) (0.773) 
agedum7 -1.165** 1.264 
 (0.527) (0.799) 
agedum8 -0.978* 0.806 
 (0.551) (0.834) 
Constant 6.702*** 10.12*** 
 (1.796) (3.090) 
Observations 18,533 13,223 
R-squared 0.679 0.680 
Note: *indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
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Appendix Table 4.2b Marginal effects of all regressors on the probability of being obese using corrected body weight 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
lobesity 0.134*** 0.0865*** 0.0953*** 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.0975*** 0.0861*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0249) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.0236) (0.0267) (0.0216) (0.0305) (0.0179) 
intobesity 0.349*** 0.348*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 0.283*** 0.262*** 0.291*** 0.240*** 0.289*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0249) (0.0196) (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0279) (0.0219) (0.0365) (0.0172) 
finstress1 0.0423* 0.00493 0.0174 0.0225 0.0169 0.0149 0.00165 0.0211 -0.00774 
 (0.0252) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0198) (0.0231) (0.0109) 
intfinstress1 0.0175 0.0658*** 0.00472 0.0391** -0.00734 0.0203 0.0126 0.0451* 0.0136 
 (0.0295) (0.0231) (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0220) (0.0245) (0.0132) 
age 0.0194 0.0371* -0.00856 -0.0513 0.0287 0.00397 -0.0318 0.0147 -0.00319 
 (0.0363) (0.0224) (0.0181) (0.0355) (0.0520) (0.0134) (0.0231) (0.0250) (0.0119) 
female -0.0288 -0.0655*** -0.0392*** -0.0792*** -0.0503*** -0.0193 -0.0500*** 0.0241 -0.0439*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0196) (0.0139) (0.0258) (0.0178) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0129) 
yedu -0.00143 -0.00582* -0.000860 -0.00420* -0.00587** -0.000752 -0.000245 -0.00397** -0.00296* 
 (0.00277) (0.00297) (0.00172) (0.00216) (0.00228) (0.00199) (0.00271) (0.00187) (0.00170) 
married -0.0256 -0.256* 0.0648 0.00187 0.0456 0.0578 0.0363 0.121* -0.285* 
 (0.157) (0.135) (0.0834) (0.0585) (0.0526) (0.0728) (0.117) (0.0656) (0.161) 
widowed -0.151 -0.338** 0.0982 -0.0514 0.0184 0.0608 -0.0235 0.0588 -0.326** 
 (0.163) (0.142) (0.0860) (0.0510) (0.0416) (0.0741) (0.121) (0.0452) (0.163) 
divorced 0.165 -0.152 0.0288 -0.00120 0.0791 0.0193 0.0874 0.0665 -0.268* 
 (0.217) (0.132) (0.0949) (0.129) (0.121) (0.0786) (0.115) (0.0928) (0.156) 
retired -0.0283 -0.00868 -0.0222 -0.0162 0.0172 -0.00745 0.0181 0.00808 0.00957 
 (0.0254) (0.0190) (0.0148) (0.0209) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0114) 
hhsize -0.00703 -0.0123 0.00394 0.00979 -0.0140 -0.00987 -0.0103 -0.00446 -0.00354 
 (0.0141) (0.0163) (0.0135) (0.0111) (0.00877) (0.0121) (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.00919) 
thinc -0.00484 -0.00648* -0.00512** -0.00486 0.00382 0.000658 -0.00174 0.000731 0.000900 
 (0.00549) (0.00349) (0.00220) (0.00669) (0.00388) (0.00307) (0.00329) (0.000771) (0.000702) 
hrass -0.000263 -0.000153 -0.000397* 0.000150 8.46e-05 -3.66e-05 0.000135 0.000112 3.25e-05 
 (0.000543) (0.000388) (0.000206) (0.000338) (0.000337) (0.000259) (0.000249) (0.000109) (0.000245) 
gali 0.0404* 0.0174 0.0241** 0.0174 0.0202 0.0209 0.0350** -0.00535 0.0395*** 
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 (0.0211) (0.0155) (0.0112) (0.0182) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0164) (0.00991) 
esmoked 0.00117 -0.0465* -0.0209 -0.00762 -0.0198 -0.0422* 0.0161 -0.0136 0.0329** 
 (0.0345) (0.0251) (0.0192) (0.0325) (0.0234) (0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0262) (0.0164) 
phinact 0.0504 -0.00417 0.0152 0.00981 0.00151 0.0333* -0.0103 0.0552* -0.0164 
 (0.0323) (0.0289) (0.0252) (0.0214) (0.0160) (0.0202) (0.0303) (0.0293) (0.0147) 
foodpc 0.0919 0.0962 0.0511 0.192*** -0.0130 0.00269 -0.0208 -0.00615 0.0291 
 (0.0792) (0.0589) (0.0472) (0.0684) (0.0516) (0.0296) (0.0493) (0.0281) (0.0251) 
eurod -0.00832 0.00309 -0.0100*** -0.00494 -0.00273 -0.00828*** -0.00981** -0.0102** -0.00660*** 
 (0.00536) (0.00403) (0.00330) (0.00346) (0.00280) (0.00312) (0.00411) (0.00452) (0.00248) 
goodhealth 0.0303 0.00259 -0.00491 -0.0200 -0.0116 -0.0169 -0.000280 -0.0285 0.0104 
 (0.0236) (0.0169) (0.0132) (0.0185) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0182) (0.0211) (0.0117) 
poorhealth 0.0158 -0.0449* -0.0355 0.0148 -0.00494 -0.00969 0.0377 0.0591* 0.00132 
 (0.0390) (0.0261) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.0198) (0.0213) (0.0291) (0.0337) (0.0212) 
w3 -0.0880 -0.128 0.0427 0.215 -0.136 0.0288 0.112 -0.0605 -0.0178 
 (0.159) (0.101) (0.0842) (0.152) (0.212) (0.0683) (0.0997) (0.117) (0.0518) 
w4 -0.107 -0.232 0.0784 0.320 -0.224 0.00763 0.169 -0.0728 0.00723 
 (0.229) (0.144) (0.120) (0.221) (0.315) (0.0935) (0.145) (0.165) (0.0748) 
w5 -0.145 -0.290 0.0905 0.430 -0.274 -0.0171 0.231 -0.125 0.00266 
 (0.301) (0.189) (0.156) (0.292) (0.419) (0.120) (0.192) (0.215) (0.0984) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. The dependent variable is corrected obesity. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all 
regressions but omitted for brevity. Wave dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Appendix Table 4.2c Marginal effects of all regressors on the probability of being overweight using corrected body weight  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES AUT DEU SWE ESP ITA FRA DNK CHE BEL 
                    
loverweight 0.141*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.132*** 0.114*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0246) (0.0212) (0.0244) (0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0263) (0.0349) (0.0191) 
intoverweight 0.276*** 0.298*** 0.320*** 0.218*** 0.305*** 0.315*** 0.311*** 0.333*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0238) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0181) (0.0220) (0.0255) (0.0349) (0.0190) 
finstress1 -0.0288 0.0414** -0.00553 0.0146 -0.00993 -0.00470 0.0256 -0.0208 -0.00796 
 (0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0179) (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0157) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0112) 
intfinstress1 0.0175 0.0269 -0.00851 0.0187 -0.0456*** 0.0388** 0.0184 0.0843** 0.0152 
 (0.0241) (0.0249) (0.0187) (0.0151) (0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0259) (0.0341) (0.0131) 
age -0.00593 0.0473** 0.00694 -0.0129 -0.00794 -0.00903 0.0183 -0.0281 -0.00859 
 (0.0330) (0.0225) (0.0190) (0.0310) (0.0427) (0.0146) (0.0267) (0.0303) (0.0136) 
female -0.0464* -0.0874*** -0.0403*** -0.0686*** -0.0778*** -0.0628*** -0.0733*** -0.0715*** -0.0621*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0211) (0.0143) (0.0205) (0.0176) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0251) (0.0134) 
yedu -0.00253 -0.00303 -0.00142 -0.00289* -0.00723*** -0.00235 0.00153 -0.00845*** -0.00199 
 (0.00236) (0.00279) (0.00170) (0.00163) (0.00213) (0.00228) (0.00286) (0.00262) (0.00162) 
married 0.00469 0.206 0.0674 -0.0694 -0.0417 0.0485 -0.0634 -0.108 0.121 
 (0.174) (0.147) (0.135) (0.0455) (0.0484) (0.0989) (0.148) (0.0704) (0.207) 
widowed -0.0788 0.243 0.0705 -0.0410 -0.0286 0.0325 -0.0988 -0.121** 0.0377 
 (0.178) (0.151) (0.137) (0.0398) (0.0396) (0.100) (0.150) (0.0562) (0.208) 
divorced 0.0150 0.114 0.0734 -0.0720 -0.0791 0.0319 -0.102 0.0309 0.0421 
 (0.248) (0.166) (0.144) (0.0930) (0.115) (0.115) (0.147) (0.122) (0.204) 
retired -0.0284 0.0223 0.00622 0.0146 0.0285* 0.0282* -0.0262 0.00175 0.0235** 
 (0.0226) (0.0196) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0116) 
hhsize -0.0235* -0.00342 0.00633 0.0139 -0.0216** 0.0111 0.00271 0.00569 -0.00965 
 (0.0121) (0.0154) (0.0132) (0.00907) (0.00852) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.00958) 
thinc 0.00130 0.00462 -0.00222 0.00180 0.00104 -0.00163 0.00122 -0.000266 3.56e-05 
 (0.00506) (0.00317) (0.00235) (0.00530) (0.00346) (0.00314) (0.00372) (0.00108) (0.000746) 
hrass -0.000371 -0.000157 0.000250 5.39e-05 0.000243 -0.000503** -0.000209 -0.000109 -0.000122 
 (0.000461) (0.000380) (0.000197) (0.000272) (0.000308) (0.000249) (0.000259) (0.000127) (0.000248) 
gali 0.0104 -0.0112 0.0262** 0.0262* -0.000386 0.0216 0.0198 0.00355 0.0221** 
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 (0.0195) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0154) (0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0166) (0.0199) (0.00996) 
esmoked 0.00361 -0.0249 -0.00837 0.0284 0.0266 -0.0230 -0.0318 -0.00337 0.0335** 
 (0.0332) (0.0264) (0.0202) (0.0275) (0.0213) (0.0224) (0.0254) (0.0326) (0.0166) 
phinact -0.00426 -0.0573** 0.000215 0.00480 -0.00894 -0.0151 -0.0234 -0.0115 0.00131 
 (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0297) (0.0174) (0.0145) (0.0228) (0.0328) (0.0465) (0.0156) 
foodpc -0.0774 -0.0317 0.0799 0.0258 0.0139 0.0299 -0.0761 -0.0209 0.0486* 
 (0.0679) (0.0587) (0.0514) (0.0555) (0.0472) (0.0308) (0.0554) (0.0337) (0.0258) 
eurod -0.0108** -0.0112*** 0.000210 -0.0109*** 0.00368 -0.00896*** -0.00690 -0.00344 -0.00317 
 (0.00470) (0.00423) (0.00342) (0.00272) (0.00260) (0.00320) (0.00430) (0.00550) (0.00246) 
goodhealth 0.00807 0.00685 0.00949 -0.0137 -0.00937 -0.0118 -0.0128 0.0301 -0.00452 
 (0.0217) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0157) (0.0205) (0.0276) (0.0121) 
poorhealth -0.0421 -0.0275 0.0278 -0.0285 -0.0420** -0.0408* -0.0548* 0.101 -0.0491** 
 (0.0320) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0196) (0.0189) (0.0242) (0.0323) (0.0792) (0.0232) 
w3 -0.00741 -0.192* -0.00403 0.0327 -0.0159 0.0448 -0.0535 0.114 -0.00380 
 (0.146) (0.103) (0.0874) (0.132) (0.175) (0.0740) (0.115) (0.140) (0.0592) 
w4 0.0563 -0.270* -0.0304 0.0656 0.0372 0.0749 -0.117 0.200 0.0341 
 (0.210) (0.145) (0.124) (0.192) (0.259) (0.102) (0.168) (0.199) (0.0855) 
w5 0.0131 -0.385** -0.0649 0.0716 0.0250 0.100 -0.154 0.233 0.0467 
 (0.275) (0.190) (0.162) (0.254) (0.345) (0.131) (0.222) (0.260) (0.113) 
          
Observations 1,532 2,252 3,320 2,876 3,744 2,816 2,500 1,376 5,368 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a RE probit model. The dependent variable is corrected overweight. Initial values of all time-varying variables are included in all 
regressions but omitted for brevity. Wave dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. See Table 4.2 for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.1. Summary of the findings  
This thesis consists of three empirical studies on household finance using micro-level data from 
China and nine EU countries. In particular, I investigate the determinants of financial inclusion 
and the impact of financial inclusion on household consumption in China, the consumption 
responses to health shocks in China, and the association between financial stress and body 
weight in nine EU countries. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing 
empirical evidence on several heated topics.  
In Chapter Two, using the 2013 wave of the China Household Finance Survey which 
consists of 28,100 households from 29 Chinese provinces/municipalities, I study the 
determinants of financial inclusion in China, with focus on the relationship between informal 
and formal finance. Different from Allen et al. (2018) who find informal and formal finance are 
both complements and substitutes at the firm-level, I only find evidence of a negative 
association between the use of informal finance and having bank accounts, credit cards, bank 
loans and the overall financial inclusion among Chinese households. This negative association 
remains significant after I control for the endogeneity of informal finance. Moreover, I find a 
strongly positive association between financial inclusion and household non-durable 
consumption. These findings indicate that enhancing financial inclusion may be a valid tool for 
boosting domestic consumption in China.  
In Chapter Three, using the 2011, 2013 and 2015 waves of the China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study, I investigate the extent to which households’ consumption 
profile changes after health shocks. I find that health shocks are significantly associated with 
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increases in out-of-pocket medical expenditure, but not with other non-medical expenditures. 
The increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditure after health shocks is higher for the urban 
and poorer residents, as well as for respondents living in provinces with a better healthcare 
system. These findings suggest that non-medical consumption is generally insured against 
health shocks in China. 
In Chapter Four, I estimate the association between financial stress and the probability of 
being obese/overweight using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
over the period 2004-2015. After controlling for the state dependence of body weight as well 
as for individual heterogeneity, I find little evidence of such an association in the sampled 
countries. In some countries, the association is statistically significant, but the magnitude of the 
effect is small. I find some evidence for a positive link between financial stress and body weight 
in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France and Switzerland. This link is robust to 
correcting self-reported weight measures in Austria, Germany and Spain, and to using an 
objective financial stress measure in Germany and Spain. I also find that the estimated marginal 
effect of subjective financial stress is more significant and generally larger than that of objective 
financial stress. This indicates that the subjective perception of financial difficulties may be the 
mediator of linking financial stress and body weight. 
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5.2. Policy implications 
This thesis provides the following policy implications. Chapter Two documents a negative 
association between informal finance and financial inclusion among Chinese households. This 
suggests that borrowing through informal sources is a substitute for formal financial services. 
Thus, policies aiming at improving the availability and accessibility of formal financial services 
may reduce the reliance of informal borrowings among Chinese households and ultimately lead 
to higher domestic consumption. In addition, as I find a positive association between financial 
inclusion and household total consumption, policies aiming at improving financial inclusion 
may boost domestic consumption and ultimately stimulate growth in the Chinese economy.  
In Chapter Three, I find health shocks are associated with an 8.1-19.1 percent increase in 
OOP medical expenditure for Chinese individuals aged 45 and over. In addition, I do not find 
evidence for associations between health shocks and non-medical expenditure. This finding 
may be the result from underutilisation of healthcare services. In particular, individuals living 
in rural areas and/or provinces with an underdeveloped healthcare system are more likely to 
underutilise healthcare services. To eliminate inequality in healthcare utilisation, policy makers 
should deepen the coverage of public health insurance schemes and make medical services 
more affordable for the disadvantaged groups such as the poor, residents living in rural areas 
and in provinces with a less developed healthcare system. In addition, further improvements of 
healthcare facilities in underdeveloped provinces will also improve healthcare equality in 
China and boost the usage of healthcare services for those disadvantaged group. 
In Chapter Four, I find some evidence for a positive link between financial stress and 
body weight in Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France and Switzerland. This link is 
robust to correcting self-reported weight measures in Austria, Germany and Spain, and to using 
an alternative financial stress measure in Germany and Spain. In addition, I find that, compared 
  
229 
 
to objective financial stress, subjective financial stress is more likely to be significantly 
associated with a higher probability of being obese/overweight. These findings suggest that 
policies targeted at improving citizens’ financial stress coping strategies and confidence in 
managing financial stress may contribute to lowering the incidence of obesity in Europe 
especially in Germany and Spain. 
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5.3. Suggestions for future research 
Regarding Chapter Two, further research could look into instrumenting the potentially 
endogenous household income /wealth. This issue could be solved once community level data 
and/or more waves of CHFS become available. Furthermore, as only associations are identified 
due to the cross-sectional data structure, future research could look into establishing causal 
relationships. In addition, it is worth studying the depth of using financial services other than 
the simple coverage of these financials services.  
In Chapter Three, I only investigate the immediate change of household consumption 
because the longitudinal data I use only consists of three waves. Future research could focus on 
estimating the longer-run effect of health shocks. This could be done by estimating a dynamic 
model after more follow-up waves of CHARLS are published. Additionally, future research 
could study households’ coping strategies following health shocks, such as dissaving, formal 
and informal borrowing, selling assets, and family transfers. This could help us understand why 
households’ expenditure on non-medical items remains unchanged after a health shock despite 
the wide but shallow coverage of public health insurance schemes in China.  
In Chapter Four, the country level differences in finance-weight nexus are presented but 
I could not provide readers with sufficient explanations for the differences. Hence, future work 
should be directed to interpreting differences among sampled countries, and in particular in 
understanding why the association between financial stress and body weight is significant in 
some countries but not in others. In addition, the present study only looks at nine EU countries 
due to the fact that only these nine countries can be tracked from the initial wave to the recent 
wave of SHARE. Future research could incorporate more countries in the analysis once the 
longitudinal structure of SHARE is further extended. Finally, for the countries where a 
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significant association between financial stress and body weight is established, investigations 
on possible mediators or moderators of such a relationship could be conducted in the future.  
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